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Abstract
This thesis studies the interaction between the financial sector and the real economy.
Chapter 1 analyzes how lending cuts by banks affect firms. I identify an exogenous
lending cut by a large German bank and examine the growth of firms and counties
dependent on this bank. Firms directly exposed to reduced bank lending grew more
slowly. On average, firms suffered when many other firms in their county experi-
enced decreased bank lending, because of lower aggregate demand and agglomeration
spillovers. The effects of the lending cut persisted after lending had resumed. Innova-
tion and productivity fell, consistent with the persistent effects.
Chapter 2 investigates the effect of house prices on household borrowing using ad-
ministrative mortgage data from the UK. The chapter develops an empirical approach
that exploits individual house price variation coming from the timing of refinancing
events around the Great Recession. There is a clear and robust effect of house prices
on borrowing. The effect can largely be explained by households using the value of
their house as collateral.
Chapter 3 focuses on financial institutions. How changes in bank size affect the real
economy is an important question in the design of financial regulation. This chapter
studies a natural experiment from postwar West Germany. Reforms by the Allied
occupiers led to increases in the size of a number of banks. I estimate the effect of
increased bank size on the growth of firms. The results suggest that firms did not
benefit when their banks became larger. The findings are inconsistent with theories
that argue the real economy benefits from increases in bank size. There is evidence
that big banks are worse at processing soft information and take more risks. Big banks
receive more mentions in the media, which could be an incentive for banks to become
big.
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Chapter 1
Disentangling the Effects of a Banking
Crisis: Evidence from German Firms
and Counties
1.1 Introduction
The Great Recession followed a common pattern in many developed economies. There
was a systemic banking crisis in the years 2008/09, during which bank lending fell.
Subsequently, there were two years of negative output growth and a slow recovery,
during which output failed to return to its pre-crisis trend. This persistence is unusual
in the postwar history of developed economies (Friedman 1993). Is there a causal link
between the reduction in bank lending and this growth pattern? Do bank lending cuts
lead to deep and persistent recessions?
Motivated by these questions, this paper delivers causal evidence on the effects of
bank lending on the real economy. I analyze a lending cut by Commerzbank, a large
German bank. During the financial crisis, Commerzbank suffered significant losses on
its international trading book. These losses were unrelated to its domestic loan portfo-
lio, but forced it to reduce its loan supply to German borrowers. I study the effects of
the lending cut using variation across German counties and firms in their dependence
on Commerzbank.1 The analysis produces two main findings. First, the lending cut did
not only reduce the growth of firms that directly relied on Commerzbank’s loan sup-
ply. There were also significant indirect effects on firms with undisturbed loan supply,
through reductions in local aggregate demand and agglomeration spillovers. The sec-
ond main finding is that the lending cut had persistent effects. Output and employment
remained low even after lending had normalized.
By focusing on an imported lending cut, I address the key identification challenge
1Commerzbank refers to all branches that were part of the Commerzbank network in 2009, including
Dresdner Bank.
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that plagues the literature on financial frictions: the reverse causality between the
health of the banking sector and economic growth. Unlike most developed economies,
Germany experienced no house price boom or decline, no endogenous banking panic,
relatively little uncertainty, and no sovereign debt crisis before or during the Great
Recession. Therefore, the lending cut by Commerzbank provides a suitable natural
experiment to disentangle the causal effects of bank lending. To verify my empirical
strategy, I show that firms with a pre-crisis relationship to Commerzbank held less bank
debt after the lending cut. In a survey, these firms reported restrictive bank loan sup-
ply in 2009 and 2010, but not in any year before or after Commerzbank’s lending cut.
An important contribution by Peek and Rosengren (2000) similarly uses an imported
lending cut to isolate an exogenous loan supply shock.
A second identification challenge arises from the possibility that unobserved
shocks affected counties dependent on Commerzbank at the same time as Com-
merzbank’s lending cut. To address this possibility, I construct an instrumental variable
(IV) for county Commerzbank dependence. The instrument is based on the enforced
breakup of Commerzbank by the Allies after World War II, which led Commerzbank to
set up three separate, temporary head offices, in Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, and Hamburg.
The data show that Commerzbank expanded its branch network around its temporary
head offices while it was broken up. The association between distance to these cities
and Commerzbank dependence has survived until today. I can thus use a county’s dis-
tance to the closest postwar head office as an instrument for Commerzbank dependence
before the lending cut.
The first set of results shows that the lending cut had real effects on firms. Follow-
ing the lending cut, firms dependent on Commerzbank reduced their capital stock and
employment, relative to similar firms located in the same county, but with no pre-crisis
Commerzbank relationship. Employment at a firm fully dependent on Commerzbank
was on average 5.3 percent lower than at a firm with no Commerzbank relationship. I
call these firm-level responses the direct effects of the lending cut, because they were
driven by firms’ immediate financial connections to Commerzbank. They are a partial
equilibrium response, keeping constant other aggregate factors that affected firms in-
dependently of their banking relationships. The findings on the direct effects confirm
the results of Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisbenner (2012) and Chodorow-
Reich (2014a).2 I estimate effects of similar magnitude to the existing literature, which
suggests that Commerzbank’s lending cut has external relevance to the United States
and other countries.
An important question is whether banking shocks affect growth at higher levels of
2Gan (2007); Khwaja and Mian (2008); Amiti and Weinstein (2011a); Schnabl (2012); Paravisini,
Rappoport, Schnabl, and Wolfenzon (2015); Garicano and Steinwender (2016); Cingano, Manaresi, and
Sette (2016a); Bentolila, Jansen, Jiménez, and Ruano (forthcoming) present further evidence.
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economic aggregation. I test the effect on counties. I construct a measure of county
Commerzbank dependence based on the average exposure to Commerzbank of firms
in the county. The results show that GDP and employment in counties dependent
on Commerzbank fell after the lending cut. A standard deviation increase in Com-
merzbank dependence lowered county employment after the lending cut by an average
of 0.8 percent in the ordinary least squares (OLS specification and 1.3 percent in the IV
specification. The IV point estimates, based on the distance instrument, imply larger
effects than the OLS estimates, but are not statistically different. This suggest that
unobserved, negative shocks cannot explain the OLS results. By conditioning on the
linear distance to each of the postwar head offices in all IV specifications, I control
for spurious correlations between growth after the lending cut and factors associated
with proximity to one of the cities. This means the identification is solely driven by
the distance to the closest postwar Commerzbank head office, rather than the distance
to one particular city.
Having established there are real effects on firms and counties, I discuss two as-
pects of the results in more detail: indirect effects and persistence. The first aspect
relates to the difference in magnitude between the firm and county effects. Two types
of firm-level effects determine the response of county aggregates. The first are the di-
rect, partial equilibrium effects. In addition, there are indirect effects of the lending
cut. These impact firms independently of their direct financial connections to Com-
merzbank. They arise when the aggregate economic environment of a county responds
to the lending cut. For example, if directly affected firms reduce employment, the
consumption of households falls, lowering aggregate demand in the county. Further-
more, a fall in the innovation activities of directly affected firms reduces agglomeration
spillovers to neighboring firms.
I investigate whether significant indirect effects of the lending cut affected the
county response. Specifically, I estimate the effect on firms of increasing the Com-
merzbank dependence of other firms in the county, while keeping constant the firms’
direct exposure to Commerzbank. The results show negative and sizable indirect ef-
fects on producers of non-tradables and firms with high innovation activities. The data
reject the hypothesis that in a county fully dependent on Commerzbank these indirect
effects were smaller than the direct effect on a firm that borrowed only from Com-
merzbank. There is no evidence for an indirect effect on tradables producers with
low innovation activities. This pattern of heterogeneity suggests that reduced county
aggregate demand and lower agglomeration spillovers in high-innovation industries
generated the indirect effects. Migration and household debt were not affected, so they
cannot explain the indirect effects.
The second aspect I discuss is that the effects on both firms and counties were per-
sistent. The causal effects resemble the growth pattern of developed economies during
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and after the Great Recession. During the years of the lending cut, growth was sig-
nificantly lower. In the subsequent two years, affected firms and counties remained
on a lower, roughly parallel trend, without any sign of convergence to the level of
unaffected firms and counties. This implies that a temporary bank lending cut can per-
sistently keep output and employment low even after bank loan supply has normalized.
The dynamics of the estimated effects suggest that the bank lending cuts during the fi-
nancial crisis of 2008/09 may have contributed to the sluggish recovery from the Great
Recession, even though the banking sector had stabilized by 2010 (Hall 2010).
Persistent effects are not generally a response to shocks. For example, I show that
firms and counties exposed to lower export demand during the Great Recession recov-
ered to the level of unaffected firms and counties in under two years. Neoclassical
growth theory similarly implies that once credit markets have stabilized, the economy
should converge back to its pre-crisis trend (Fernald and Jones 2014). A decrease in in-
novation and productivity, however, could explain the persistent effects. Indeed, firms
reduced innovation activities, proxied by patenting, when they were directly affected
by Commerzbank’s lending cut. A back-of-the envelope growth accounting exercise
suggests that county total factor productivity fell, implying that productivity losses
may have played a role in generating the persistence.
Influential contributions by Bernanke (1983) and Bernanke and Blinder (1992) ar-
gue that banking shocks affect the real economy. A number of more recent empirical
studies document that banking crises have been correlated with deep and persistent
recessions (Cerra and Saxena 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009; Schularick and Taylor
2012; Giesecke, Longstaff, Schaefer, and Strebulaev 2014; Krishnamurthy and Muir
2017). But there is ambiguous causal evidence on the effects at levels of aggregation
higher than the firm-level. Peek and Rosengren (2000), Calomiris and Mason (2003),
Ashcraft (2005), Benmelech, Bergman, and Seru (2011), and Mondragon (2015) find
that banking shocks in the United States strongly reduce local economic activity. On
the other hand, Driscoll (2004), Ashcraft (2006), and Greenstone, Mas, and Nguyen
(2014) report no or only small effects. Mian and Sufi (2014b) argue that business fi-
nancing was not an important problem in the United States during the Great Recession.
In contrast, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (2015) and Beraja, Hurst, and Os-
pina (2015) calibrate models that show supply-side shocks, such as financial frictions,
best account for the growth pattern. In the German setting, Dwenger, Fossen, and
Simmler (2015), Hochfellner, Montes, Schmalz, and Sosyura (2015), and Popov and
Rocholl (2015) argue that banking shocks have real effects.
Ashcraft (2005) speculates that a reason for the different findings may be that small,
regional differences in exposure to bank shocks are not informative about the conse-
quences of a large, systemic lending cut. An advantage of studying Commerzbank’s
lending cut is that the variation across counties in exposure to Commerzbank is large
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and uncorrelated with other contemporaneous shocks. In line with Romer and Romer
(2017), the results show that going beyond binary measures of financial distress helps
to identify the real effects of financial shocks.
I contribute to the literature by clearly differentiating between the contemporane-
ous effects of a lending cut and the effects after lending has stabilized. I present evi-
dence that productivity is affected. Furthermore, the existing literature has had to rely
on strong assumptions about the indirect effects. The findings of large indirect effects
are of interest to researchers studying the aggregate implications of a range of shocks,
not just banking crises. It is a general problem in empirical work that well-identified,
partial equilibrium effects may not be informative about the aggregate implications
of a given shock (Acemoglu 2010). While the effects I estimate do not easily aggre-
gate into national effects (Nakamura and Steinsson 2014; Beraja, Hurst, and Ospina
2015; Chodorow-Reich 2017), the combination of firm and county data is sufficient to
establish the two main findings of indirect county-level effects and persistence.
This paper also adds to the literature on the importance of a single firm, in this
case a bank, in shaping macroeconomic outcomes. Models by Gabaix (2011) and
Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012) illustrate how idiosyncratic
firm-level shocks may translate into large aggregate fluctuations. I show empirically
that lending by a single financial institution can persistently affect regional output and
employment, consistent with Amiti and Weinstein (forthcoming).
The paper proceeds in the following section by explaining the identification strat-
egy and the institutional background. I describe the data in Section 1.3, including a
new dataset on the relationship banks of German firms. Section 1.4 verifies my identi-
fication strategy, by showing that firms dependent on Commerzbank reported restricted
loan supply and held less bank debt after Commerzbank’s lending cut. Section 1.5 re-
ports the firm-level results on the direct effect and Section 1.6 performs the county
analysis. Section 1.7 discusses the evidence for the indirect effects and the persistent
losses. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Identification and Institutional Background
1.2.1 Identification Strategy
This paper aims to estimate the causal effects of exposure to a bank lending cut. There
are two well-known identification challenges. The first is reverse causality. A negative,
exogenous shock to firms harms their lenders, for example because some firms default
on loans. Therefore, banks may experience financial distress and cut lending because
of the performance of their borrowers. The second identification challenge is that an
omitted variable may simultaneously affect both the outcome and bank loan supply.
For example, an expected reduction in regional growth would induce local firms to
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reduce employment and banks to cut lending to that region. Both these endogeneity
concerns would lead to spurious correlations between lending cut exposure and firm
growth, even if the true causal effect of a lending cut was zero.
I overcome the identification challenges by using the Commerzbank dependence
of German firms and counties as proxy for their exposure to Commerzbank’s lending
cut. Frictions on credit markets mean that firms depend on the loan supply of their
relationship banks (Sharpe 1990a). Firms and counties, for which Commerzbank was
an important relationship bank, were therefore more exposed to the lending cut.
A lending cut can affect firms through multiple channels. It can reduce access to
bank loans, affect the interest rate on loans and deposits, reduce the length of loans,
and increase uncertainty regarding future credit access. Using just one of these vari-
ables as regressor would overestimate the effect of this particular variable. Identifying
the causal impact of each channel would require one separate instrument per channel
(Chodorow-Reich 2014a). I do not pursue such approaches here. Instead, I estimate the
reduced-form impact, where Commerzbank dependence serves as proxy for exposure
to a lending cut. This strategy overcomes the problem of reverse causality because
Commerzbank’s lending cut was exogenous to the performance of its German loan
portfolio, as shown in the next Section 1.2.2. To address possible bias due to omit-
ted unobservable variables at the regional level, I propose an instrument for county
Commerzbank dependence in the subsequent Section 1.2.3.
1.2.2 The Origin of Commerzbank’s Lending Cut
This section argues that Commerzbank’s lending cut during the financial crisis of
2008/09 was an exogenous shock to its German borrowers. Commerzbank was respon-
sible for around 9 percent of total bank lending to German non-financial customers in
2006. Its lending stock developed in parallel to that of the other banks until 2007, as
shown in Figure 5.1. In 2008 and 2009, lending by Commerzbank fell sharply. Sub-
sequently, it returned to a parallel trend relative to its peer group of other commercial
banks.3
Why did lending decrease? Commerzbank is a universal bank, which means it
earns both interest income from lending and non-interest income from trading and
investing in international financial markets. During the financial crisis, Commerzbank
suffered significant losses and write-downs on its trading portfolio. The trading losses
led to a fall in Commerzbank’s equity capital in every year between 2007 and 2009,
decreasing it by 68 percent during this period. Commerzbank responded by cutting its
3There are three types of banks in Germany: commercial banks, cooperative credit unions, and
public banks (Landesbanken and savings banks). The cooperatives and public banks have a political
and social mandate to upkeep lending, unlike the commercial banks. 6.5 and 6.6 explain why trading
losses at other German banks did not have real economic consequences, discussing papers by Dwenger,
Fossen, and Simmler (2015) and Popov and Rocholl (2015).
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loan supply to the German economy for two reasons. First, the Basel II regulations
require a bank to hold at least 4 percent of its risk-weighted assets in equity. When
equity falls, banks have to reduce assets (and start raising new equity). Second, the
equity losses raised Commerzbank’s cost of external funds, so it needed to lower risk
exposure to be able to access funding markets.
The changes in Commerzbank’s equity capital were entirely driven by write-downs
on financial instruments and profits, as shown in the left panel of Figure 5.2. Write-
downs on financial instruments included, for example, changes in the valuation of
derivatives the bank held, and were unconnected to the firm and household loan port-
folio. The change in profits was also unrelated to firms and households. The right
panel of Figure 5.2 illustrates that trading and investment income was entirely respon-
sible for the negative profits. Interest income, on the other hand, which includes what
Commerzbank earns from lending to firms and households, remained on an upward
trend up to 2009.
The trading losses were due to Commerzbank’s investments in asset-backed se-
curities related to the United States subprime mortgage market and its exposure to
the insolvencies of Lehman Brothers and the large Icelandic banks. In 2008, Com-
merzbank had wrongly forecast the duration of the financial crisis and the likelihood of
institutional failures. Commerzbank head Martin Blessing admitted that his bank had
reduced its exposure to asset-backed securities too late and had believed that the United
States government would not let Lehman Brothers fail. In comparison, Deutsche Bank
avoided damage by hedging against a persistent drop in the United States housing mar-
ket early on. Overall, the evidence shows that reverse causality is not a concern when
I analyze the effects of Commerzbank’s lending cut.
A more detailed analysis of Commerzbank’s trading and loan portfolios is in 6.2.
This analysis draws on 110 financial analyst research reports and a number of bank
financial statements. The reports confirm that Commerzbank’s loan portfolio was not
riskier than other German banks’. In fact, the reports interpret Commerzbank’s sta-
ble relationships to German firms as a source of strength. Its loan and trading di-
visions operated fairly independently, with no cross-divisional hedging relationship.
While Commerzbank’s international trading portfolio suffered losses, German bond
markets remained stable and did not affect the health of Commerzbank and other Ger-
man banks. Commerzbank’s 2009 acquisition of Dresdner Bank was agreed before
both banks suffered the severe trading losses. Both banks followed a similar trading
strategy and contributed approximately evenly to the trading losses of the joint institu-
tion. Hence, the estimated effects of the lending cut are not different for customers of
the old Dresdner Bank. The analyst reports agree that Commerzbank had stabilized by
2011. It had refocused its operations on lending to German customers and had repaid
the majority of the government support extended during the crisis.
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1.2.3 An Instrument for County Commerzbank Dependence
The second identification concern is that unobserved shocks affected counties depen-
dent on Commerzbank at the same time as the lending cut. To investigate this possi-
bility, I propose an instrument for county Commerzbank dependence. The instrument
isolates the effect of Commerzbank dependence from other unobservable determinants
of county growth. It is the county’s distance to the closest of three temporary, post-
World War II head offices of Commerzbank. After World War II, the Americans were
convinced that the Nazi government’s ability to wage war effectively stemmed from
the Third Reich’s economic centralization. From 1948 to 1957, they forced three large
German banks to break up into separate entities in mandated banking zones. During
this period, Commerzbank and (and its 2009 acquisition Dresdner Bank) had three
separate head offices in Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, and Hamburg.
These cities were chosen due to a combination of historic accident and power strug-
gles among the Allies, rather than the bank’s business considerations. In the first bank-
ing zone, North-Rhine Westphalia, the British declared Düsseldorf as the state capital,
because it was the only city with a large building that had survived the war (Düwell
2006). The banks followed the political power and settled there. In the second, North-
ern zone, the British ordered the surviving and non-imprisoned bank board members
to set up a central head office in Hamburg. Frankfurt was chosen as head office for the
Southern zone because the Americans had placed the new central bank there. At the
time, Frankfurt was far from its current role as Germany’s financial center, but it was
chosen for its central location (Horstmann 1991).
The literature has established that banks prefer to form relationships with geo-
graphically close customers (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004; Degryse and On-
gena 2005a). Indeed, in the years after the breakup, Commerzbank was significantly
more likely to establish a new branch in counties close to its temporary head offices,
as shown in Appendix Table 6.1. The association between county Commerzbank de-
pendence and distance to a postwar head office has survived until today, allowing me
to construct a distance instrument based on how far a county is located from the post-
war head offices. This distance instrument is calculated as the minimum of the linear
(geodesic) distances to Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, and Hamburg. None of the three linear
distances is perfectly correlated with the distance instrument. That means I can control
for each of the linear distances to Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, and Hamburg in the IV speci-
fications. In addition, I control for the linear distances to Berlin and Dresden, because
historic, pre-war head offices of Commerzbank were located there.
Controlling for the linear distances is a crucial aspect of my IV strategy. It ad-
dresses the concern that the instrument may simply pick up spurious factors that are
correlated with proximity to one of the postwar head offices. For example, professional
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services (such as legal, accounting, consulting, and advertising firms) experience cycli-
cal demand fluctuations and are clustered around Düsseldorf. One may worry that the
demand shock to this industry during the Great Recession, rather than Commerzbank’s
lending cut, drives the results. By controlling for the linear distance to Düsseldorf, I
statistically remove the correlation between industry concentration around Düsseldorf
and growth after the lending cut. The identification is solely driven by the distance to
the closest postwar Commerzbank head office, rather than the factors associated with
proximity to one of the cities.
1.3 Data
This paper uses five datasets: a firm panel, a firm employment cross-section, a firm
survey, a county panel, and a household panel. The firm panel is based on balance sheet
data from the database Dafne by Bureau van Dijk. It contains firms with non-missing
data from 2007 to 2012 for the following variables: employment, wage bill, bank loans,
value added, production capital (fixed tangible assets), and capital depreciation. Dafne
reports the firms’ industry, foundation year, the export share (fraction of exports out
of total revenue), and the import share (fraction of imports out of total costs). From
the database Orbis, I match information on the firms’ patents. To construct the firm
employment cross-section, I extract data from Dafne for all firms, for which I can
calculate the employment change from 2008 to 2012.
The firm survey is the Business Expectations Panel of the ifo Institute. The sample
includes all firms that responded to the following two questions in 2006 and 2009:
“How do you evaluate the current willingness of banks to grant loans to businesses:
cooperative, normal, or restrictive?” and “Are your business activities constrained by
low demand or too few orders: yes or no?”
I obtain proprietary data from the year 2006 on the names of the relationship banks
(Hausbanken) of 112,344 German firms, recorded by the credit rating agency Cred-
itreform. The agency collects information on the relationship banks from firm surveys
and financial statements. In all three firm datasets, I link firms to their banks in 2006
using a unique firm identifier (Crefonummer). The pre-crisis timing avoids endogene-
ity from weak banks getting matched with weak firms during the Great Recession. I
drop firms in the financial and public sectors. This leaves 2,011 matched firms in the
panel, 48,101 in the employment cross-section, and 1,032 in the survey. I construct a
variable to measure a firm’s dependence on Commerzbank in 2006, called CB dep f c
for firm f in county c. It equals the fraction of the firm’s relationship banks that were
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Commerzbank branches out of the firm’s total number of relationship banks:
CB dep f c =
number o f relationship banks that are Commerzbank branches f c
total number o f relationship banks f c
.
(1.1)
I additionally construct a county panel dataset from 2000 to 2012. It contains data
on GDP, employment, and migration from the German Statistical Federal Office. A
variable called county Commerzbank dependence (CB depc for county c) measures
the average value of firm Commerzbank dependence for firms with their head office in
the county, using all 112,344 firms in the dataset of relationship banks. For each firm,
I additionally construct a variable CB dep f c that measures the average Commerzbank
dependence of all the other firms in the county, from the point of view of an individual
firm (leave-out mean). I calculate the distance measures for the IV specifications us-
ing the average geodesic distance between firms in the county and the location of the
former Commerzbank head offices.
The household panel I analyze is the nationally representative German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP). In 2002, 2007, and 2012 individuals reported the value
of their outstanding debt. Every year they also reported a binary variable for whether
they had any outstanding debt.
In some specifications in the paper, the outcome variable is the symmetric growth
rate, a second-order approximation to the ln growth rate. This measure is bounded
in the interval [-2,2]. It has become standard in the establishment-level literature be-
cause it naturally accommodates zeros in the outcome variable, for example due to
zero household debt or firm exit (Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh 1998a).4
Table 5.1 summarizes the firm panel. Firms have an average of 3 relationship
banks. German firms traditionally form close and durable ties to their relationship
banks. Dwenger, Fossen, and Simmler (2015) report that only 1.7 percent of firms find
a new relationship bank per year. There is no information in my data on what services
exactly a firm receives from a particular bank. In a separate survey, Elsas (2005a)
finds that relationship banks mostly finance bank loans, both long- and short-term, and
provide payment transactions. A histogram of firm Commerzbank dependence is in the
left panel of Figure 5.3. Just under half of firms have a Commerzbank branch among
their relationship banks. The average value of firm Commerzbank dependence is 0.16.
To test whether firms borrowing from Commerzbank differ from other firms, I
regress firm Commerzbank dependence on observables from the year 2006 using the
firm panel. There is no evidence for an economically significant correlation between
4The formal definition of the symmetric growth of y between t-1 and t is: gy = 2 · (yt−yt−1)(yt+yt−1) . The firm
panel contains some insolvencies, but no cases of zero employment, because the German insolvency
process takes long. The employment cross-section contains some cases of zero employment in 2012,
because it includes more small firms, which have faster insolvency processes.
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Commerzbank dependence and any of the firm characteristics, controlling for county
and industry. An analysis of firm summary statistics by bins of Commerzbank depen-
dence is in 6.1.
In general, my firm datasets underweight small firms and the service sector relative
to the population. In the population, 98 percent of firms have under fifty employees
and 60 percent are in the service sector (as defined by the Statistical Federal Office).
In the employment cross-section, 72 percent of firms have fewer than 50 employees
and 53 percent are in the service sector. The selection into the firm panel requires that
Dafne reports balance sheet variables for every year. This leaves, on average, larger
firms (15 percent under 50 employees) and fewer in the service sector (48 percent) in
the firm panel. Importantly, the results in the two datasets turn out to be similar and
there is no heterogeneity in the effects by firm size or sector.
County summary statistics are in Table 5.2. The mean population of a county
in 2000 was 203,280 and mean county Commerzbank dependence is 0.12. There is
significant variation in county Commerzbank dependence, as shown in the right panel
of Figure 5.3 and in the map in Appendix Figure 6.1.
1.4 The Effect of the Lending Cut on Bank Debt
This section contains the first step of the empirical analysis. It verifies my empirical
strategy by showing that Commerzbank’s lending cut reduced the bank loan supply
of firms. Hence, Commerzbank dependence is a valid proxy for firms’ exposure to a
lending cut. I find no effect on household debt and explain why.
1.4.1 Firm Survey Evidence on Commerzbank’s Lending Cut
I examine whether firms dependent on Commerzbank perceived their banks to lend
more restrictively. The results are in Table 5.3. The outcome variable is the answer to
the question: “How do you evaluate the current willingness of banks to grant loans to
businesses: cooperative, normal, or restrictive?” All the specifications control for firm
industry, federal state, size, and age. A lagged dependent variable from 2006 accounts
for pre-existing, time-invariant differences in bank loan supply.
The coefficient on firm Commerzbank dependence in column (3) has the interpre-
tation that in 2009 a firm fully dependent on Commerzbank perceived its banks to
be 0.47 standard deviations less willing to grant loans, compared to a firm with no
Commerzbank relationship. The estimate is statistically significant at the 1 percent
level. The effect remained significant in 2010, as Commerzbank continued its lending
cut. There was no association between Commerzbank dependence and perceived bank
loan supply in 2007 and 2008, indicating the absence of a pre-trend. Commerzbank
repaid most of the government equity in 2011 and refocused its operations on the core
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business of lending. Accordingly, the negative effect of Commerzbank dependence
disappeared in 2011 and turned positive in 2012. This is in line with Figure 5.1, which
shows Commerzbank’s lending stock returning to the same trend as the other commer-
cial banks from 2011 onward. The lending cut only led to temporary credit constraints.
There was no difference in the perceived level of demand between firms dependent
on Commerzbank and other firms in any year (6.3). This shows worse demand shocks
cannot explain the reduction in loan supply.
1.4.2 The Effect of Commerzbank’s Lending Cut on Firms’ Bank Debt
Having established that firms dependent on Commerzbank reported reduced loan sup-
ply, I test whether the lending cut actually reduced bank debt. The outcome is the
natural logarithm of firm bank loans. I run specifications using the firm panel dataset,
including year and firm fixed effects. Table 5.4 presents the results. The regressor of
interest is firm Commerzbank dependence interacted with d, a dummy for the years
following the lending cut, 2009 to 2012.
The point estimate in column (1) indicates that firms dependent on Commerzbank
held less bank debt after the lending cut, but the effect is imprecisely estimated. Col-
umn (2) controls for firm county, age, and size, while column (3) additionally condi-
tions on industry and the export and import shares. These control variables improve the
precision of the estimates. The coefficient in column (3) is statistically different from
zero at the 1 percent level. It implies that a firm fully dependent on Commerzbank held
20.5 percent less bank debt in the years following the lending cut. This is similar to the
decline in Commerzbank’s aggregate lending stock by 17 percent during that period,
compared to the other German banks (Figure 5.1).5
These results imply that Commerzbank dependence is a valid proxy for exposure
to Commerzbank’s lending cut. Firms dependent on Commerzbank were unable to
substitute other lenders for Commerzbank. This was the case even though all firms
were located in regions where other healthy lenders operated, as county Commerzbank
dependence ranged from 1 to 31 percent. The results therefore suggest an important
role for credit market frictions even in the presence of alternative healthy lenders.
1.4.3 The Effect of Commerzbank’s Lending Cut on Household Debt
I investigate whether Commerzbank’s lending cut also affected households’ access to
bank loans. 32 percent of Commerzbank’s interest income in 2006 stemmed from
5There was no heterogeneity in the size of the lending cut by characteristics such as firm produc-
tivity, firm size, county Commerzbank dependence, or county economic growth (Appendix Figure 6.2).
This suggests that Commerzbank did not cut lending disproportionately to firms with weaker growth
prospects. Heterogeneity in the lending cut would not affect my identification strategy, since I use
predetermined Commerzbank dependence as proxy for lending cut exposure.
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households. Table 5.5 analyzes the household panel GSOEP. The outcome in the
first three columns is the symmetric growth rate of debt. The effect of county Com-
merzbank dependence is small and statistically insignificant in all specifications. The
estimate in column (2) controls for county characteristics and predetermined individ-
ual debt holdings. It implies that households in a county entirely dependent on Com-
merzbank experienced an increase in their growth rate of debt between 2007 and 2012
by 0.7 percentage points. Adding individual control variables in column (3) raises the
coefficient, but it remains insignificant. The outcomes in columns (4) to (8) are dum-
mies for whether an individual has any outstanding debt in the given year. There is no
significant effect of county Commerzbank dependence in any year between 2008 and
2012.
These results can be explained by features of the German financial system that fa-
cilitate bank-switching for households. For example, the government-owned develop-
ment bank KfW co-finances nationally standardized mortgage contracts in cooperation
with private and public banks. This is important because mortgage debt comprised
91 percent of German household debt. Households can apply for these mortgages
through any bank, regardless of whether they have a pre-existing relationship bank
or not. KfW raised its mortgage commitments to households by 26.5 percent during
the crisis. Aggregate lending to private customers by commercial banks actually rose
slightly between 2007 and 2010, which suggests that other commercial banks were
able to compensate households for Commerzbank’s lending cut. In contrast, aggregate
lending to corporate borrowers by commercial banks fell, which implies firms were
not able to turn to other lenders. Consistent with these findings, a recent paper by
Jensen and Johannesen (2017) shows that when bank-switching costs are low, there is
no effect of lending cuts by individual banks on household debt.
1.5 The Direct Effect on Firms
Having established that Commerzbank dependence is a valid proxy for firm exposure
to Commerzbank’s lending cut, I proceed to estimating the real effects of the lend-
ing cut on firms. This section focuses on the direct effect, which is driven by firm’s
immediate financial connections to banks that cut lending. The effect operates in-
dependently of the economic environment the firm faces. That means it is a partial
equilibrium response, identified by comparing two similar firms affected by the same
aggregate shocks. The direct effect has been the focus of the firm-level literature, for
example Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisbenner (2012) and Chodorow-Reich
(2014a).
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1.5.1 Firm Specification
I use the firm panel to estimate equation 1.2, for firm f in county c at time t. β is the
direct effect. dpostt is a dummy for the years following the lending cut, 2009 to 2012:
y f ct = ζ +βCB dep f c ∗dpostt +κc ∗dpostt +Γ′X f c ∗dpostt + γ f c+λt + ε f ct . (1.2)
The specification includes county fixed effects interacted with the post-lending cut
dummy, κc ∗ dpostt . This is an important step in isolating the direct effect. It keeps
constant any county-specific shocks associated with the Commerzbank dependence of
other firms in the county. Firm fixed effects γ f c account for time-invariant, firm-specific
differences in the outcome. Year fixed effects λt control for changes in the outcome
that are common to all firms in a year, for example due to macroeconomic fluctuations.
X f c is a vector of further control variables, listed in Table 5.6. The standard errors are
two-way clustered at the level of the county and the industry.
The identifying assumption in this section is that there were no unobservable
shocks within counties correlated with firm Commerzbank dependence. The evidence
supports this assumption. Figure 5.4 shows that firms with and without a relationship
to Commerzbank followed parallel employment trends before the lending cut. The
firm panel shows no strong correlation between Commerzbank dependence and firm
observables in 2006 (6.1). There was no effect of Commerzbank dependence on per-
ceived product demand in any year before the lending cut, and an effect on perceived
credit constraints only during the lending cut (6.3).
1.5.2 Firm Results
Table 5.6 reports the main result of this section in column (3). The point estimate
implies that, following the lending cut, employment at a firm fully dependent on Com-
merzbank was on average 5.3 percent lower than at a firm with no Commerzbank
relationship. The modest impact of the control variables across the first three columns
of Table 5.6 strengthens the argument that Commerzbank dependence was not sig-
nificantly correlated with other determinants of firm growth. The existing literature
estimates direct effects of a similar magnitude, suggesting that Commerzbank’s lend-
ing cut has external relevance. For instance, Chodorow-Reich (2014a) for the United
States and Bentolila, Jansen, Jiménez, and Ruano (forthcoming) for Spain find that
firms connected to distressed banks reduced employment growth by 4 to 5 percentage
points.
The remaining results in Table 5.6 support the view that reduced bank loan supply
was responsible for the effect of Commerzbank dependence, rather than unobserved
shocks hitting all firms dependent on Commerzbank. Column (4) reports no statisti-
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cally significant effect on firms with a low share of bank loans out of total debt. The
effect on bank-dependent firms is strong. Column (5) shows there is no effect on firms
with Commerzbank dependence greater than 0 and up to one-quarter. These firms
had a relatively large number of other relationship banks that could step in after Com-
merzbank cut lending. The effect is strongest for firms with Commerzbank dependence
over one-half, which had few alternative options to access bank loans.6
Table 5.7 analyzes other outcomes and thereby sheds light on how firms adjust to
a lending cut. The capital stock decreased by an average of 13 percent. Therefore, the
capital-labor ratio fell, which suggests firms use bank loans primarily to finance cap-
ital investment. Firms dependent on Commerzbank were capital-constrained, which
increased their average product of capital, measured as value added per capital in col-
umn (3). On the contrary, the lending cut did not affect the average product of labor
and the average wage, relative to other firms in the same county, as shown in columns
(4) and (5) respectively. This is consistent with a competitive county labor market.
Column (6) reports no effect on the interest rate, in line with evidence from the United
States credit card market (Ausubel 1991).
1.6 The Effect on Counties
The previous section established that there were significant direct effects of the lending
cut on firms. In this section, I test whether the lending cut also had effects at a higher
level of aggregation, on counties.
1.6.1 County Specification
I estimate equation 1.3 for county c at time t:
yct = ζ +ρCB depc ∗dpostt +Γ′Xc ∗dpostt + γc+λt + εct . (1.3)
The coefficient on CB depc ∗ dpostt , scaled by 100, measures the average percentage
change in the outcome following the lending cut in a county fully dependent on Com-
merzbank. γc is a county fixed effect and λt a year fixed effect. Xc is a vector of
time-invariant control variables, described in the notes of Table 5.5. The standard
errors are clustered at the level of 42 quantiles of the county’s industrial production
share (GDP share of mining, manufacturing, utilities, recycling, construction). This is
6In unreported results, I find no heterogeneity in the effect on capital-intensive industries (consistent
with Paravisini, Rappoport, Schnabl, and Wolfenzon (2015)), on large firms (consistent with Bentolila,
Jansen, Jiménez, and Ruano (forthcoming)), on firms in counties with relatively high county Com-
merzbank dependence, or on firms dependent on Dresdner Bank before the 2009 acquisition. 6.4 shows
firms dependent on Commerzbank did not suffer higher losses on the value of their financial assets
during the financial crisis.
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a more general method than clustering at the level of the county. It allows for arbitrary
correlations of the errors across counties of similar industrial structure.
1.6.2 County OLS Results
The left panel of Figure 5.5 plots the growth rate of county GDP from 2007 to 2012
against Commerzbank dependence. The line of best fit shows a statistically significant
negative relationship, suggesting that the lending cut lowered GDP growth.
Table 5.8 reports the results of the corresponding OLS specifications. The key re-
sult of this section is in column (2). The point estimate implies that a standard deviation
increase in Commerzbank dependence (6 percentage points) lowered county GDP by
an average of 1 percent after Commerzbank’s lending cut. This specification controls
for the two main identification concerns. The first concern is that idiosyncratic shocks
to certain industries and exposure to the trade collapse during the Great Recession may
be correlated with Commerzbank dependence. I control for the share of 17 industries
among the county’s firms in 2006 as well as the average export and import shares of
firms in the county. The second main concern is that some regions fared worse be-
cause they were in the former GDR or because their Landesbank suffered losses in the
financial crisis (Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen 2011). I add dummies for counties in these
regions to the specification. Column (3) tests the robustness of the result further, by
controlling for population density, ln population, ln GDP per capita, and household
leverage. The coefficient remains stable, suggesting that the results are not driven by
pre-existing differences in county characteristics.
The specification in column (4) estimates that a standard deviation increase in
Commerzbank dependence lowered county employment by an average of 0.83 per-
cent, conditional on the main controls.7 Following Blanchard and Katz (1992), I in-
vestigate whether the effects can be explained by migration across counties in column
(5). The outcome is county net migration divided by 2006 employment. The coeffi-
cient is insignificant and small, implying there was no migratory response. Mertens
and Haas (2013) similarly report no association between county unemployment rates
and migration in Germany.
1.6.3 County IV Results
I use the distance instrument to test whether there is any evidence for bias in the OLS
estimates. The right panel of Figure 5.5 plots the growth rate of GDP from 2007 to
2012 against the distance instrument. There is a negative and statistically significant
7Burda and Hunt (2011) show that the German government’s well-known short-time work scheme
did not have a strong effect on the labor market. Firms could only claim subsidies for a maximum of
2 years. The level of short-time workers was back down to its pre-crisis value in 2011, suggesting if
anything only a transitory impact (Fujita and Gartner 2014).
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reduced-form relationship. Figure 5.6 confirms that the growth rate of GDP was lower
only during the years of Commerzbank’s lending cut. In the figures and in all IV spec-
ifications, I add five separate linear distance control variables, measuring the distances
to five former head offices in Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Berlin, and Dresden.
This ensures that the effect is identified only through the distance to the closest of
Commerzbank’s postwar head offices. I also include a dummy for the former GDR to
account for the postwar breakup of Germany.
Table 5.9 reports the regression results. Columns (1) and (2) show a strong first-
stage relationship between the distance instrument and Commerzbank dependence.
The IV second-stage coefficients in columns (3) to (7) report negative and significant
effects on county GDP and employment and no effect on migration, consistent with
the OLS results. Adding the list of control variables hardly affects the point esti-
mates, strengthening the argument that the distance instrument is exogenous to county
growth.8
In general, the IV point estimates imply larger effects than the OLS estimates. The
coefficient in column (4) implies a GDP loss of 2.2 percent from a standard devia-
tion increase in Commerzbank dependence, conditional on the main controls. There
could be a number of reasons for the difference. First, county Commerzbank depen-
dence may be measured with error, since it is based on the Creditreform sample of
firms, which covers roughly half of total employment in Germany. Measurement error
would attenuate the OLS, but not the IV estimates. Second, there is some evidence that
Commerzbank’s expansion across German counties was driven by economic consid-
erations. For example, Klein (1993) describes that Commerzbank followed a unique
branch expansion strategy in the former GDR after German reunification in 1990. The
other German banks simply took over the pre-existing branch networks of the former
GDR state banks, while Commerzbank built up its own. Commerzbank may have
selectively expanded into counties that are less affected in recessions. In unreported
results, I find no general association between county Commerzbank dependence and
the average annual growth rate between 2000 and 2009. Only in the sole recession-
ary year 2003, counties dependent on Commerzbank grew faster. If this indicates a
systematic positive correlation between county Commerzbank dependence and growth
in recessions, OLS estimators of the effect of Commerzbank’s lending cut on county
growth would be biased upwards.
8Appendix Table 6.3 reports that the linear distances to postwar Commerzbank head offices or other
major cities are uncorrelated with growth after the lending cut, conditional on the distance instrument.
Appendix Table 6.4 shows that controlling for the linear distances removes the correlation between the
instrument and a number of county characteristics. I confirm the effects of Commerzbank’s lending
cut using a county-level proxy for the change in bank loans in 6.7. An unreported placebo experiment
for Deutsche Bank, using the distance to the closest postwar Deutsche Bank head office as instrument,
finds no effect of Deutsche Bank dependence on county growth. Hence, there is no generic effect from
dependence on large banks.
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It is important to recognize, however, that the OLS and IV coefficients are not
statistically different. This suggests the difference between the point estimates could
also be driven by estimation error. The most important insight from this section is that
the IV analysis confirms the negative effect of Commerzbank’s lending cut on county
growth.
1.7 Discussion of the Results
With the firm and county estimates in hand, I turn to discussing two aspects of how
the lending cut affected firms and counties. First, I examine how the direct, firm-level
effects translated into county outcomes. Specifically, I test whether there is evidence
for an indirect effect on all firms in counties with high county Commerzbank depen-
dence, independent of the firms’ individual banking relationships. Second, I show that
the temporary lending cut had persistent effects on firms and counties.
1.7.1 The Indirect Effect
The response of county aggregates depends on two types of firm-level effects. The
first are the direct effects on firms borrowing from Commerzbank. In addition, there
may also be indirect effects on all firms in a county. Such indirect effects arise through
changes in the county’s aggregate economic conditions due to the direct responses of
firms borrowing from Commerzbank. This section explores whether indirect effects
played a role in shaping the effect of the lending cut on counties.
I use the employment cross-section dataset to estimate equation 1.4. The larger
sample size of 48,101 firms enables me to estimate the direct effect β and the indirect
effect σ in the same specification. The outcome is the symmetric growth rate of firm
employment between 2008 and 2012:
employment growth f c = ζ +βCB dep f c+σCB dep f c+Γ′X f c+ξ f c. (1.4)
Table 5.10 presents the results. The main object of interest in this section is the indirect
effect, that is the coefficient on the average Commerzbank dependence of other firms
in the county. I include firm control variables in column (1). The point estimate is
negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Adding the county controls
in column (2) hardly affects the estimate. To illustrate the size of the indirect effect
implied by the point estimates, consider a firm fully dependent on Commerzbank, op-
erating in a county where no other firm had Commerzbank among their relationship
banks. This firm reduced employment growth between 2008 and 2012 by 3.6 per-
centage points, the direct effect.9 If the same firm had operated in a county where
9This point estimate of the direct effect is slightly smaller than in Table 5.6, because I use a different
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the Commerzbank dependence of the other firms had been one standard deviation (6
percentage points) greater, employment growth would have fallen by 4.6 percentage
points. In this latter county, firms with no direct relationship to Commerzbank would
have reduced employment growth by 1 percentage point, solely due to the indirect
effect.
Table 5.11 gives an overview of the county employment change implied by the
different estimates in the paper. The estimate in row 1, based solely on the direct effect,
underestimates the county employment loss, because it ignores the indirect effect. The
average county Commerzbank dependence is 0.12, so the direct effects harm only a
relatively small fraction of firms. It is the indirect effect that amplifies the effects of
the lending cut throughout the county economy. The estimates of the sum of direct and
indirect effects are larger than the estimate in row 1, whether I use the county data (rows
2 and 3) or the firm data (row 4). The IV estimate based on the county dataset is close
to the OLS estimate based on the firm employment cross-section dataset, supporting
the view that there is no significant bias in the OLS estimates.
I turn to investigating which economic mechanisms underlie the indirect effect,
by testing two theoretical channels. The first argues that the direct effects reduced
local agglomeration spillovers. These can exist in the form of knowledge spillovers,
transport costs of inputs and outputs, or the quality of the local labor market (Ellison,
Glaeser, and Kerr 2010; Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti 2010; Bloom, Schanker-
man, and Van Reenen 2013). There is evidence that high-innovation industries are
particularly dependent on such spillovers (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson 1993;
Audretsch and Feldman 1996; Henderson 2003). This leads to the hypothesis that the
indirect effect should increase with the innovation intensity of an industry. I classify in-
dustries with R&D spending in excess of 2.5 percent of revenue (the OECD cut-off) as
high innovators, using data on German industries from Gehrke, Frietsch, Neuhäusler,
Rammer, and Leidmann (2010). For low-innovation industries, I rely on Gehrke, Fri-
etsch, Neuhäusler, Rammer, and Leidmann (2013), who identify a group of industries
with the lowest score on all innovation indicators in the Mannheim Innovation Panel.
The lists of high- and low-innovation industries are in Appendix Tables 6.5 and 6.6.
The second theoretical channel argues that household consumption fell due to em-
ployment losses at firms dependent on Commerzbank, reducing aggregate demand in
the county. Producers of non-tradables rely strongly on local demand. Producers of
tradables, on the other hand, mainly depend on national and global demand. Follow-
ing the methodology of Mian and Sufi (2014b), I classify an industry as tradable if
the sum of its exports is at least USD 10,000 per worker or USD 500 million in total
(using industry data from the United States). The retail and restaurant sector are clas-
outcome, the symmetric growth rate. Using the ln difference as outcome renders the point estimates
almost identical.
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sified as non-tradable. In addition, firms with a Herfindahl index in the top quartile
produce tradables and firms in the bottom quartile produce non-tradables. This uses
the fact that non-tradable industries are highly dispersed, because they need to produce
locally in the markets they serve, while tradable industries tend to be concentrated. If
industries remain unclassified, I call them producers of part-tradables.
The interaction of innovation and tradability leaves me with seven industry types.10
I estimate a separate indirect effect for each industry type, by interacting the variable
CB dep f c in equation 1.4 with a full set of industry type dummies. The specification
controls for the direct effect, by including the variable CB dep f c. In addition to the full
set of firm and county control variables, the specification also includes fixed effects
for the categories of tradability and innovation, to ensure that the coefficients are not
biased by common shocks to firms in these categories.
Figure 5.7 plots estimates of the indirect effect by industry type. There is a sta-
tistically significant indirect effect for high-innovation producers of tradables and pro-
ducers of non-tradables.11 The effect on high-innovation firms is consistent with ag-
glomeration spillovers particular to these industries. In unreported results, I find that
the Commerzbank dependence of other high-innovation firms in the county drives the
indirect effect on high-innovation firms. There is no significant indirect effect from the
Commerzbank dependence of low- and medium-innovation firms. Furthermore, the in-
direct effect is larger in counties with a high, above-median density of high-innovation
firms. This suggests agglomeration spillovers are more important in innovation clus-
ters.
The significant indirect effect on producers of non-tradables is consistent with the
second theory on demand. After directly affected firms in their county reduced employ-
ment, producers of non-tradables experienced the largest reduction in demand relative
to the other industry types and cut employment.12 Moretti (2010) studies the local
employment multiplier in the US, finding that for each additional job in the tradable
sector, 1.6 jobs are created in the non-tradable sector. The corresponding figure in my
setting is 1.7.13 Hence, my estimate of the local demand channel is close to Moretti
10The industry shares in my sample are: producers of tradables with low innovation activities: 2
percent; tradables, medium: 29; tradables, high: 8; part-tradables, low: 11; part-tradables, medium: 25;
non-tradables, low: 5; non-tradables, medium: 20. Few firms are high-innovation part-tradables and
non-tradables producers, so I add them to the medium-innovation industry types.
11I find no significant heterogeneity by industry type in the direct effect, so this cannot explain the
results. In a robustness check, I find similar results when I do not follow the Mian and Sufi (2014b)
methodology, but instead classify firms with a strictly positive export share as tradable producers.
12Changes in household debt cannot explain the non-tradable indirect effect. Di Maggio and Kermani
(2017) estimate an elasticity of non-tradable employment with respect to household debt of 0.2. Using
their estimate, the lower bound of the 90 percent confidence interval of the household debt effect from
column (1) of Table 5.5 can only explain 15 percent of the indirect effect on non-tradable, low-innovation
firms’ employment.
13To get this figure, I first calculate the effect of the lending cut on tradable employment in a county, in
which the tradable sector is fully dependent on Commerzbank. The direct effect leads to an employment
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(2010).
The two theories predict no indirect effect on producers of tradables with low in-
novation activities. Indeed, the coefficient on these firms in Figure 5.7 is positive and
statistically insignificant. In an unreported test, I also find no indirect effect for low-
and medium-innovation tradables producers located in an industrial cluster, unlike for
high-innovation firms. Furthermore, I find no heterogeneity in the direct effect by
county Commerzbank dependence. This implies that potential increases in the diffi-
culty of finding new lenders cannot explain the indirect effect.
1.7.2 The Persistence of the Effects
Firms dependent on Commerzbank reported restrictive bank loan supply in 2009 and
2010, but not in any year before or after (Section 1.4.1). Figure 5.4 shows that em-
ployment at firms with Commerzbank among their relationship banks developed in
parallel to other firms before the lending cut. In 2009 and 2010, firms dependent on
Commerzbank grew more slowly. Afterwards they remained on a lower, parallel trend
for two years. Figure 5.6 illustrates the same pattern for counties. Counties close to
the postwar head offices, with greater Commerzbank dependence, grew more slowly
during the years of the lending cut and did not recover afterwards.
Such persistent losses do not occur in response to all economic shocks. For ex-
ample, firms and counties exposed to the drop in export demand during the Great
Recession converged to the level of unaffected firms and counties in under two years,
as shown in 6.8. A standard neoclassical production function implies that temporary
shocks to the capital stock do not lead to persistent output losses. But there is no such
mechanism that facilitates convergence after productivity losses. I investigate whether
there is evidence that the lending cut lowered innovation and productivity.
Table 5.12 examines the effect of the lending cut on firms’ innovation activities,
proxied by patents. The outcome in column (1) is the symmetric growth rate of the
number of patents between the periods before (2005-08) and after Commerzbank’s
lending cut (2009-12). If a firm produced no patents in either period, the growth rate is
set to zero. If a firm produced at least one patent from 1990 to 2004, I call it a patenting
firm. The effect on these patenting firms is large. The growth rate of the number of
patents was approximately 55 percentage points lower at patenting firms entirely de-
loss of 3.5 percent for all tradable producers (estimated in the regression for Figure 5.7). In addition, 21
percent of tradable producers are high-innovators, so they also suffer the indirect effect of 39.9 percent.
Overall, tradable employment declines by approximately 3.5 + 0.21*39.9 = 11.9 percent. The indirect
effect on the average non-tradable firm is 25.9 percent. 23 percent of firms produce tradables. Therefore,
the indirect effect reduces non-tradable employment by 0.23*25.9 = 6 percent. Multiplying the elasticity
of non-tradable to tradable employment by 3.33, the ratio of non-tradable jobs to tradable jobs, gives
the figure of 1.7. Further evidence on the local demand channel can be found in Bernstein, Colonnelli,
Giroud, and Iverson (2017), Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo (forthcoming), and Giroud and Mueller
(2017).
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pendent on Commerzbank. There is no effect on non-patenting firms. It is possible that
many non-patenting firms are structurally unsuited to ever issue patents, independent
of credit supply, or that in a period of low global growth, few firms choose to com-
mence patenting. Negative binomial count models in columns (2) and (3) confirm that
after the lending cut, patenting firms dependent on Commerzbank issued significantly
fewer patents. There was no significant difference before the lending cut.14
A growth accounting exercise can inform an estimate of productivity changes at the
county level. Conventional measures of TFP overestimate productivity losses during
recessions, because they do not account for decreases in the utilization of existing labor
and capital (Basu, Fernald, and Kimball 2006). Since the lending cut had no effect on
county growth in 2011 and 2012, I alleviate this problem by focusing on changes from
2008 to 2012. An IV specification estimates that a standard deviation increase in Com-
merzbank dependence lowered output per worker by 1.8 percent from 2008 to 2012.
There are no data on county capital. I rely on the firm panel to estimate that the capital-
labor ratio at firms fully dependent on Commerzbank fell by 14.8 percent. Under the
assumption that for all the other firms the capital-labor ratio grew at an identical rate,
growth accounting implies that a standard deviation increase in Commerzbank depen-
dence reduced county TFP by 1.4 percent from 2008 to 2012. Fernald (2014) provides
data on utilization-adjusted capital and labor inputs for the United States. I construct
an adjustment factor to inflate my estimates of the changes in capital and labor. This
factor is based on the average ratio of utilization-adjusted to unadjusted input changes,
measured two years after the last three NBER recessions in Fernald’s data. Incorpo-
rating this adjustment slightly lowers the estimated TFP shortfall to 1.3 percent. This
point estimate needs to be treated with caution, since it relies on strong assumptions
about the loss in capital and the utilization adjustment.15 Overall, however, the firm
and county data paint a consistent picture. The results suggest innovation and produc-
tivity fell after the lending cut, which could explain the persistent losses.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper presents new evidence on the causal effects of bank lending on economic
activity. It analyzes a lending cut by Commerzbank, a large German bank. The lending
cut was not caused by domestic factors, but it was imported to Germany through Com-
merzbank’s trading losses on international financial markets during the financial crisis
of 2008/09. The results show that the lending cut lowered the output and employment
14The average patenting process takes around two years. In unreported results, I find the effect on
patents is entirely driven by the years after 2011, with no significant difference for the years before.
15I carry out two robustness checks. First, the estimate of TFP growth remains negative when I use
adjustment factors larger than any value observed two years after a recession in Fernald’s data. Second,
to explain the output loss while keeping TFP constant, capital would have had to fall by 5.6 percent.
This equals 1.9 times the output loss, which is implausibly large given historic movements.
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of firms and counties dependent on Commerzbank. Employment at a firm fully de-
pendent on Commerzbank fell by 5.3 percent, while a standard deviation increase in
county Commerzbank dependence reduced county employment by 0.8 percent.
Two key findings stand out. First, there were indirect effects of the lending cut that
affected firms independently of their immediate bank loan supply. The results sug-
gest that these indirect effects operated through lower aggregate demand and reduced
agglomeration spillovers among high-innovation firms. Second, a bank lending cut
causes an extended hangover. Both firms and counties dependent on Commerzbank
experienced lower growth rates during the years of the lending cut. Thereafter, they re-
turned to the growth rates of unaffected firms and counties, but did not converge to the
unaffected levels. This pattern resembles the growth experience of the United States
and other developed economies following the financial crisis of 2008/09.
The findings in this paper contribute to the academic discussion about the Great Re-
cession and its aftermath. Reifschneider, Wascher, and Wilcox (2015) and Anzoategui,
Comin, Gertler, and Martinez (2017) interpret the productivity slowdown following the
Great Recession as an endogenous response to weak aggregate demand. This paper’s
finding of an indirect demand effect suggests that bank lending cuts during the fi-
nancial crisis can partially account for the aggregate demand shortfall. In addition, the
evidence in this paper shows a direct, causal link from bank lending cuts to lower inno-
vation and productivity. Since economies are unable to make up productivity shortfalls
in only a few years, recoveries from banking crises are slow. This pattern can be seen
in the slow recovery from the Great Recession and the lengthy recessions associated
with banking crises in the cross-country literature.
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Chapter 2
The Effect of House Prices on
Household Borrowing: A New
Approach
2.1 Introduction
It is a well-known fact that house prices are strongly correlated with household bor-
rowing and consumption over the business cycle. These comovements have existed for
a long time and were especially strong around the Great Recession. We illustrate this
in Figure 6.3, which shows the evolution of house price growth, consumption growth,
and mortgage debt growth in the US and UK over the last four decades. Motivated by
such macro patterns, a leading narrative about the Great Recession argues that house
price swings drive borrowing and consumption (e.g. Mian and Sufi 2011, 2014a; Mian,
Rao, and Sufi 2013; Kaplan, Mitman, and Violante 2015). In this paper we revisit this
question using a new approach, providing evidence both on the effect of house prices
on borrowing and on the underlying mechanisms driving the effect.1
This is an area where causal identification is particularly difficult, because house
price variation is endogenous and compelling quasi-experiments are difficult to find.
The time series evidence in Figure 6.3 does not have a causal interpretation, a point
emphasized by Campbell and Cocco (2007) and Attanasio, Blow, Hamilton, and Le-
icester (2009); Attanasio, Leicester, and Wakefield (2011). Much of the recent liter-
1I confirm that Chapter 2 was jointly co-authored with James Cloyne, Ethan Ilzetzki, and Henrik
Kleven and I contributed 25% of this work. This research was carried out as part of the Bank of Eng-
land’s One Bank Research Agenda. It uses Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) Product Sales Data that
have been provided to the Bank of England under a data-sharing agreement. The FCA Product Sales
Data include regulated mortgage contracts only, and therefore exclude other regulated home finance
products such as home purchase plans and home reversions, and unregulated products such as second
charge lending and buy-to-let mortgages. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not nec-
essarily reflect the views of the Bank of England, the Monetary Policy Committee, the Financial Policy
Committee or the Prudential Regulatory Authority.
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ature instead uses variation in house price growth across geographical areas, which
raises concerns about confounding regional shocks (such as shocks to local income ex-
pectations) that drive both house prices and the outcome of interest. This requires the
use of an instrument for regional house price growth, but fully conclusive instruments
are difficult to find.2
Motivated by these challenges, we consider a different setting and a different ap-
proach to study the effect of house prices on borrowing. We examine the borrowing
decisions of home refinancers using administrative data on the universe of mortgage
contracts in the UK from 2005-2015. Our data and setting offer three main advantages.
First, the dataset has information on individual house prices from mortgage appraisals
by lenders. We present evidence showing that, in the UK, mortgage appraisals provide
unbiased measures of actual house prices. Second, the data has a panel dimension as
many homeowners refinance several times during the 10-year window we consider.
This results from the fact that refinancing is a frequent phenomenon in the UK, be-
cause long-term fixed interest mortgages are not available (see Best, Cloyne, Ilzetzki,
and Kleven 2015). The panel dimension of the data allows us to control for a rich set
of fixed effects that deal with the standard confounders discussed in the literature. For
example, confounding regional shocks will not be a threat to identification here as we
control for county-by-time fixed effects.
Third and finally, the institutional setting helps with identification. Most mortgage
products in the UK come with a relatively low interest rate for a short time period, typi-
cally 2-5 years, followed by a much higher reset rate. This creates a strong incentive to
refinance around the onset of the reset rate, and we show that most homeowners do in
fact refinance around this time. This implies that the timing of refinance is determined
by past contract choices, namely the duration of the initial low interest rate in the last
contract.3 These mortgage institutions combined with the large house price swings
over the period we consider create a potential quasi-experiment. Refinancers face very
different house price shocks depending on whether they refinance before, during, or
after the housing crisis, and this timing is determined largely by a mortgage contract
choice made in the past. Loosely worded, we use the Great Recession interacted with
pre-determined, idiosyncratic contract choices as a quasi-experiment for house prices.
We present three main sets of results. The first set of results concerns the impact of
house prices on homeowner borrowing. While such borrowing effects are interesting
2Much recent work instruments regional house price growth using a topography-based measure of
housing supply elasticities, namely proximity to mountains and oceans that restrict supply (as con-
structed by Saiz 2010). The idea is that regional housing markets are exposed differently to demand
shocks because of their topography. A debate about this instrument highlights potential issues with the
exclusion restriction and defiers (see e.g., Davidoff 2013, forthcoming).
3This quasi-exogeneity of refinancing stands in contrast to the US setting where the decision to
refinance is endogenous to factors such as income shocks, liquidity needs, and the market interest rate
(see Hurst and Stafford 2004).
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in their own right (e.g. Mian and Sufi 2011), they are also indicative of the potential
consumption effects of house prices and they relate to the same underlying mecha-
nisms as consumption. We find clear evidence that house price appreciation induces
homeowners to increase borrowing by extracting equity from their home, but the mag-
nitude of the response is smaller than suggested by recent US estimates. The elasticity
of borrowing with respect to house prices lies between 0.2-0.3 and is robust across a
range of specifications.4 In our preferred specification, the elasticity is identified from
within-individual variation in house price growth. This variation comes from home-
owners who refinance at least twice and experience different house price shocks due to
how their (quasi-exogenous) refinance timing interacts with the housing cycle. Unlike
previous studies, our results are based on non-parametric, graphical analyses in which
we do not impose any a priori assumptions on functional form. A finding from this
approach is that the borrowing elasticity is constant across the distribution of house
price changes.5
The second set of results concerns patterns of heterogeneity and mechanisms. The
two main reasons why house prices may affect borrowing are wealth effects and collat-
eral effects (see e.g., Sinai and Souleles 2005; Berger, Guerrieri, Lorenzoni, and Vavra
2015).6 All else equal, the wealth effect should be larger for older homeowners who
have short horizons and are therefore in a position to cash in on their housing wealth,
while the collateral effect should be larger for more leveraged homeowners. The exist-
ing literature has tried to distinguish between different mechanisms by studying such
patterns of heterogeneity (Campbell and Cocco 2007; Attanasio, Blow, Hamilton, and
Leicester 2009; Attanasio, Leicester, and Wakefield 2011). A challenge for such ex-
ercises, however, is that different dimensions of heterogeneity are highly correlated.
For example, older homeowners have shorter horizons and more asset risk, but are
also less levered, and so it is not clear if the age profile is picking up wealth or collat-
eral effects. We resolve this issue through a multivariate and non-parametric analysis
of heterogeneity in the elasticity of borrowing with respect to house prices. We con-
sider four dimensions simultaneously: loan-to-value (LTV), age, income, and income
growth. Our approach shows how the borrowing elasticity varies across bins of a given
4These elasticity estimates are roughly half the size of the US estimates provided by Mian and Sufi
(2011).
5The finding of an isoelastic relationship motivates our focus on log-log specifications through most
of the paper, because the log-log coefficient is a direct estimate of the elasticity (in robustness checks,
we also report estimates of the marginal propensity to borrow). Reporting the elasticity also eases
comparisons to the part of the literature that estimates the elasticity of total borrowing, as opposed to
only mortgage borrowing, because there is no mechanical reason why these elasticities should differ.
A possible economic reason for the elasticities to differ is that mortgage debt is generally cheaper than
other forms of consumer debt, in which case households may shift debt onto their mortgage following a
house price increase. Such shifting would lead our elasticity of mortgage borrowing to overestimate the
elasticity of total borrowing.
6A third possible reason is the presence of substitution effects on housing consumption, but this
channel is shut down here as we consider refinancers who stay in their existing houses.
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dimension, while simultaneously allowing for differences in the elasticity across bins
of the other three dimensions. The striking finding from this analysis is that there is
essentially no heterogeneity in any dimension except one — loan-to-value — but this
dimension is strong. More levered households are more responsive to house prices,
with borrowing elasticities around 0.7 at loan-to-value ratios above 85%. By contrast,
the age profile is completely flat after controlling non-parametrically for the other di-
mensions.
The strong relationship between borrowing elasticities and LTV is consistent with
evidence on subprime borrowing in the US (Mian and Sufi, 2009, 2011), and it is
strongly suggestive of collateral effects. The UK mortgage market offers an interest-
ing way to investigate the collateral channel more deeply, arising from the presence
of observable credit constraints that depend on collateral. Specifically, as described
and analyzed by Best, Cloyne, Ilzetzki, and Kleven (2015), the mortgage interest rate
features discrete jumps (notches) at critical LTV thresholds. These notches can be
interpreted as soft credit constraints, around which increases in LTV (reductions in
collateral) sharply increase the cost of borrowing.7 In such a setting it is natural that
house price growth leads to larger borrowing by moving homeowners to lower notches
and reducing their interest rate, a form of collateral effect.
This brings us to the third set of results, which shows that the borrowing elas-
ticity depends critically on whether the underlying price variation relaxes credit con-
straints (by pulling homeowners down to lower notches), reinforces credit constraints
(by pushing homeowners up to higher notches), or leaves credit constraints unchanged.
This analysis shows that the elasticity is much higher (around 0.5) among homeowners
whose collateral constraint is relaxed by house price growth, and that the elasticity is
zero among those whose collateral constraint is reinforced. Furthermore, we present
an analysis of the dynamic interaction between house price growth and bunching re-
sponses to interest notches, which is consistent with the collateral channel. We show
that, when house price growth pulls homeowners below interest notches and relaxes
their credit constraint, they respond by extracting equity until their LTV hits an interest
notch. These findings provide direct evidence on the important role of collateral-based
credit constraints in a large and representative population of homeowners.
Seminal contributions by Mian and Sufi (2011) and Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013)
have shaped the debate about the effect of house prices on household debt and con-
sumption. Their important findings suggest that house price booms and busts were
key determinants of US economic growth before and during the Great Recession. To
identify the causal effects of house prices, Mian and Sufi (2011) and Mian, Rao, and
Sufi (2013) rely on relatively strong assumptions about the correlation between the de-
7Conceptually, a hard credit constraint (often assumed in models) can be interpreted as the special
case of a prohibitively large interest rate notch at a collateral threshold.
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terminants of household debt and the topography of US regions. Stroebel and Vavra
(2014) and Kaplan, Mitman, and Violante (2015) use similar assumptions to study
the mechanisms through which house prices affect real outcomes. Influential papers
by Muellbauer and Murphy (1990), Carroll, Otsuka, and Slacalek (2011), and Case,
Quigley, and Shiller (2013) rely on time-series or cross-state variation in house prices,
which makes causal interpretation difficult. The identification challenges are exem-
plified by Hurst and Stafford (2004) who show that the timing of refinancing is en-
dogenous to household liquidity shocks, and by Attanasio, Leicester, and Wakefield
(2011) who argue that macroeconomic shocks and expectations explain the correlation
between house prices and household borrowing.
Our contribution takes the literature beyond these concerns about confounders and
the validity of topography-based instruments for house prices. We identify the causal
effects of house prices using a new quasi-experimental approach that allow us to con-
trol non-parametrically for the key confounders discussed in the literature. Making no
a priori assumptions about the functional form between house prices and borrowing,
we show that the relationship is roughly isoelastic. Exploiting that our data spans the
period before and after the Great Recession, we provide some of the first evidence on
how the borrowing elasticity varies over the economic business cycle.8 Furthermore,
our non-parametric and multivariate heterogeneity analysis is new to the literature and
informs an unresolved debate. Previous studies have found a negative age profile of
wealth effects, which is inconsistent with standard life-cycle models (Attanasio and
Weber 1994; Attanasio, Blow, Hamilton, and Leicester 2009; Attanasio, Leicester, and
Wakefield 2011; Mian and Sufi 2011; Berger, Guerrieri, Lorenzoni, and Vavra 2015;
Bhutta and Keys 2016). We show that the negative age profile reflects the confounding
effects of collateral and that the true age profile is flat.
An additional contribution of our paper is to shed new light on the role of collateral
constraints in driving the effect of house prices on borrowing. The closest study to this
aspect of our paper is by DeFusco (2016). He uses a compelling natural experiment
in Montgomery County, Maryland to show that relaxations of collateral constraints
increased borrowing. Our paper uses a larger and representative sample (the full popu-
lation of UK homeowners), studies the effects of both relaxing and tightening collateral
constraints, introduces the bunching methodology as a test of collateral constraints, and
examines not only the effects of a collateral shock, but generally how households re-
spond to a house price shock, including tests for the wealth channel. Two recent papers
find that LTV-dependent borrowing constraints affect households in response to other
shocks, such as debt reductions (Ganong and Noel 2017) and interest rate changes (Di
Maggio, Kermani, Keys, Piskorski, Ramcharan, Seru, and Yao forthcoming).
8See also Guren, McKay, Nakamura, and Steinsson (2017) for an analysis of time variation in hous-
ing wealth effects.
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Given that much of the recent literature focuses on the US, it is natural to ask if
our results are transportable to the US setting. Two points are worth highlighting.
First of all, our empirical design — relying on within-individual variation — identifies
micro elasticities rather than macro elasticities. This implies that the various reasons
why macro elasticities can vary across economies (such as the underlying source of
the house price shock as highlighted by Kaplan, Mitman, and Violante 2015) are not
relevant for assessing external validity in this case. Second, while micro elasticities
may clearly vary across different markets (say because of differences in the strength
of credit constraints), we present one piece of evidence in support of external validity:
When we use an empirical specification without fixed effects (similar to previous work)
and consider the pre-recession period, we obtain borrowing elasticities of a similar
magnitude to those found by Mian and Sufi (2011) for the US between 2002-06.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the institutional setting and
data, section 2.3 analyzes the sources of house price variation used for identification,
section 2.4 presents results on the effect of house prices on borrowing, section 2.5
presents results on heterogeneity and mechanisms, and section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Setting and Data
2.2.1 UK Mortgage Market
The UK mortgage market has several institutional features that make it an excellent
laboratory for investigating the relationship between house prices and homeowner bor-
rowing. In contrast to the US mortgage market, long-term fixed-rate mortgages are
unavailable in the UK. Almost all mortgage products feature a relatively low interest
rate for an initial period followed by a penalizing reset rate.9 The initial rate typically
has a duration of 2-5 years and this rate may be either fixed or floating. The reset rate
lasts for the remainder of the mortgage’s duration and is always floating. The reset
rate is penalizing in the sense that the same bank almost always offers an identical
mortgage product with a much lower rate. For example, at current rates a refinancer
could lower her interest payments by more than 200 basis points (without altering the
amortization schedule or other features of the mortgage) by refinancing to avoid the
penalizing rate.
In addition to the penalizing reset after the end of the initial low-interest period,
most mortgage contracts feature large early repayment charges, typically 5 or 10 per-
cent of the outstanding loan. These charges make it very costly to refinance or adjust
borrowing before the end of the initial period.
The combination of penalizing reset rates and heavy early repayment charges im-
plies that households have strong incentives to refinance right around the end of the
9More than 90% of mortgage products feature such reset rate structures (see e.g., MoneyFacts.co.uk).
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initial duration. To confirm that households act on these incentives, Figure 5.8 shows
the distribution of time between mortgages among refinancers in our data. The distri-
bution features large spikes in refinancing activity around 2, 3, and 5 years after the
previous mortgage, consistent with the fact that these are the most common durations
on offer. The lightly shaded bars indicate the fraction of households in each month that
refinance around the end date of their initial low-interest duration (within a window of
2 months before and 6 months after the end date). The figure demonstrates that the
vast majority of households refinance around the time that the initial duration ends.10
This institutional setting has the following key advantages for our empirical ap-
proach. First, the fact that refinancing occurs around predetermined dates makes the
time of refinance potentially orthogonal to individual circumstances. This contrasts
with the US setting where the decision to refinance or take out home equity loans is
likely to be correlated with unusual consumption and borrowing needs (see Hurst and
Stafford 2004). Second, the fact that refinance events are frequent allows us to ob-
serve the same homeowner refinancing several times, facilitating the use of panel data
methods. Third, the frequency of refinancing also implies that the market for home
equity loans is minimal in the UK. As households are only a few years away from re-
financing at any given time, home-equity based borrowing is done almost exclusively
through equity extraction at the time of refinancing. Finally, it is worth highlight-
ing that mortgage debt comprises nearly 90% of all household debt in the UK. Thus
studying borrowing responses in the mortgage market gives a nearly complete view of
household borrowing behavior.
When households refinance, the lender appraises the house value and this appraisal
determines home equity. The household’s decision about equity extraction then de-
termines the new debt level, the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, and the interest rate. The
interest rate charged on UK mortgages follows a step function with discrete jumps
(notches) at certain LTV thresholds. The most common interest rate notches occur
at LTVs of 60%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85%. Figure 6.4 in the appendix shows the
average interest rate schedule as a function of LTV across all mortgage products (see
Best, Cloyne, Ilzetzki, and Kleven 2015 for details).11 The overall level of the interest
rate schedule depends on a number of mortgage contract characteristics (including the
duration of the initial interest rate), but all contracts feature notches at critical LTV
thresholds. These interest notches introduce a form of ‘soft’ credit constraints that de-
10How do borrowers choose their mortgage’s initial duration? The main determinants in this choice
are interest rates and expectations thereof. For example, a two-year initial duration will offer a lower
interest rate than a five-year initial duration, but the five-year product hedges against interest rate in-
creases in the remaining three years. The choice between the two will be determined by, among other
things, risk preferences. Our empirical approach will be able to deal with unobserved heterogeneity in
preferences for low-interest durations.
11Best, Cloyne, Ilzetzki, and Kleven (2015) provide a bunching analysis of borrowing responses to
these interest rate notches.
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pend on collateral values: borrowing costs jump sharply as the LTV ratio exceeds —
and the collateral therefore falls below — the critical thresholds.12 House price growth
reduces a homeowners’s LTV ratio, allowing her to borrow at a lower interest rate if
it pulls her across interest notches. We will utilize this institutional feature to devise a
test for the collateral channel.
2.2.2 House Price Measurement
We measure house prices based on lenders’ house value appraisals. There are a num-
ber of useful reasons for this. First, these appraisals provide us with house price infor-
mation at the individual level. Second, appraisals take place at every refinance event,
providing us with several observations of house prices for each house-homeowner pair.
Third, the appraisal provides the exact house price measure used by the lender to deter-
mine collateral, the LTV ratio and the interest rate. Hence, for capturing the collateral
effect of house prices, there is no measurement error in the price measure we use.
Nevertheless, a potential concern with our house price measure is the presence
of appraisal bias. A literature has shown that mortgage appraisals feature systematic
upward bias in the US (e.g. Ben-David 2011; Agarwal, Ben-David, and Yao 2015;
Agarwal, Ambrose, and Yao 2016), which may reduce the suitability of appraisals
for capturing the true wealth effect of house prices in that setting. However, such
appraisal bias does not seem to be a problem in the UK, as we demonstrate in two
ways. First, while we do not observe actual market prices for refinanced properties, we
do observe market prices (along with appraisals) when properties are purchased and
the first mortgage is originated. Hence, Figure 5.9 shows a histogram of the difference
between the purchase price and the appraisal for transacted properties. The difference
is zero for the vast majority of transactions, showing that appraisals line up with the
actual price for newly purchased homes.
However, appraisal bias may be more acute for refinances than for first mortgages,
as there is no purchase price to anchor the appraisal for refinances. This motivates
our second test in which we compare actual purchase prices (for transacted properties)
with appraised prices (for refinanced properties) over time. The results are shown in
Figure 5.10. Panel A plots the raw time series of actual and appraised prices. Taken
at face value, this panel suggests that there is bias: appraised prices are slightly higher
than purchase prices on average, and the appraised prices are too smooth during the
financial crisis. But such a comparison does not account for the fact that the composi-
tion of properties in the two series is different, and that the composition of each series
changes over time. To be able to accurately compare the two series and their changes
over time, Panel B presents regression-adjusted price series in which we control non-
12Alongside these notches, there is also a hard collateral constraint as only a handful of mortgage
products are currently available at LTVs exceeding 90%.
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parametrically for two observables: the age of the homeowner and the postcode of the
property. Specifically, we run the following regression separately for the price and the
appraisal series:
Pi =∑
t
βt · I [quarteri ∈ t]+∑
k
γk · I [agei ∈ k]+∑
p
λp · I [postcodei ∈ p]+νi, (2.1)
where the first term includes a full set of quarter dummies, the second term includes
dummies for twenty quantiles of the age distribution, and the third term includes dum-
mies for twenty quantiles of the postcode-level distribution of house prices. Specifi-
cally, the last term is based on the average house price of each 6-digit postcode, and it
includes dummies for the postcode’s quantile position in the distribution of postcode-
level prices. This term controls for the fact that the quality of neighborhoods that
feature high or low activity differs across the two series and changes over time.
The plotted values in Panel B are the coefficients on the quarter dummies from
equation (2.1), adding a constant equal to the effect of the average age and the average
postcode (in each series separately). We see that, with non-parametric controls only for
age and neighborhood, the two series track each other closely throughout the period
and the recession is now clearly visible in the appraisal series. In other words, the
differences in Panel A were due to differences in sample composition rather than real
appraisal bias. We therefore conclude that appraisals are a good reflection of true
property prices in the UK market.13
2.2.3 Data
The data come from a novel and comprehensive regulatory dataset containing the uni-
verse of mortgage product sales. These data are collected by the UK’s Financial Con-
duct Authority (FCA) and available to restricted members of staff at the FCA and the
Bank of England. This Product Sales Database (PSD) has information on all com-
pleted household mortgage product originations from April 2005, but does not include
commercial or buy-to-let mortgages.14
Regulated lenders are required to submit quarterly information on all mortgage
originations. The data include a range of information about the mortgage such as the
loan size, the date the mortgage became active, the house price appraisal, the interest
rate charged during the introductory period, whether the interest rate is fixed or vari-
able, the end date of the initial duration (the time at which the higher reset rate starts
13Further evidence against consequential appraisal bias is that the equity extraction elasticity remains
stable when controlling for fixed effects for month, household, and county x year, as well as a number of
time-varying household characteristics (results in Section 2.4.2). Typical sources of appraisal bias are
that certain households or banks tend to demand biased appraisals or that region- or household-specific
income shocks lead to biased appraisals. The control variables account for all these possibilities.
14See https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/product-sales-data for officially published high level data.
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applying), whether mortgage payments include amortization, and the mortgage term
over which the full loan will be repaid. The data also include a number of borrower
characteristics such as age, gross income, and whether the income is solely or jointly
earned.15
Another useful feature of the PSD is that it contains information on whether the
household is a refinancer. Using information about the characteristics of the property
and the borrower, refinancing households can be matched over time to construct a
panel. As noted above, since refinancing is a regular occurrence in the UK mortgage
market, this provides us with multiple observations for the same household over the 11
years of the sample. Using our new panel, we can compute a range of useful household-
level statistics including house price growth, mortgage debt growth, amortization, and
equity extraction/injection.
Overall, the PSD contains around 14 million mortgage observations. Around half
of these observations are mortgages for new house purchases, while the other half
are refinancing events. Since we need to calculate the house price change and equity
extracted for our analysis, we can only use refinancing observations where we observe
a previous mortgage event (either the house purchase or a previous refinancing event)
by the same household for the same property. Our sample is therefore a subset of the
refinancers in the PSD.
Table 5.13 summarizes the data. Panel A compares descriptive statistics for home
buyers (column 1), all refinancers (column 2), and refinancers in our estimation sample
(column 3). There are no significant differences between the three groups in the share
of couples, income, income growth, interest rate, and house price. Some differences
between buyers and refinancers are to be expected. For example, buyers tend to be
younger and have higher LTV ratios.
Panel B of Table 5.13 reports statistics for the 1.38 million observations in our
estimation sample, split into three subsamples. As discussed above, practically all
mortgages in the UK have an initial duration with a favorable interest rate, after which
a higher reset rate kicks in. This gives a strong incentive for refinancing around the
onset of the reset rate. The subsample in column 1 of panel B includes the 0.48 million
observations where we know refinancing took place “on-time” (defined as between 2
months before and 6 months after the reset rate onset), while column 2 includes the
0.28 million observations where we know refinancing took place “off-time”. For a
large part of the sample, 0.61 million observations, we do not observe when the reset
rate kicks in, because lenders were not always required to report this statistic to the
Financial Conduct Authority. We summarize these observations in column 3. There
are no significant differences across the three groups in any of the observables.
15Full details of the dataset can be found on the FCA’s PSD website.
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2.3 House Price Variation
There is large house price variation in the data. Figure 5.11 shows the distribution of
house price growth between refinance events for homeowners in our estimation sample.
To measure individual house price growth, the sample conditions on observing home-
owners at least twice. The first price observation for each homeowner may come either
from the first mortgage in the house or a refinance, while subsequent price observations
always come from refinances. The distribution shows that house price growth lies be-
tween -30% and +60% across refinance events, giving us lots of variation to work with.
We note that there is some round-number bunching at zero price growth, suggesting
that some lenders set the new house price equal to the old house price whenever the
two are very close (see Kleven 2016 for a discussion of round-number bunching).
While there is large house price variation in the data, the challenge is that much
of it may be endogenous to demand factors that impact our outcome of interest. Our
approach starts by controlling for obvious confounders by absorbing a rich set of fixed
effects. Individual fixed effects control for time-invariant individual preferences for
borrowing, month fixed effects control for time-varying macro factors that affect bor-
rowing, while county-by-year fixed effects control for local, time-varying shocks to
borrowing demand. Specifically, ‘counties’ are defined as local planning authorities
(or councils), of which there are more than 400 in the UK and 32 in London alone.
Figure 5.12 shows the distribution of residual house price growth, after absorbing
the fixed effects described above. Allowing for individual fixed effects on house price
growth gives an R-squared of one among households with just two mortgage observa-
tions (one price growth observation), so the figure considers the sample of homeowners
observed at least three times. Panel A shows the raw distribution of house price growth
in this subsample as a benchmark (it looks similar to the raw distribution in the pre-
vious figure), while Panel B shows the residualized distribution. Importantly, there is
large remaining house price variation even after controlling for fixed effects, between
-20% and +20% across refinance events.
What drives this residual variation? In general there can be two sources of remain-
ing variation. The first is that different properties experience different price growth
within counties, so that county-by-year fixed effects do not fully absorb the housing
cycle. This arises because of variation across neighborhoods within counties, varia-
tion across property types within neighborhoods, or completely idiosyncratic variation
driven by features of the specific house. On the latter, note that the value of a specific
house may increase due to home improvements undertaken by the owner, which would
not be real house price appreciation. However, the data include an indicator for home
improvement activity, which allow us to deal with this potential issue. Moreover, as
described below, we consider IV-specifications that are unlikely to be affected by home
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improvements.
The second source of variation is idiosyncratic variation in the timing of refinance
events relative to the price cycle. As described above, homeowners have a strong in-
centive to refinance around the onset of the reset rate, typically after 2, 3 or 5 years,
as these are the most common products in the market. Hence, the timing of refinance
is determined to a large extent by a duration choice made several years in advance,
creating arguably quasi-exogenous variation. Figure 5.13 illustrates conceptually how
this works. It compares two homeowners who start out at the same time (time 0), live
in houses with the same price cycle (the solid blue line), but have different prefer-
ences over low-interest rate durations. One homeowner prefers 2-year fixed interest
rate loans, while the other prefers 3-year fixed interest loans. Of course, this difference
in duration preferences will be related to, for example, risk preferences that may them-
selves impact on borrowing behavior, but such time-invariant preference heterogeneity
is absorbed by the individual fixed effect. What creates variation here is the interaction
of idiosyncratic duration preferences with the housing cycle: The 2-year person refi-
nances three times over a 6-year period, facing either positive or negative price shocks
at each event, whereas the 3-year person refinances only two times facing a zero price
shock each time. Our empirical strategy exploits this kind of within-person variation
in price growth.
In Figure 5.14 we illustrate this point using the actual data. The figure plots aver-
age house price growth for homeowners who refinance at different times (in January of
different years) by bins of the duration of their last mortgage. The two panels show the
same graphs, but highlight two different homeowners who experience very different
within-person price patterns due to past duration choices. The homeowner in Panel
A refinances in January 2010 coming out of a 2-year mortgage chosen in 2008, and
refinances again in January 2013 coming out of a 3-year mortgage chosen in 2010.
This homeowner experiences a substantial negative shock the first time around, and a
substantial positive shock the second time around. The homeowner in Panel B also
refinances in January 2010 and January 2013, with the only difference being that in
2010 she was coming out of a 5-year mortgage chosen in 2005. As a result, this
homeowner faces similar positive price growth in both refinance events. The empirical
approach we propose uses this kind of within-person variation for identification: i.e.,
we use the change over time for Person A (who goes from negative to positive price
growth) relative to the change over time for Person B (who goes from positive to pos-
itive price growth). This is a form of triple-differences strategy as we are comparing
within-person changes in price growth.
The exogeneity of this duration-driven variation in house price growth requires that
homeowners are not choosing durations in anticipation of future house price growth
and future borrowing needs. For example, if homeowners were choosing 2-year mort-
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gages (rather than 3-year mortgages) in late 2005 — anticipating that this would put
them at the peak of the boom (rather than at the bottom of the bust) — to be able
to extract more equity for consumption goods in late 2007, then our estimates would
not be causally identified. A sufficient condition for ruling out such hyper-rational and
forward-looking behavior is that homeowners are not able to forecast house prices with
much precision. This assumption seems particularly persuasive around the time of the
Great Recession, and it is consistent with a growing consensus that homeowners tend
to have biased beliefs about future house prices (e.g., Case and Shiller 1989; Shiller
2007; Case, Shiller, Thompson, Laibson, and Willen 2012; Kaplan, Mitman, and Vi-
olante 2015). However, we do not necessarily need bias or irrationality for our strategy
to work; a sufficient amount of house price uncertainty will do.
Another way of gauging the exogeneity of duration-driven house price growth is to
check if duration choices, besides predicting future house price appreciation, predict
other things of relevance to borrowing. Hence, Figure 6.5 in the appendix shows how
much of the residual price variation (Panel A) and residual income variation (Panel B)
can be explained by past duration choices, having absorbed all the other fixed effects.
The figure shows that, while duration choices are strong predictors of future price
growth, they do not predict future income. This lends further support to our strategy.
We present results from two types of strategies. We first consider OLS fixed effects
regressions, which use all of the residual variation for identification. This includes
idiosyncratic variation in price growth across properties within counties, and it includes
idiosyncratic variation in the timing of refinance events. As discussed earlier, a concern
with the first source of variation is that it may be partly driven by home improvements.
Hence, we also consider IV-regressions in which we construct instruments based on
past duration choices (which determine refinance timing). These results should not be
affected by home improvements. Reassuringly, our OLS fixed effects and IV results
turn out to be quite similar.
2.4 Do House Prices Affect Borrowing?
2.4.1 Baseline Specification
To establish a baseline, we start from a specification that is similar in spirit to specifi-
cations used in existing work. Specifically, we consider the following specification
∆ logDit =∑
j
β j · I [∆ logPit ∈ j]+νit , (2.2)
where Dit and Pit denote mortgage debt and house prices, respectively, for individual i
at time t. While we primarily consider log-specifications, we will also explore level-
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specifications and show that those yield the same qualitative results.16 We allow for
different bins of house price growth to have different effects on borrowing, as we do
not (yet) want to commit to a specific functional form.
Equation (2.2) corresponds to the specification used by Mian and Sufi (2011), ex-
cept for three differences: (i) we rely on individual rather than regional house price
variation, (ii) we allow for a non-parametric specification without a priori functional
form restrictions, and (iii) we do not instrument house prices using topography-based
housing supply elasticities.17
Panel A of Figure 5.15 shows the results from this specification. It plots the log-
change in mortgage debt against bins of the log-change in house prices. Three insights
are worth highlighting. First, overall there is a clear positive relationship between
house price growth and debt growth. Debt growth changes from 0% to 15% as house
price growth changes from -10% to + 40%. Second, there is a strong asymmetry
between negative and positive price shocks: Homeowners increase debt when their
house becomes more valuable, but they do not reduce debt when their house becomes
less valuable. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is the presence of liquidity
constraints that prevent homeowners from injecting equity when negative house price
shocks push up their LTV ratios. Third, the average elasticity of borrowing across
the full range of house price growth — obtained from a log-linear specification —
equals 0.3. However, this elasticity masks the heterogeneity between the negative and
positive ranges, with an elasticity of 0 in negative ranges and an elasticity of 0.4 in
positive ranges.
Panel B of Figure 5.15 investigates cyclical variation in the elasticity of borrowing.
Again, we consider the elasticity obtained from a log-linear specification, splitting the
sample into different years. The graph shows that the borrowing elasticity is strongly
pro-cyclical, with the largest elasticities in the run-up to the recession and the smallest
elasticities in the middle of the recession. This elasticity cycle is consistent with the
asymmetry between negative and positive shocks shown in Panel A, but this is far
from the whole story: When we condition the sample on positive price growth, or
add a fixed effect for negative price growth in the full sample, the cyclicality largely
survives. In general, there can be two possible explanations for the elasticity cycle. The
first possibility is that the true elasticity is cyclical, because the underlying mechanisms
16The coefficient obtained from a log-specification represents a borrowing elasticity, whereas the
coefficient obtained from a level-specification represents a marginal propensity to borrow (which can
be translated into an average borrowing elasticity in the population in order to compare with the log-
specification).
17Hilber and Vermeulen (2016) constructs a topography-based housing supply elasticity index for
England (a la Saiz 2010), but not for the rest of the UK (Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales). How-
ever, besides the potential issues with the exclusion restriction of such instruments (as discussed in the
introduction), Hilber and Vermeulen (2016) show that the instrument does not have a strong first stage
in the English setting: Topography does not predict house price variation in this country.
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driving the effect change over the business cycle. The second possibility is that the true
elasticity is not cyclical, but rather that a cyclical omitted variable (e.g. expectations)
is creating a spurious cyclical estimate. As we move to better identified specifications
below, we will be able to distinguish between these two hypotheses.
The outcome considered above equals total debt growth between the current and
the last refinance event, i.e. ∆ logDit = logDit − logDit−1. This outcome captures
both the equity extraction decision made by the homeowner at time t and the amortiza-
tion between times t−1 and t. Because the amortization schedule was chosen as part
of the last mortgage contract, it cannot respond to house price appreciation between
t − 1 and t. If there is any spurious correlation between amortization schedules and
house price variation, this will lead to bias. Fortunately, we have sufficiently detailed
information about mortgage contracts to precisely assess amortization for each home-
owner. Hence, we now turn to an improved outcome variable that captures only the
active equity extraction decision made at time t. This outcome equals logDit− logDPit ,
where DPit denotes the pre-determined debt at time t based on past debt choices and
amortization.18
The results for this outcome are shown in Figure 5.16, which is constructed exactly
as is the previous figure. The results are qualitatively similar: there is a clear posi-
tive relationship between house price growth and borrowing overall, there is a strong
asymmetry between positive and negative house price growth, and the borrowing elas-
ticity is cyclical. The average elasticity of borrowing is a bit smaller here (0.23), but
this reflects that the slope is now negative (as opposed to zero before) in the range of
falling house prices. Within the range of increasing house prices, the elasticity is about
0.4, corresponding to the finding in the previous figure. In the analysis that follows we
consider equity extraction as our outcome.
2.4.2 Fixed Effects Specification
Taking advantage of the fact that we observe multiple refinance events for each indi-
vidual, we augment the baseline specification with fixed effects. That is, we specify
logDict− logDPict =∑
j
β j · I [∆ logPict ∈ j]+αi+ γt +δct +νict , (2.3)
where the index c denotes county (local planning authority as described above), αi is
an individual fixed effect, γt is a time fixed effect (at the monthly level), and δct is
a county-by-time fixed effect (at the yearly level).19 The county-by-time fixed effect
absorbs regional, time-varying factors (such as local shocks to income expectations),
thus dealing directly with the main confounder discussed in the previous literature. By
18That is, we have DPit = Dit−1+ amortization between t−1 and t.
19There is some abuse of notation here as we use t to describe time in both months and years.
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allowing for individual fixed effects in a first-differenced equation, this has the form of
a triple-differences specification relying on within-individual variation in price growth.
The results are shown in Figure 5.17, distinguishing between a specification with
individual and time fixed effects only (Panel A) and a specification that adds county-
by-time fixed effects (Panel B). The following insights emerge. First, the two different
fixed-effects specifications yield almost identical results. Once we have controlled for
individual and time fixed effects, adding county-time fixed effects have no noticeable
effect. Second, the relationship between equity extraction and house price growth is
now monotonically increasing and almost perfectly linear in logs. There is no longer
any asymmetry between negative and positive shocks. Third, the borrowing elasticity
is now smaller, about 0.2.
The results in Figure 5.17 could be biased by individual, time-varying effects that
are correlated with house price growth and impact on borrowing behavior. To investi-
gate this threat to identification, we can exploit that the data include information on a
number of individual, time-varying variables that are relevant for debt demand. Hence
we consider a specification with such individual controls:
logDict− logDPict =∑
j
β j · I [∆ logPict ∈ j]+αi+ γt +δct +Xitθ +νict , (2.4)
where Xit includes the income level, the income growth, the last mortgage interest
rate, the age of the borrower, a dummy for couples, and dummies for a range of self-
reported reasons for the current and the last refinance (including home improvement
as one possible reason).
The results are shown in Figure 5.18. Panel A of the figure shows that the results
are completely stable when moving to this richer specification: the average elasticity
is the same and in fact the entire functional form is the same. Panel B of the figure
returns to the question of cyclicality in the elasticity. The elasticities reported in this
figure are based on a log-linear version of equation (2.4), interacting the house price
growth variable by year dummies. We see that the richer specification has eliminated
some, but not all of the elasticity cycle shown earlier. Hence we conclude that the
strong cycle observed for the baseline specification was partly a result of bias and
partly a real phenomenon.
As discussed in sections 2.2 and 2.3, our empirical strategy is based on the idea
that the timing of refinance is quasi-exogenous in the UK. The argument was that
homeowners tend to refinance around the onset of the reset rate, the timing of which
is determined by a duration choice made in the last refinance event. We showed in
section 2.2.1 that a majority of homeowners do indeed refinance around the onset of
the reset rate, but we also saw that some homeowners refinance at other times, typically
‘too late’. There are a variety of reasons why some homeowners might refinance late
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— including inattention and financial distress — but whatever the reason, it raises the
concern that such homeowners endogenously tailor the timing of refinance to house
price movements. If this is so, our estimates based on the full sample of refinancers —
including both on-time and off-time refinancers — may be subject to selection bias.
To investigate this selection issue, Table 5.14 presents estimates of borrowing elas-
ticities across samples that vary by refinance timing: the full sample in Panel A (sum-
marizing the results already presented), the sample of on-time refinancers in Panel
B, the sample of off-time refinancers in Panel C, and the sample of refinancers with
missing duration information in Panel D. As mentioned earlier, even though almost all
mortgage contracts in the UK (including variable-rate loans) come with a penalizing
reset rate after a certain duration, we do not observe this duration for all homeowners
as it was not always mandatory for lenders to provide it.20 Overall, the table shows
that elasticity estimates are very robust: across all four samples and fixed-effects spec-
ifications (columns 2-4), the elasticity varies between 0.17 and 0.27. It is interesting,
however, that the elasticity is consistently higher in the off-time sample, consistent with
a small selection bias. Hence our preferred estimates are those based on the on-time
sample, featuring borrowing elasticities that are slightly smaller that those reported
above.
Finally, we present two additional robustness checks on the fixed effects specifi-
cation. The first check investigates the issue of home improvements. While working
with individual house price information has several advantages, they do introduce a
problem not present in regional-level data: the house price variation may be driven
partly by idiosyncratic home improvements, which are endogenous and may not rep-
resent true increases in household net worth.21 As a first check we use self-reported
information on the reason for refinancing, including home improvements as one of the
reasons, that is available for part of the sample. Hence, for homeowners who reported
home improvement in their last refinance, we know that house price growth in the cur-
rent refinance is likely to be driven partly by home improvements. Hence, Table 6.20
shows elasticity estimates in three subsamples: homeowners whose last refinance was
for home improvements (Panel A), homeowners whose last refinance was not for home
improvements (Panel B), and homeowners for whom the reason for the last refinance
is unknown. The table shows that, for all the fixed effects specifications, the estimated
elasticity is quite stable across samples. Specifically, among those who report no home
improvement, we find elasticities that are similar to the elasticities for the full sample
20To be clear, we always observe the actual time between refinance events, it is only the duration
of the low-interest rate period defined in the mortgage contract that we do not always observe. In the
sample of homeowners with missing duration information, the actual time between refinance events
features strong bunching at 2, 3 and 5 years, showing that these households do in fact have a fixed
low-interest duration.
21In particular, home improvements do not increase household net worth unless they increase the
house price by more than the amount invested in the house.
52
discussed above. This alleviates any major concerns about home improvements, but
we acknowledge that our measure of home improvements is imperfect. Hence, the
next section goes further by presenting IV-estimates that cannot be plausibly affected
by home improvements.
The second check investigates alternative specifications. Starting from equation
(2.3), Figure 6.6 shows how the results are affected by moving from a log-specification
to a level-specification (Panel A) and by moving from house prices to housing net
worth as the explanatory variable (Panel B). In each panel we continue to allow for
different bins of the explanatory variable to have different effects on borrowing. While
the results are qualitatively unaffected by these changes, the alternative specifications
are useful for obtaining different types of parameters. Panel A yields an estimate of the
marginal propensity to borrow (equal to 0.11) as opposed to the elasticity parameter
discussed so far. Panel B yields an estimate of the elasticity with respect to housing
net worth — defined as house price minus baseline mortgage debt — as opposed to
the elasticity with respect to house prices.22 The fact that the elasticity with respect
to housing net worth is considerably smaller is a mechanical rather than substantive
result: because housing net worth is only a fraction of the house price, any given log-
change in house prices translates into a much larger log-change in housing net worth.
This makes the elasticity with respect to housing net worth mechanically smaller.
2.4.3 IV Specification
Our fixed effects specification relies on two sources of residual variation: (i) idiosyn-
cratic variation in price growth across houses within counties, (ii) idiosyncratic varia-
tion in the timing of refinance events across homeowners. The first source of variation
could be endogenous due to for example home improvements (as discussed above)
or endogenous selection into neighborhoods. Hence, in this section we consider an
IV-strategy that relies solely on variation in the (pre-determined) timing of refinance
events.
We do not want to rely on cross-sectional variation in duration choices, because
these are insurance choices that reflect risk preferences and therefore may affect bor-
rowing directly. As discussed above (see Figure 5.14), the most compelling source of
variation is the interaction between the duration choice in the last mortgage (say 2-year
vs 3-year fixed interest rate) and the time of the current refinance event (say 2010 vs
2011). Hence we construct instruments based on the interaction between dummies for
past duration choices and dummies for the time of refinance, within different regions.
22We specify housing net worth as the house price minus baseline debt (as opposed to current debt) in
order to avoid a clear endogeneity problem. This implies that the variation in housing net worth comes
from the variation in house prices, and so the two elasticities are identified from the same source of
variation.
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The first stage of the IV is specified as follows
∆ logPict = ρ · last durationit⊗yeart⊗ regioni+αi+ γt +δct +Xitη+µict , (2.5)
where ⊗ denotes the outer product, so that the instrumental variables (last durationit⊗
yeart⊗ regioni) include every possible interaction between last duration dummies, year
of refinance dummies, and regional dummies. It is for computational reasons that
the instruments are based on year dummies (rather than month dummies) and region
dummies (rather than the more disaggregated county dummies). We include fixed
effects for household, month and county-by-year, and we also allow for individual,
time-varying controls Xit including duration dummies on their own. This specification
implies we are identifying off of the interaction between last duration and time, taking
out the average effects of duration and time separately.
The second stage of the IV is similar to the fixed effect specifications considered
earlier, i.e.
logDict− logDPict = β · ̂∆ logPict +αi+ γt +δct +Xitθ +νict , (2.6)
where ̂∆ logPict is the predicted house price growth from the first-stage specification
(2.5).
The results are shown in Table 5.15. The table shows the estimated elasticities of
equity extraction with respect to house price across five IV specifications. The rich-
est specification in column (5) corresponds to the specification shown in equations
(2.5)-(2.6). There is a non-trivial difference in the estimates between the basic spec-
ifications without household and month fixed effects (columns (1)-(2)) and the richer
specification with those fixed effects (columns (3)-(5)). But across the richer spec-
ifications, the IV elasticity estimates are very stable (around 0.28-0.29) and slightly
higher than the OLS estimates shown earlier. The fact that the IV estimates are higher
is consistent with a (small) bias from home improvements in the OLS estimates: house
price appreciation due to home improvements does not represent real appreciation and
would therefore tend to attenuate the OLS estimates. These differences notwithstand-
ing, the IV table confirms the overall qualitative results presented so far: There is
a clear positive effect of house prices on borrowing, but the effects are smaller than
recent estimates have suggested.
2.5 Why Do House Prices Affect Borrowing?
Having established a causal relationship between house prices and household borrow-
ing, we now investigate the reasons for this relationship. Berger, Guerrieri, Lorenzoni,
and Vavra (2015) provide a theoretical foundation for the various mechanisms that may
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be at play. Here we focus on the two main mechanisms discussed in the literature.
First, higher house prices increase homeowners’ nominal housing wealth, so that
borrowing responses may reflect the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth
(Campbell and Cocco 2007; Case, Quigley, and Shiller 2013). However, it is not ob-
vious that such changes in nominal wealth translate into real wealth, as highlighted by
Sinai and Souleles (2005). They argue that homeownership provides a hedge against
future housing expenditures for households with long expected tenures in their exist-
ing homes. This implies that house prices have negligible effects on lifetime net worth
and should not affect borrowing. If wealth effects are operational they must there-
fore rely on expected changes in real housing consumption over the lifecycle. For
example, old homeowners may expect to downsize or exit the housing market in the
near future, in which case house price growth tends to increase net wealth. Young
homeowners, on the other hand, have constant or increasing housing needs over the
foreseeable future, so that the nominal wealth effect of house price growth will be off-
set by increases in future housing expenditures. This suggests larger wealth effects
for old homeowners than for young homeowners. Hence, a number of existing papers
assess the importance of wealth effects by studying heterogeneity with respect to age,
but with conflicting results (Attanasio and Weber 1994; Campbell and Cocco 2007;
Attanasio, Blow, Hamilton, and Leicester 2009; Mian and Sufi 2011).
Second, housing wealth is the largest form of household collateral. An increase in
nominal housing wealth may therefore relax borrowing constraints, which tend to be
proportional to collateral values. The collateral channel has been studied theoretically
in the macro housing literature (e.g., Aoki, Proudman, and Vlieghe 2004; Iacoviello
2005), and it has been argued to be empirically important for household borrowing in
a number of studies (e.g., Lustig and Nieuwerburgh 2005; Mian and Sufi 2011; De-
Fusco 2016).23 The collateral channel implies heterogeneity across leverage ratios:
Households with higher leverage are more collateral constrained, and house price ap-
preciation is therefore more likely to relax collateral constraints for such households.
In the next section, we take a first step towards disentangling wealth and collateral
effects based on a heterogeneity analysis that uses the power and granularity of our
administrative data. We analyze heterogeneity in the borrowing elasticity along the
main dimensions predicted to determine household borrowing responses, including
age and leverage. This analysis suggests that the collateral channel plays a crucial
role. We then explore the collateral channel more closely in the following section,
proposing a new method to assess its empirical importance.
23The collateral channel has also been shown to be important for business investments and employ-
ment (Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar 2012; Adelino, Schoar, and Severino 2015).
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2.5.1 Heterogeneity Analysis
We investigate how borrowing elasticities vary along four dimensions of heterogeneity:
loan-to-value (LTV), age, income level, and income growth. We consider two types of
specifications. Univariate specifications investigate heterogeneity in each dimension
separately, while multivariate specifications allow for heterogeneity in all four dimen-
sions simultaneously. Many dimensions of heterogeneity are highly correlated, making
it difficult to interpret results from univariate heterogeneity analyses. Our multivariate
specifications allow us to disentangle which dimensions truly drive heterogeneity in
responsiveness, and which dimensions only appear to do so by being correlated with
other relevant dimensions. We estimate specifications of the type
logDit− logDPit =∑
k
∑
j
β kj · I
[
Xkit ∈ j
]
·∆ logPit +∑
k
∑
j
λ kj · I
[
Xkit ∈ j
]
+νit , (2.7)
where I
[
Xkit ∈ j
]
is a dummy equal to one when variable k (LTV, age, income, or
income growth) falls in bin j. By allowing for a large set of bin dummies in each
dimension (7 LTV bins, 9 age bins, 7 income bins, and 7 income growth bins), and by
allowing for these dummies to affect both the slope and the intercept, our analysis is
very non-parametric. Hence, the heterogeneity patterns we uncover will not be driven
by overly restrictive functional form assumptions. We do assume that the effect of
prices on borrowing within dimension k and bin j is log-linear, but this assumption is a
good approximation as we show below. To increase precision, specification (2.7) does
not include the household and time fixed effects considered in the previous section. It
is possible to consider such an extension and the heterogeneity results turn out to be
very similar, but standard errors increase substantially in fixed effects specifications
with heterogeneity.
In Figure 5.19 we investigate heterogeneity with respect to age and LTV, which
are the two main proxies for wealth and collateral effects as discussed above. The top
panels show heterogeneity by pre-determined LTV, defined as the LTV ratio absent
any equity extraction/injection and absent any house price growth between the current
and last refinance event. This LTV is determined by the last choice of mortgage debt
and amortization along with the last house price. The graphs show a strong monotonic
relationship between the borrowing elasticity and LTV. This holds both when studying
this dimension of heterogeneity on its own (Panel A) and when controlling for the
other dimensions of heterogeneity (Panel B). In fact, going from the univariate to the
multivariate specification hardly affects the relationship, although it increases standard
errors somewhat. Hence, homeowners with low levels of collateral borrow much more
against house price increases than do those with high levels of collateral. The strong
degree of LTV heterogeneity is not driven by the log-linearity assumption made in
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equation (2.7), which we show in a fully non-parametric specification in appendix
Figure 6.7.24
The bottom panels of Figure 5.19 investigate the effect of age. These panels show
heterogeneity in the borrowing elasticity across 5-year bins between the ages of 20 and
60. Panel C presents results without controls for the other dimensions of heterogeneity.
The figure shows the opposite pattern of wealth effects than what is suggested by stan-
dard lifecycle theory: young households are more responsive to house prices than old
households. A similar pattern of heterogeneity was found by Attanasio, Blow, Hamil-
ton, and Leicester (2009) using UK survey data and structural methods. They suggest
that this puzzling pattern might arise because the young tend to be more leveraged
than the old, so that collateral effects confound wealth effects (see Berger, Guerrieri,
Lorenzoni, and Vavra 2015 for a similar argument). Panel D investigates and confirms
this hypothesis. It shows that, once we control for LTV (as well as income and income
growth), the age profile of borrowing elasticities is completely flat.
For completeness, Figure 5.20 displays heterogeneity across income levels (top
panels) and income growth (bottom panels). Income is measured at the time of the last
refinancing event, while income growth is measured as the log-change since the last
refinancing event. We use dummies representing seven quantiles of the distribution
of each of these variables. Once again, we consider the univariate specification on
the left and the multivariate specification on the right. These graphs do not show any
noticeable patterns of heterogeneity: they are quite flat across both income levels and
income growth in both the univariate and multivariate cases.
How should we interpret these heterogeneity patterns? The fact that lever-
age is such a strong predictor of borrowing elasticities, even after controlling non-
parametrically for other correlated factors, while at the same time the other factors
have no predictive power clearly points to the collateral channel as being central. A
few qualifications to this interpretation are worth mentioning. First, wealth effects
may not be the only force driving heterogeneity across age (even conditional on the
other controls), and so the flat age profile does not rule out wealth effects. Second,
wealth effects may themselves lead to heterogeneity across LTV ratios, even absent a
collateral channel. This issue is particularly pronounced in the log-log specification
(2.7). A one percent increase in the house price represents a five percent increase in
24Figure 6.7 presents non-parametric estimates allowing for a large set of bin dummies for house price
growth (as in the previous section) within three separate LTV categories. The three samples correspond
to low-leverage homeowners (LTV below 60%), intermediate-leverage homeowners (LTV between 60-
80%), and high-leverage homeowners (LTV above 80%). Two insights are worth highlighting. First,
the level of equity extraction decreases with leverage as one might expect: highly leveraged households
have a larger stock of existing debt, are more constrained in their borrowing capacity, and should be
on an amortization path over their lifecycle. Second, the slope of equity extraction increases with
leverage, consistent with our previous findings on elasticity heterogeneity. That is, homeowners with
high leverage (low collateral) extract less equity, but are more inclined to increase equity extraction
when house prices go up.
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housing net worth for a homeowner at 80% LTV, but only a two percent increase for
a homeowner at 50% LTV. Mechanically, there are heterogeneous wealth changes de-
pending on LTV. As a robustness check, we have therefore tried a level specification as
well, finding very similar qualitative results. This strengthens the conclusion that the
collateral channel is crucial. Third and finally, leverage may be correlated with unob-
served individual characteristics that affect borrowing behavior. A candidate would be
self-control problems. As Mian and Sufi (2011) note, it is likely that households with
greater self-control problems will be observed as credit constrained. However, when
augmenting equation (2.7) with individual fixed effects (which should pick up self-
control problems), we find that our heterogeneity results are qualitatively unchanged
(albeit with larger standard errors). Controlling for fixed effects ensures that the varia-
tion in leverage isn’t confounded with individual characteristics, such as self-control.
To conclude, the heterogeneity results are strongly suggestive of the collateral
channel, but perhaps not fully conclusive to a skeptic. In the next section, we pro-
pose a more sophisticated test — one that exploits discrete changes in the tightness of
collateral constraints around interest notches — providing our final piece of evidence
in favor of the collateral channel.
2.5.2 Collateral Channel: A Test Using Interest Notches
The UK setting offers a novel way of investigating the collateral channel arising from
the presence of observable credit constraints that depend on collateral. As described
in section 2.2.1, the mortgage interest rate schedule features discrete jumps (notches)
at critical LTV thresholds. There are notches at LTV ratios of 50%, 60%, 70%, 75%,
80%, 85%, and 90%.25 These notches introduce ‘soft’ credit constraints: as the LTV
ratio surpasses (and housing collateral therefore falls below) one of the critical thresh-
olds, the cost of borrowing increases sharply.26 The direct incentive created by these
interest notches is for homeowners to choose LTV ratios below one of the thresholds,
thus creating bunching in the LTV distribution. Such bunching represents borrow-
ing responses to the interest rate — rather than responses to the house price — and
was studied in detail by Best, Cloyne, Ilzetzki, and Kleven (2015). Here we consider
whether house price movements interact with bunching responses to interest notches
in a way that is consistent with the collateral channel. The basic idea is that house
price growth, by increasing collateral, moves homeowners below interest notches and
induces borrowing responses due to reduced costs of borrowing.
25Figure 6.4 illustrates most of these notches.
26The difference between such soft borrowing constraints and the hard borrowing constraints often
assumed in theoretical models can be interpreted in terms of the size of the notch: a hard borrowing
constraint is one where the borrowing cost jumps prohibitively at a threshold. In fact, the 90% LTV
notch serves as a hard borrowing constraint for most homeowners in our data, because very few lenders
have offered mortgage products above this level since the global financial crisis.
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We start by presenting a simple test of heterogeneity, similar in spirit to the preced-
ing analyses, before turning to a more sophisticated and conclusive analysis. Specif-
ically, Figure 5.21 investigates if the equity extraction elasticity depends on whether
the underlying price variation moves homeowners across notches and in which di-
rection. We define the collateral constraint as being relaxed (reinforced) when house
price variation moves the homeowner at least one notch down (up) and thus reduces
(increases) the mortgage interest rate. Otherwise, the collateral constraint is defined
as “unchanged.”27 Panel A of the figure considers a baseline specification without any
other controls. This is a specification like (2.7) in which house price growth is inter-
acted with dummies for the three notch scenarios (relaxed/reinforced/unchanged), but
without simultaneously controlling for other dimensions of heterogeneity. This analy-
sis shows that the elasticity is the highest (close to 0.5) when the collateral constraint
is relaxed, and that the elasticity is the lowest (close to zero) when the collateral con-
straint is reinforced.28 The fact that the elasticity is essentially zero when the collateral
constraint is reinforced may be due to collateral constraints interacting with liquidity
constraints, making it hard for homeowners to inject cash when house price growth
increases their cost of borrowing. As a robustness check, Panel B introduces house-
hold and month fixed effects in the specification. This graph confirms the qualitative
relationship between the borrowing elasticity and changes in collateral constraints, al-
though the effect is smaller than in the baseline specification without fixed effects. The
asymmetric response to relaxing and tightening borrowing constraints is suggestive of
the importance of the collateral channel.
To provide more conclusive evidence of the collateral channel, Figure 5.22 ana-
lyzes the dynamic interaction between house price growth and bunching responses to
interest rate notches. This figure focuses on the sample of households who are pulled
down to a lower notch by house price growth, i.e. households whose collateral con-
straint is relaxed. For this analysis, it is useful to formally define three different LTV
concepts. First, we define the pre-determined LTV = DPit/Pit−1 as the homeowner’s
LTV at time t given past mortgage choices (the debt level and amortization schedule
chosen at time t− 1) and the old house price. Second, we define the passive LTV =
DPit/Pit as the homeowner’s LTV at time t given past mortgage choices and the new
house price. This is the LTV that would apply if the homeowner simply rolled over
her debt at time t, i.e. if she were “passive.” Third, there is the actual chosen LTV =
Dit/Pit that includes any equity extraction or injection at time t. By this terminology,
the sample in the figure includes borrowers for whom the passive LTV is at least one
notch down from their pre-determined LTV.
27However, this terminology should not be taken literally: house price appreciation may relax credit
constraints even if it does not move homeowners to a lower interest rate notch.
28While the figure pools all years 2005-15, we have checked that the patterns are roughly the same
inside and outside the recession years.
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The figure shows two panels in which we compare the density distributions of the
three LTV measures defined above. The x-axis in each panel represents the distance
between a given LTV measure (pre-LTV, passive LTV, or chosen LTV) and the next-
notch-up from the passive LTV. Panel A illustrates the implications of house price
growth by comparing the distributions of pre-LTV and passive LTV. Two implications
are worth highlighting. First, house price growth moves all borrowers from the positive
range (in terms of their pre-LTV) to the negative range (in terms of their passive LTV).
This follows from the fact that we are restricting the sample to households who are
pulled down by at least one notch. Second, house price growth eliminates all bunching
at interest notches: there is bunching at every notch in the pre-LTV distribution, but no
bunching in the passive LTV distribution.29
How do borrowers respond to the relaxed collateral constraints? Panel B illustrates
the implications of equity extraction behavior by comparing the distributions of the
passive LTV and the final chosen LTV. Strikingly, equity extraction behavior largely
recreates the qualitative pattern that existed before house price growth. We see a dra-
matic right-shift of the LTV distribution, moving borrowers back to around zero or into
the positive range, and recreating bunching at notches. In other words, when house
price growth pulls households below one or more notches (Panel A), most of them
extract equity back to the next notch above (at zero) or a higher notch (in the positive
range). Hence, this figure shows how house price growth interacts with bunching re-
sponses to interest notches in a way that is consistent with a collateral mechanism.30,31
To conclude, the multivariate heterogeneity analysis presented in the previous sec-
tion combined with the notches analysis presented here provides quite compelling ev-
idence of the importance of the collateral channel. Most previous work on the effect
29The fact that the passive LTV distribution primarily falls in the bins (−5,0) and (−10,−5), with
a discrete drop between the two, is not a bunching response. It follows mechanically from the x-axis
normalization and the fact that most homeowners are no longer 5 or 10 percentage points away from
a notch. Furthermore, notice that bunching in the pre-LTV distribution is attenuated compared to the
actual amount of bunching in the last refinance event due to amortization between the last and current
refinance events.
30To be clear, what is new in Figure 5.22 compared to the more standard bunching analysis in Best,
Cloyne, Ilzetzki, and Kleven (2015) is the illustration of a dynamic interaction between house price
growth and bunching responses.
31It is also conceivable that some refinancers are targeting their previous monthly mortgage payment
rather than borrowing up to a soft collateral constraint. They might do so because of liquidity constraints
or behavioral factors (see Di Maggio, Kermani, and Ramcharan 2014 for an analysis of the mortgage
payment channel). To explore such effects, Figure 6.8 shows the distribution of changes in monthly
mortgage payments between the last and the current mortgage among homeowners who are pulled
down to a lower notch by house price growth (i.e., the same sample as in Figure 5.22). In this sample,
monthly payments are always reduced by house price growth as it pulls them below interest notches.
But the total net change in the payment depends on other factors such as changes over time in interest
rate levels and the amount of equity they choose to extract. If homeowners extract equity to target an
unchanged monthly mortgage payment, then we would see excess bunching at zero in Figure 6.8. There
is arguably a small spike at zero, but overall the distribution is quite smooth. This shows that, in this
setting, homeowners do not primarily target an unchanged mortgage payment when choosing equity
extraction (while they do target collateral notches as shown above).
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of house prices on household borrowing was only able to estimate the total effect, be-
cause the empirical analyses were based on house price variation (regional or aggregate
variation) that affect both wealth and collateral.
2.6 Conclusion
The global financial crisis of 2007-8 has reignited a debate on the role of house prices
in driving household debt. A first generation of papers following the crisis studied
this question using regional data in the US and found strong borrowing responses.
This paper takes a different methodological tack to this question. Rich administrative
mortgage data and novel features of the UK mortgage market allow us to construct
a large panel of refinancers and study the relationship between borrowing and house
prices at the household level. Exploring a far more granular source of house-price
variation that relies on idiosyncratic rather than regional variation in house prices, we
find household borrowing responses that are considerably smaller than those found
for the US using regional data. Specifically, we find that a 10% percent increase in
individual house price increases borrowing by 2%. Importantly, when we do not make
full use of the panel structure and consider the pre-crisis period, we obtain similar
elasticities to those found for the US.
Our rich dataset also allows us to explore why borrowing responds to house prices.
The striking finding from this analysis is that there is essentially no heterogeneity in
any dimension except one — loan-to-value — but that this dimension is very strong. In
particular, the elasticity is strongly increasing in LTV ratios, even after controlling non-
parametrically for factors such as age, income and income growth. This heterogeneity
analysis together with a test using ’soft’ credit constraints (interest rate notches based
on collateral) strongly suggests that the housing collateral channel is the main driver
of the elasticities we find.
The magnitude of these responses, and the importance of collateral constraints,
has important implications for understanding household behavior in both micro- and
macro-economics. A growing literature on macro and housing relies on collateral con-
straints to obtain realistic macro responses to boom-bust cycles in the housing market.
Our findings affirm such theoretical approaches and provide microeconometric esti-
mates that could help discipline future research in this area.
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Chapter 3
Are Bigger Banks Better? Firm-Level
Evidence from Germany
3.1 Introduction
Does the real economy benefit from having big banks? Will size-dependent banking
regulation harm economic growth? These questions are at the forefront of the debate
about financial regulation following the financial crisis 2008/09. The market share of
the 10 biggest banks in the United States has risen from around 25 percent in 1990
to over 60 percent today (McCord and Prescott 2014). Since the failure of a big bank
can destabilize the entire financial system, regulation to stop banks from getting big-
ger is being debated and implemented (Stern and Feldman 2004). Prominent policy
proposals include direct caps on bank size and higher capital requirements for big in-
stitutions. Policymakers disagree about whether such size-dependent regulation, by
limiting increases in bank size, could reduce the potential for efficiency gains in the
banking system, restrict credit supply, and harm real economic growth (Haldane 2010;
Stein 2013; Johnson 2016; Minneapolis Fed 2016).
Since exogenous variation in bank size is difficult to find, the academic literature
has struggled to analyze the causal effects of increases in bank size (Bernanke 2016).
The key contribution of this paper is to estimate the causal impact of bank size on
the growth of firms in the real economy. I study a natural experiment from postwar
Germany. Two reforms by the Allied occupiers permitted a number of institutions to
consolidate from state-level banks into national banks. The reforms were not caused
by the performance of the banks or the firms they were lending to. Hence, the reforms
led to exogenous increases in the size of the relationship banks of a number of firms.
A newly digitized dataset on German firms and their relationship banks enables me to
compare the growth of firms with a relationship bank treated by the reforms to firms
borrowing from other banks. The main results show that firms did not grow faster
when their banks became larger. Additional analyses reveal the size increase did not
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improve banks’ cost efficiency, but it negatively affected their opaque (small, young,
low-collateral) customers, increased bank risk-taking, and raised the media presence
of the consolidating banks.
Economic theory suggests that big banks may be more efficient, because they are
more diversified (Diamond 1984; Boyd and Prescott 1986; Williamson 1986), can use
internal capital markets (Stein 1997; Scharfstein and Stein 2000), and rely on a large
capital base to fund loans and spread fixed costs. On the other hand, large organi-
zations may be complex to manage (Williamson 1967; Krasa and Villamil 1992a,b;
Cerasi and Daltung 2000) and worse at processing soft information, which may hurt
small and opaque borrowers (Stein 2002; Berger and Udell 2002; Brickley, Linck, and
Smith 2003). They may also take more risk, due to implicit "too-big-to-fail" subsi-
dies by governments (Freixas 1999; Dávila and Walther 2017) and more severe agency
problems (Rajan 2005). The net impact of increases in bank size on the real economy
is an empirical question.1
The empirical challenge in estimating the causal effects of bank size is that banks
do not become big randomly. One cause of differences in bank size is underlying het-
erogeneity in bank efficiency, for example due to the quality of bank managers. More
efficient banks will capture a larger part of the market and hence become bigger than
other banks. A second reason is that firms experience random growth shocks. These
firms will demand more loans from their banks and leave more deposits, increasing the
size of their banks. Third, banks may strategically consolidate with other banks, for
example because they expect increases in the loan demand of the other banks. Such ex-
pectations are usually unobservable in the data, making it difficult to isolate the effects
of size from the strategic factors that drove the consolidation. These reasons imply
that, even in the absence of a causal effect of bank size, one would observe a positive
correlation between bank size and bank efficiency, and between the growth of banks
and the firms they lend to.
Two features of the postwar German banking system combined provide a natural
experiment that overcomes the empirical challenge. The first feature is the reliance
of German firms on relationship banking. Due to asymmetric information, firm-bank
relationships were sticky, so that shocks to specific banks affected the relationship cus-
tomers of the shocked banks more strongly. The second feature is the banking policy of
the Allied occupiers in postwar Germany. The Allies wanted to punish three national
banks (Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, and Dresdner Bank) for their cooperation with
the Nazis and to break their political power. In 1947 and 1948, the Allies broke up the
treated banks into 30 independent state-level organizations, prohibiting the new banks
from branching outside state borders. A first reform in 1952 permitted the state-level
banks to consolidate with other state-level banks within three banking zones. Instead
1Section 3.3 reviews the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of big banks in more detail.
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of 30 state-level banks, there were now 9 treated institutions, one for each former na-
tional bank in each banking zone. A second reform in 1957, after Germany became
a sovereign nation, lifted the restrictions entirely and led to the reconsolidation of the
treated banks into three national banks.2
Improvements in the attitude of the Allies towards Germany, mainly due to the
emergence of the Cold War, were responsible for the implementation and timing of
these reforms. Hence, they were unrelated to the counterfactual growth of the banks
and their customers. Because of the reforms, firms with a treated relationship bank
experienced exogenous increases in the size of their banks in 1952 and 1957.3 Impor-
tantly, the reforms did not directly affect the range of products offered by the banks, the
branch managers, staff, the number of bank branches, or other non-size determinants
of bank efficiency. The reforms also did not change credit market competition, since
the number of banks operating in each local banking market remained the same. This
allows identification of the causal effects of bank size, keeping constant competition
and other spurious confounders correlated with bank size.
Policymakers today often consider a bank systemically important if its assets ex-
ceed 1 percent of GDP. During the breakup, all of the state-level treated banks were
below this threshold, relative to German GDP at the time. After they had reconsoli-
dated in 1957, the assets of each treated bank exceeded 1 percent of GDP. Hence, the
repeal of the Allied legislation transformed the treated banks from 30 relatively small,
regional lenders into 3 banks of systemic importance. This makes this historic episode
a relevant experiment for today’s policy considerations. German banks at the time
focused on the traditional activities of lending, deposit-taking, payment services, and
security underwriting. These activities remain the focus of the vast majority of today’s
banks and still represent a key link between banks and the real economy.
The main analysis examines whether the increases in bank size, induced by the
Allied banking reforms, affected the growth of firms. The firm-level identification
strategy compares the growth of firms with a treated relationship bank to firms that
borrowed from other, untreated banks. The implementation of the identification strat-
egy requires information on the relationship banks and the growth of firms in postwar
Germany. Historic volumes by the commercial information provider Hoppenstedt pro-
vide such information. Due to the poor print quality of the paper volumes, the data
needed to be hand-digitized. The resulting new dataset includes the names of the rela-
tionship banks of around 5,900 firms, the growth of balance sheet variables for around
400 firms, and employment growth for around 2,300 firms.
2The US postwar occupiers of Japan also restructured the corporate financing system and broke up
some of the largest companies. Unlike in Germany, however, the Japanese banks were not split up
(Hoshi and Kashyap 2004).
3I focus on the 1952 and 1957 reforms and do not analyze the impact of the 1947/48 breakup, because
no data exist for the immediate postwar period.
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The main results provide little support for the argument that firms benefit from
having big banks. The growth rates of bank debt, employment, and revenue per worker
were not higher for firms with a treated relationship bank. Firms more likely to benefit
from improvements in the efficiency of their banks, such as firms with a high bank
debt-to-assets ratio or exporters, did not grow faster either. The treated banks did
not form more new banking relationships than other banks and their new relationship
customers did not grow faster than comparable firms. I separately examine a subsample
of firms that are small, young, or in industries with a low share of easily collateralizable
assets. These firms are "opaque", because when they apply for loans they rely on
their banks to process hard-to-verify, soft information, for example to issue character
loans. Opaque firms substituted bank debt with other sources of financing after their
relationship banks grew in size, indicating a relative increase in their cost of bank
debt. Firms with little access to alternative funding suffered a decrease in employment
growth. The results on opaque firms are consistent with theories that argue big banks
are worse at processing soft information.
The second set of results uses data on banks. Before the 1952 reform, total lending
by all the treated, state-level banks grew in parallel to other untreated banks. After the
reforms, however, lending growth was slightly lower. These findings are consistent
with the firm-level results, indicating the reforms did not raise loan supply. Common
measures of banks’ cost efficiency include the ratios of non-interest expenses over to-
tal assets and employee compensation over total assets. If big banks are more efficient
because they can spread fixed costs over a larger base, increases in size should lower
these ratios. Compared to a set of similar, untreated banks, however, the ratios of
the treated banks (aggregated to the level of their former national banking group) im-
proved slightly less after the reforms. These findings are inconsistent with theories that
emphasize the cost efficiency of big banks.
An additional bank-level analysis examines the number of times the treated banks
and their executives were mentioned in the media. Their media mentions strongly
increased after the reforms. Reporting about the reforms cannot explain the effect.
The findings imply that the total number of media mentions of many, small banks is
lower than the media mentions of one big bank, even when the aggregated size of the
small banks is identical to the size of the big bank. An empirical literature shows that
media presence affects consumer choices, political opinions, and voting (Enikolopov
and Petrova 2015; Bursztyn and Cantoni 2016). Media presence may also be correlated
with influence on politicians and regulators (Zingales 2017). Hence, the finding of a
causal effect of bank size on media presence could account for the desire of managers
to build big corporate empires, even when big firms are not more economically efficient
(Jensen 1986; Stein 2003).
The third set of results examines the new banking relationships formed by firms.
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Opaque firms were less likely to establish new relationships with the treated banks
after the reforms, consistent with the reduced ability of big banks to process soft infor-
mation. To test risk-taking, I use three measures of firm risk: the ratio of stock capital
to assets, the volatility of employment growth before the reforms, and the volatility of
revenue growth. Along all three dimensions, I find evidence that risky firms were more
likely to establish new relationships with the treated banks after the reforms, relative to
the untreated banks. Overall, the fraction of opaque firms among the relationship cus-
tomers of the treated banks fell and the fraction of risky firms increased. The findings
on risky firms are consistent with theories linking big banks to increased risk-taking,
due to either moral hazard or bank-internal agency problems.
The final step of the empirical analysis examines the effects at a higher level of
economic aggregation, on municipalities. The municipality-level results capture not
only the effect of the reforms on the growth of firms. Other potential channels include
local general equilibrium effects or the effects on households. The results show that
municipalities with a treated bank branch experienced lower employment growth after
the reforms. Similarly, municipalities with a larger share of firms with treated relation-
ship banks grew more slowly. The negative effect on municipalities is consistent with
the firm-level and bank-level analyses, since there is no evidence that any firm gained
from the increases in bank size, while opaque firms grew more slowly, and overall
lending by the treated banks declined. The municipality-level results are based on a
small sample of around 80 municipalities, so caution is warranted in interpreting these
results. Nonetheless, the results support the conclusion that there is no evidence of a
beneficial effect of the reforms on employment growth.
Size-dependent banking regulation limits the growth of banks by imposing size
caps or higher capital requirements on big banks. The opponents of such regulation
often appeal to the real economic benefits of increases in bank size, for example by
arguing that bigger banks offer higher credit supply to firms. The results of this paper
suggest that the real economy did not benefit when bank assets grew beyond 1 percent
of GDP. Hence, there is no evidence that the introduction of size-dependent banking
regulation for banks of this size would forego significant economic benefits. There
is empirical support for the theories that motivate size-dependent regulation, such as
the reduced ability to process soft information and the higher risk-taking of big banks.
Overall, the findings of this paper throw into question the empirical relevance of the
standard arguments against size-dependent regulation.
This paper proceeds in the following section by describing institutional details
about relationship banking and the postwar banking reforms. Section 3.3 reviews the
theoretical channels of bank size, presents a simple model of how bank size can affect
firm growth, and explains the identification strategy. Section 3.4 describes the data.
The main results on the growth of firms are in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 presents the re-
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sults based on bank data, Section 3.7 analyses new banking relationships, and Section
3.8 studies the effect on municipal employment growth. Section 3.9 concludes.
Related Literature A number of recent cross-sectional papers argue that big banks
face increasing returns or are more efficient (Feng and Serletis 2010; Wheelock and
Wilson 2012; Hughes and Mester 2013; Davies and Tracey 2014; Kovner, Vickery,
and Zhou 2014; Biswas, Gómez, and Zhai 2017). In general, however, the cross-
sectional evidence is mixed (Berger and Mester 1997; Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan
1999). The possibility of reverse causality, that is banks becoming bigger because
they first experienced improvements in their efficiency, makes a causal interpretation
of the cross-sectional data difficult. The evidence based on banking consolidations
(mergers and acquisitions) is similarly ambiguous (Rhoades 1998; Berger, Demsetz,
and Strahan 1999; Calomiris 1999; Focarelli and Panetta 2003). A challenge for this
literature is that consolidations are not random. For instance, Focarelli, Panetta, and
Salleo (2002) find that consolidating banks and the quality of their loan portfolios differ
systematically from other banks. Calomiris and Karceski (2000) argue that this makes
it difficult to find appropriate control groups and causally interpret bank performance
after consolidations.
Another related literature has established that the relaxation of branching regu-
lations in the US influenced real outcomes on many dimensions.4 There are many
potential channels, including increased competition in credit and deposit markets, the
reallocation of lending across banks and states, changes in the incentives of bank man-
agers, and increases in average bank size (Jayaratne and Strahan 1998; Stiroh and
Strahan 2003; Berger, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, and Haubrich 2004; Evanoff and Ors
2008). Hence, the deregulation literature cannot inform a clean estimate of the causal
effects of bank size.
This paper contributes to the literature by identifying a shock to the size of banks
that is exogenous to both the banks and their customers. This allows credible identi-
fication of the causal effects of bank size. I study how bank size affects the growth
of firms, bank efficiency, and municipal employment growth, outcomes relevant to to-
day’s policy discussions about the regulation of big banks. The results about bank
risk-taking and media mentions provide new causal evidence about the behavior of big
organizations.
The findings on opaque firms contribute to an existing literature on how big banks
interact with small firms. Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995) show that, in the cross-
4It raised the performance incentives and pay of bank managers (Hubbard and Palia 1995), state
income and output (Jayaratne and Strahan 1996), entrepreneurship (Black and Strahan 2002; Cetorelli
and Strahan 2006; Kerr and Nanda 2009), and house price co-movements across states (Landier, Sraer,
and Thesmar 2017). It lowered growth volatility (Morgan, Rime, and Strahan 2004), income volatility
(Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and Sørensen 2007), and income inequality (Beck, Levine, and Levkov 2010).
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section, big banks lend proportionally less to small firms. The evidence from consol-
idations is mixed, which may be explained by the non-randomness of consolidations
(Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell 1998; Peek and Rosengren 1998; Strahan and
Weston 1998; Berger, Klapper, and Udell 2001; Sapienza 2002; Jagtiani, Kotliar, and
Maingi 2016). Cole, Goldberg, and White (2004) analyze a firm survey and report that
big banks are less likely to use soft information. Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and
Stein (2005) find that firms located in markets with larger banks rely more on trade
credit, which indicates credit constraints. My identification strategy uses exogenous
variation in the size of the same bank serving the same firm. This strategy overcomes
concerns that the non-randomness of consolidations or underlying, cross-sectional dif-
ferences across regions, firms, and banks bias the estimated effects. An additional
innovation relative to the small-firm literature is that I focus more broadly on opaque
firms, rather than just small firms, and estimate real effects on employment, rather than
just lending.
A number of papers study how banks acquire and use information about their bor-
rowers. These papers do not speak directly to the question of bank size, but their
findings support the view that the decreased use of soft information in large organiza-
tions can explain the negative effects of bank size on opaque firms. Liberti and Mian
(2009) and Canales and Nanda (2012) find that banks with large hierarchies rely less
on soft information, while Cerqueiro, Degryse, and Ongena (2011) report that the loan
terms for opaque borrowers depend on the discretion of the loan officer. Skrastins
and Vig (2018) show that the introduction of additional hierarchical layers in Indian
bank branches reduced total lending and the performance of loans. Consistent with all
these results, Qian, Strahan, and Yang (2015) report that loan officers’ incentives and
internal communication costs strongly affect the quality of information produced by
banks.
Other papers investigate specific channels, through which bank size can affect effi-
ciency. Houston, James, and Marcus (1997), Gilje, Loutskina, and Strahan (2016), and
Cortés and Strahan (2017) show that banks use internal capital markets in response
to shocks. Geographic diversification raises bank-internal agency problems (Goetz,
Laeven, and Levine 2013), reduces bank risk (Goetz, Laeven, and Levine 2016), and
lowers funding costs (Levine, Lin, and Xie 2016). Unlike these papers, I do not fo-
cus on the effects of internal capital markets or diversification. Instead, I estimate the
causal effects of bank size, which may be partially driven by these channels.
3.2 Institutional Details
This paper’s methodology relies on two institutional features of the postwar German
banking system: relationship banking and the Allied banking reforms. In combination,
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these two features give rise to a natural experiment: Firms with a treated relationship
bank were exposed to an exogenous increases in the size of their banks. This section
describes the two features.
3.2.1 Relationship Banking
Economic history (Jeidels 1905; Calomiris 1995), case studies (summarized in Guin-
nane 2002), and recent evidence (Harhoff and Körting 1998; Elsas and Krahnen 1998;
Elsas 2005a) suggest that relationship banking has played an important role in Ger-
man corporate finance from the start of the 19th century until today. Firms of all sizes
formed close and durable business ties to their banks, which reduced asymmetric infor-
mation and improved banks’ monitoring capabilities (Sharpe 1990a; Boot 2000).5 The
literature provides empirical evidence from a number of countries and episodes that
idiosyncratic shocks to relationship banks have real effects on firms, for instance Ben-
melech, Frydman, and Papanikolaou (2017) for the US Great Depression, Amiti and
Weinstein (2011a) for Japan in the 1990s and 2000s, Chodorow-Reich (2014a) for the
2008-09 US financial crisis, and Bentolila, Jansen, Jiménez, and Ruano (forthcoming)
for the Great Recession in Spain.
Three types of banks operated in postwar Germany: commercial banks, cooperative
credit unions, and public banks (Landesbanken and savings banks). The banks offered
their relationship customers the range of universal banking services. Most important
were lending, deposit-taking, payment transactions, and the underwriting of corporate
bonds and stocks.
3.2.2 The Allied Banking Reforms
Three Allied military governments ruled over occupied West Germany after World War
II. The British were in charge of Northern and Western Germany, most of the South
was under American control, and the French governed two small regions in the South-
West. The military government of the American zone was the driving force behind
banking policy.
Phase 1: State-level Breakup 1947/48-52 During the initial years of the occupation,
the American aim was to weaken the German economy, so that it would not be able to
support another war in the future (as laid out in the doctrine of the Morgenthau Plan).
American policymakers were convinced that one reason for the Nazis’ ability to wage
a destructive war had been the centralized banking system. They wanted to break the
5In an influential essay, Gerschenkron (1962) argues that the direct involvement of large banks in
corporate governance was crucial for German industrialization in the late 19th century. Fohlin (1998,
1999) challenges this theory, but does not argue against the view that firms depended on their relation-
ship banks for financial services.
69
political power of the large banks and punish them for cooperating with the Nazis.
Three large banks with a national branch network remained active at the end of the
war: Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, and Dresdner Bank. All had cooperated with the
Nazi regime. I refer to these banks as "treated" (Adler 1949; Horstmann 1991).
The first step towards the breakup of the treated banks came in early 1946, when the
Americans prohibited the treated bank managers in their zone from coordinating busi-
ness with branches in other zones (Wolf 1994). In May 1947, an American military
law institutionalized the breakup. The law created new state-level banks, composed
of the branches of the treated, former national banks. The new banks were not al-
lowed to operate a branch in another federal state. Their directors were the regional
and national managers of the former national banks. Government-appointed custodi-
ans, independent and unconnected to the former banks, were in charge of ensuring
the new state-level banks operated separate financial accounts from each other. The
names of the new institutions were unrecognizable from the former national names,
to underscore that the newly-formed entities were separate from each other and their
former national structure (Der Spiegel 1951). The financial services offered by the
treated banks remained unchanged. The law did not introduce new regulations for the
untreated commercial, cooperative, or public banks.
The French military government issued an identical decree for their zone in 1947.
The British were initially against the breakup, since they worried that foregoing the
efficiency benefits of big banks would harm German economic recovery. In April 1948,
however, they gave in to American pressure and applied the American regulations in
their zone. This first phase of Allied legislation completely changed the structure of
the treated banks. Instead of three treated national banks, as before the war, there were
now 30 independent state-level banks (Holtfrerich 1995; Ahrens 2007).6 Panel A of
Figure 5.23 shows a map of the state-level banking zones.
Phase 2: Three Banking Zones 1952-57 In the early 1950s, the Allied attitude to-
wards West Germany changed. Instead of weakening the German economy, the Allies
now wanted it to serve as buffer against the Communist threat from Eastern Europe.
There was disagreement among the Allies, German politicians, and bankers on how
to optimally reorganize the banking system. The Americans, leading Southern state
politicians, and most central bankers believed that the state-level banks supplied finan-
cial services efficiently. On the other hand, the British, the federal German govern-
ment, and most of the treated bank directors argued that bigger banks would be more
6To be clear, take the example of Dresdner Bank: Instead of one national Dresdner Bank, as before
the war, there were 11 state-level successor banks in 1948, one in each state. Each state-level bank
was composed of the former Dresdner Bank branches in the relevant state. No Deutsche Bank branches
existed in Schleswig-Holstein, so there were 10 Deutsche Bank successors. No Commerzbank branches
existed in Baden and Württemberg-Hohenzollern, so there were 9 Commerzbank successors.
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efficient (Horstmann 1991).
The Allies and the federal German government reached a compromise in Septem-
ber 1952. They created three banking zones, shown in Panel B of Figure 5.23. There
were precise rules on how the treated banks were allowed to partially reconsolidate
within these zones. The state-level banks were allowed to consolidate with other state-
level banks belonging to the same former national bank and located within the same
banking zone. Out-of-zone branching was prohibited. The first zone comprised the
Northern states, which were under British control. The American and French terri-
tories were combined to form the Southern zone. The third zone was the state of
North-Rhine Westphalia, also under British control. Since the state and zonal bor-
ders were identical, the treated banks operating in the state of North-Rhine Westphalia
remained unaffected by the 1952 reform. The empirical strategy outlined in the subse-
quent section exploits the particular treatment of the banks in North-Rhine Westphalia
to construct a plausible control group for the 1952 reform.
The majority of treated bank directors believed their banks would benefit from
being larger. Hence, the Northern and Southern state-level banks had consolidated by
the end of 1952, soon after the reform. Instead of 30 state-level banks, there were
now nine treated banks, one for each former national bank in each banking zone (Wolf
1993). Most of the directors of the nine banks had been directors of the former state-
level banks. The reform did not directly affect the bank staff and the total number of
branches (Holtfrerich 1995).
Phase 3: National Banks from 1957 Five years later, international political devel-
opments affected the structure of the treated banks once more. The emergence of the
Cold War had made Germany a key ally of the West. The Allies granted the German
government full sovereignty in the Paris Agreement of 1955. Since the federal gov-
ernment had always believed in the efficiency of large banks, it lifted all restrictions
from January 1957 (Scholtyseck 2006). The treated banks subsequently consolidated.
By 1958, there were once again three large banks with a national branch network, op-
erating under their old, pre-war names. All directors of the former, zonal banks joined
the boards of the new national banks, while staff and branches remained unchanged
(Horstmann 1991; Holtfrerich 1995).
The reconsolidation of the treated banks was not a foregone conclusion. The Amer-
icans had intended the breakup to be permanent (Der Spiegel 1951). Apart from the
treated banks, the Allies broke up three other large corporations into small, indepen-
dent organizations: the chemical manufacturer I.G. Farbenindustrie, the steel corpo-
ration Vereinigte Stahlwerke, and the movie producer Universum Film. Unlike in the
case of banking, German politicians did not believe these industries benefited from
significant economies of scale. Hence, these organizations remained broken up in
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sovereign Germany, against the wishes of their management (Kreikamp 1977).
3.3 Theory and Identification
Economic theory suggests that changes in the size of a bank can affect its efficiency.
This section reviews the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of big banks. I ex-
plain how the banking reforms of 1952 and 1957 affected the organization of the treated
banks with respect to each theoretical advantage and disadvantage. A model of lending
under relationship banking then illustrates how size-induced changes to bank efficiency
can affect firms. The final part of this section argues that the postwar banking reforms
provide a suitable natural experiment that identifies the causal effects of bank size on
firms.
3.3.1 Advantages of Big Banks
The first theoretical benefit of big banks is that they are more diversified and therefore
have lower funding costs. Under the assumption that there are fixed costs to monitor-
ing borrowers, models by Diamond (1984), Boyd and Prescott (1986), and Williamson
(1986) show that banks with a larger number of customers attract cheaper deposits, be-
cause they can diversify more cheaply. A monopoly bank is socially efficient in these
models. The postwar banking reforms sharply increased the number of customers
served by one treated institution. If indeed there are consequential fixed costs to moni-
toring, the treated banks should have benefited from cheaper funding after the reforms.
Holtfrerich (1995) quotes a number of treated branch managers that argued during the
breakup period that the reforms would lower funding costs.
A second theoretical benefit of big banks is that they use internal capital markets to
allocate funds. During the breakup, the treated banks were allowed to hold interbank
accounts, but had to settle their mutual balances through the central banking system,
just like the other commercial banks (Adler 1949). After consolidating, they were able
to allocate capital internally. Horstmann (1991) explains that interbank markets and
central clearing were well-developed in postwar Germany. Accordingly, treated banks
with a strong deposit base regularly lent through interbank markets before the reforms
(Wolf 1994). If there were significant benefits to internal capital markets, the treated
banks should have become more efficient after the reforms. Stein (1997) argues that
the use of internal capital markets is optimal when external financial markets are un-
derdeveloped. On the other hand, Scharfstein and Stein (2000) show that rent-seeking
behavior by division managers can lead to an inefficient allocation of funds through
internal capital markets. If such rent-seeking is widespread, the access to larger inter-
nal capital markets could actually have been detrimental to the efficiency of the treated
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banks.7
The third benefit concerns the larger capital base of big banks. Big banks can
spread fixed costs over more customers and fund larger loans on their own. Treated
branch managers expressed concerns about high overhead costs from operating sepa-
rate payment transactions systems and from employing specialized credit experts for
each industry before the reforms (Horstmann 1991). Wolf (1994) documents that dur-
ing the first phase of the breakup, the treated banks formed loan syndicates with other
treated and untreated banks to fund large loans. If contracting frictions are high for
loan syndicates, the cost of large loans should have fallen after the reforms.
3.3.2 Disadvantages of Big Banks
The first theoretical disadvantage of big banks arises from the complexity of managing
a large number of customers. Williamson (1967) argues generally that transmitting
accurate information to decision-makers is difficult in large organizations. If banks
cannot fully diversify their risk, Krasa and Villamil (1992a,b) show that the costs of
monitoring big institutions can outweigh the benefits of diversification, raising the cost
of deposits. In the model by Cerasi and Daltung (2000), limited resources of individual
bankers mean that the marginal cost of lending to an additional borrower is increas-
ing. The reforms increased the number of hierarchical levels and the organizational
complexity of the treated banks. For instance, during the first phase of the breakup,
each treated state-level bank decided on loan applications independently in region-
ally specialized credit councils (Horstmann 1991). After the reforms, a centralized
decision-making structure took over.
Models by Stein (2002), Berger and Udell (2002), and Brickley, Linck, and Smith
(2003) suggest a second disadvantage. Institutions with many hierarchical levels may
be less suited to processing soft, difficult-to-verify information. Soft information is
important when banks deal with opaque firms, where it is difficult to objectively doc-
ument creditworthiness. In such cases, bank managers may rely on soft information
to issue character loans, for example. The centralization of decision-making after the
reforms may have reduced the incentives for regional managers to collect soft infor-
mation, lowered the availability of soft information to the responsible bank managers,
and ultimately decreased loan supply to opaque relationship customers of the treated
banks.
7One hypothesis is that the benefits to internal capital markets depend on how closely the treated
banks cooperated during the breakup period. Reports by the German Federal Ministry of Economics,
Ahrens (2007), and Horstmann (1991) suggest that the successor banks of the Dresdner Bank cooperated
most closely with each other, for example by organizing meetings of all the heads of the successor banks.
The Commerzbank and Deutsche Bank successors cooperated less. In the result below, I report no
differential effects for the corporate customers of the Dresdner Bank successors, suggesting the degree
of cooperation did not significantly influence the effects of the postwar reforms.
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A third theoretical disadvantage is that big banks may take more risks, because
of moral hazard or agency problems. The cause of moral hazard is that big banks
carry higher systemic risk (Pais and Stork 2013; Adrian and Brunnermeier 2016). As a
result, Freixas (1999) argues, governments are more likely to bail out big banks when
they become insolvent. Dávila and Walther (2017) show theoretically that big banks
internalize the increased probability of a bailout and take more risk. The postwar
reforms increased the probability that the treated banks would experience a bail-out.
One reason is their increased size and hence systemic importance. A second reason
is that the German government, which became sovereign before the second reform,
believed in the economic necessity of big banks. In contrast, the Allied governments,
that had been in charge before the second reform, had actively tried to break the large
banks’ influence.
The cause of agency problems is the increased hierarchical distance between bank
directors and local branch managers in big organizations. Directors of big organiza-
tions find it more difficult to directly monitor the local bank managers and understand
the local risks. Instead, they may reward the local managers based on outcomes. Many
such outcome-based reward schemes distort incentives. Bank managers may reap the
benefits if the risk pays off, for example by earning promotions. They may not suffer
sever consequences in the downside scenario, for example because they can easily find
a job at another bank or because it cannot be unambiguously documented that their in-
creased risk-taking is to blame for losses. If the upside benefits outweigh the downside
risks in such a manner, the local managers in big organizations have a greater incentive
to take risks (Rajan 2005; Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein 2008).
A theoretical social cost of bank consolidation is a decrease in competition. Im-
portantly, the Allied banking reforms changed the size of the treated banks without
affecting competition in the regional banking markets. The reason is that the state-
level institutions did not compete with each other, as they were not allowed to open
branches in other federal states.8 Hence, the number of banks operating in each re-
gional banking market remained unaffected by the bank breakup and the reforms. This
allows me to isolate the pure effects of bank size from the effects of competition.
3.3.3 Model
The theoretical considerations documented above suggest an increase in the size of a
bank can affect bank efficiency. The appropriate measure of size in these models is
the number of customers served by a bank.9 Henceforth, I refer to increases in bank
8The data on bank-firm relationships show that 99 percent of firms did not have a treated relationship
bank outside the state of their headquarters in 1951. The exceptions may be explained by firms operating
multiple establishments.
9The reason is that by adding new customers with imperfectly correlated default risk, the bank
becomes more diversified. This is not true when the bank simply expands lending to a single customer.
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size and increases in the number of customers interchangeably. The following model
illustrates how shocks to the number of customers can affect the loan supply of firms,
if the cost function of the bank depends on the number of its customers. The key
assumption of the model is that a firm can only borrow from its relationship bank, due
to asymmetric information in credit markets (Sharpe 1990a). This implies that banks
hold a "bilateral monopoly" (Boot 2000) over each relationship customer.
Firms Firm ib maximizes profits piib. Capital Kib is the sole input, which the firm
borrows at a interest rate rib from its relationship bank. The firm takes the interest rate
as given. Aib captures all exogenous factors shifting the firm’s demand for capital, such
as productivity shocks or demand shocks in the product market. The returns-to-scale
production parameter is α , where 0 < α < 1:
piib = AibKαib− ribKib.
The firm’s optimal demand for capital is given by:
αAibK
(α−1)
ib = rib. (3.1)
Banks Bank b lends to a total of nb relationship customers. For now, assume the
bank takes as given the total number of relationship customers. I discuss reasons for
why this number may change when discussing equilibrium below. Banks earn interest
income, which is the interest rate charged to each relationship customer multiplied by
the amount of capital lent to that firm, summed over all firms. The bank faces the
capital demand function of each relationship customer, as reported in equation 3.1.
Banks pay a constant marginal cost for each unit of lent capital, c(nb,βb). This
marginal cost includes expenditures on risk management, employees, and deposits.
The marginal cost is a function of a bank efficiency parameter βb and the total number
of relationship customers nb. The marginal cost is decreasing in bank efficiency βb.
As discussed in the previous subsection, theory is ambiguous about the effect of the
number of relationship customers nb on marginal cost. The bank maximizes profits pib:
pib =
nb
∑
i=1
[ribKib− c(nb,βb)Kib], (3.2)
where the first term in the bracket is the interest income from lending to firm ib and
the second term in the bracket is the total cost from lending to firm ib.
Equilibrium Combining equations 3.1 and 3.2 and taking the first-order condition
gives the optimal amount of capital lent to firm ib, Kib. This amount increases with the
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exogenous capital demand shock Aib and decreases with the marginal cost of lending
c(nb,βb):
ln(kib) =
1
1−α [ln(Aib)− ln(c(n
′
b,β
′
b)].
A simple specification of the marginal cost for each unit of lent capital is:
ln(c(nb,βb)) =−φnb−κβb,
where φ is either positive or negative and κ is strictly positive. Under this specification,
the change in capital lent to firm ib from period t to period t ′ is given by equation 3.3,
where the operator ∆t,t ′[.] indicates the growth of the variable in square brackets from
t to t ′:
∆t,t
′
[ln(Kib)] =
1
1−α ·∆
t,t ′[ln(Aib)]+
φ
1−α ·∆
t,t ′[nb]+
κ
1−α ·∆
t,t ′[βb]. (3.3)
Changes in firm capital demand Aib, the number of the bank’s relationship customers
nb (i.e. bank size), and bank efficiency βb determine the growth in capital lent. The
coefficient φ1−α measures the causal effect of changes in bank size on firm growth,
the key object of interest in this paper. The model can be extended to include other
factors of production complementary to capital, such as employment. These factors
would depend on firm capital demand, bank size, and bank efficiency in a qualitatively
similar manner to capital.
Empirical Implication The empirical challenge in estimating the causal effect of
bank size arises from the fact that changes in firm capital demand Aib and bank effi-
ciency βb are typically unobservable in the data. This means the estimable specification
is:
∆t,t
′
[ln(Kib)] =
φ
1−α ·∆
t,t ′[nb]+υib, (3.4)
where firm capital demand and bank efficiency enter the unobservable error term:
υib =
1
1−α ·∆
t,t ′[ln(Aib)]+
κ
1−α ·∆
t,t ′ [βb].
A regression based on equation 3.4 estimates the true causal coefficient φ1−α if changes
in firm capital demand and bank efficiency are generally uncorrelated with changes
in bank size. However, banks do not become big randomly. For example, a random
shock to regional productivity will lead to firm entry, raising the size of banks operat-
ing in that region, and simultaneously increase the capital demand of incumbent bank
customers. In addition, banks strategically consolidate with other banks, for example
because they expect increases in the efficiency of the other banks that are unrelated to
size. These considerations imply that changes in bank size are likely to be correlated
76
with changes in firm capital demand and bank efficiency. Hence, the observed, uncon-
ditional correlation between bank size and firm growth can be positive, even if the true
causal coefficient φ1−α is zero.
To estimate the causal effects of bank size on firms, a suitable experiment needs to
manipulate the number of a bank’s relationship customers, without directly affecting
firm capital demand, bank efficiency, and other unobservable components of firm and
bank performance.
3.3.4 Identification Strategy
The postwar reforms of 1952 and 1957 provide suitable natural experiments that allow
estimating the causal effects of bank size. Equation 3.4 motivates the regression speci-
fication, which is given by equation 3.5. The outcome is the growth in the total amount
of capital borrowed by firm ib from period t to period t ′:
∆t,t
′
[ln(Kib)] = θ · (relationship bank treated between t and t ′)b+η ·Xib+ εib. (3.5)
Alternative specifications use firm employment growth and revenue productivity
growth as outcomes.
The key regressor is an indicator for whether one of the firm’s relationship banks
increased in size due to a postwar reform between the years t and t ′. This regressor
serves as proxy for an increase in the number of the bank’s customers, i.e. the term
∆t,t ′[nb] from equation 3.4.10
Equation 3.5 can be thought of as reduced-form specification. The coefficient θ
captures all the channels, through which a bank size shock could affect firms.11 θ
estimates the causal effect of a change in bank size on firm growth if a parallel-trends
assumption holds. This assumption requires that firms with a treated relationship bank
would have grown in parallel to other firms, had it not been for the reforms.
The parallel-trends assumption is equivalent to the assumption that the components
of the error term, including changes to firm capital demand and bank efficiency, are un-
correlated with the treatment indicator. Changes in firm capital demand, ∆t,t ′[ln(Aib)],
and bank efficiency, ∆t,t ′[βb], enter the error term εib, as in equation 3.4. Importantly,
the reforms increased the size of the banks independent of changes in the firms’ capital
demand or other determinants of bank efficiency. The results sections below present
evidence in support of the parallel-trends assumption, including parallel pre-trends and
10In robustness checks, I also use regressors based on the fraction of the firm’s relationship banks
that were treated. The baseline specification uses the dummy, since it is not clear theoretically whether
the treated banks would extend the benefits of size equally to all their relationship customers or more to
firms with a higher fraction of treated relationship banks.
11Apart from the interest rate on loans, the return on deposits, the cost of payment services, and
expectations about future credit access could all be affected.
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balancing tests of firm and bank observables. To further strengthen the assumption, the
regressions condition on a vector of control variables Xib, described in the relevant re-
sults section.
The data allow me to analyze two periods. First, I can calculate the growth of
stock corporations from 1951 to 1960. The two reforms were in 1952 and 1957, so
the reforms affected all stock corporations with a treated relationship bank during this
period. The second period I analyze is from 1951 to 1956. I have data on the growth
of non-stock firms for this period. The 1952 reform only affected treated banks out-
side the state of North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW). Hence, the treatment dummy in the
specifications analyzing growth from 1951 to 1956 indicates whether firms had a rela-
tionship bank that was treated in 1952. The samples in the baseline regressions include
all firms, for which I have data for the given period.
For the period from 1951 to 1956, I additionally create a more restrictive,
"matched" sample. There are four restrictions for the matched sample. First, it only
includes firms that had a relationship bank treated in either 1952 or 1957. This restric-
tion addresses the concern that firms with a relationship to a bank treated in either 1952
or 1957 differed from firms with banks that were never treated. Second, I drop from
the sample firms located in the Ruhr area, an urban region within NRW traditionally
based on heavy industry, which was potentially exposed to different economic shocks
than the rest of the country. Third, to address the concern that the formation of the
European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 may bias the results, I drop firms pro-
ducing coal and steel. Fourth, from the remaining sample, I only use firms in NRW
or in states bordering NRW. The state of NRW was a hasty postwar creation, based on
the British desire to institutionalize its control over Western Germany. The subregions
composing NRW were culturally heterogeneous. Many were more similar to the states
they bordered than to the other subregions in NRW (von Alemann 2000). Regressions
using the matched sample identify the effect by comparing relationship customers of
banks treated in both 1952 and 1957 (located in states bordering NRW) to customers
of banks treated only in 1957 (located in NRW).12 The use of the matched sample
strengthens the parallel-trends assumption because the restrictions make it likely that
all firms in the matched sample were affected by similar unobservable shocks.
Three additional analyses supplement the main results on firm growth. I study
the financial figures and media mentions of banks, the establishment of new bank-
ing relationships, and municipal employment growth. All analyses require a similar
parallel-trends assumption as the main analysis, namely that the treated banks and mu-
nicipalities with a treated bank branch would have evolved in parallel to other banks
12In additional tests, I apply only the first restriction, comparing relationship customers of banks
treated in both 1952 and 1957 (located in any state except NRW) to customers of banks treated only in
1952 (located in NRW). The results are similar.
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and municipalities in the absence of the reforms.
3.4 Data
3.4.1 Data on Firms
At the heart of the paper lies a newly digitized dataset on the relationship banks and
the growth of German firms in the 1950s. To my knowledge, this is the first digi-
tal micro-dataset on German firms in the postwar period. The data source are two
publication series by the commercial information provider Hoppenstedt. The historic
volumes of these series are difficult to locate.13 Supported by the German National
Library of Economics, I was able to access the 1941, 1952, 1958/59, and 1970 vol-
umes of the publication Handbuch der Grossunternehmen and the 1952/53, 1961/62,
and 1970/71 volumes of the publication Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften
in various German archives. The poor print quality of the older volumes does not allow
automatic digital character recognition. Instead, I photographed all pages from these
publications, around 15,000 photographs in total. Appendix Figure 6.9 displays a pho-
tograph of a page from a firm entry in the 1952/53 volume on Aktiengesellschaften.
The firm data were then digitized by hand.
The publication on Aktiengesellschaften reports data on all German stock corpo-
rations, while Grossunternehmen includes a subset of firms of other legal forms. In
the postwar years, both publications list the firms’ names, addresses, names of rela-
tionship banks, and employment. There is no information on what financial services
or how much credit a firm received from a particular relationship bank. Aktienge-
sellschaften additionally reports revenue, total assets, liabilities, and bank debt, while
Grossunternehmen indicates whether the firm exported any of its products. A signifi-
cant number of firms in both publications have missing data on many of these variables.
The main dataset builds on the 1952 and 1958/59 Grossunternehmen and the
1952/53 and 1961/62 Aktiengesellschaften volumes. From these volumes, I digitize
data for all non-financial firms that, at a minimum, contain the names of the firm’s
relationship banks. There are 2,882 such stock corporations and 4,589 such non-stock
firms in the 1952/53 volumes. Using the firm name and address as identifiers, I perform
a Stata fuzzy match (reclink) procedure to connect firm entries from 1952/53 volumes
to the 1958/59 and 1961/62 volumes. I check all matches by hand to ensure there are
no errors. Additionally, I identify 43 cases of firm exit, which are reported at the end of
the Hoppenstedt volumes. There are also six reported mergers of firms in the dataset.
To account for the mergers, I aggregate the employment and balance sheet values of
all firms participating in the merger, record all their relationship banks, and keep only
13Hoppenstedt destroyed its entire paper archive a few years ago. Online library catalogs do not
always report the holdings accurately because historic volumes get misplaced or break.
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one firm in the dataset for the years before the merger. Overall, the match leaves 2,188
stock corporations and 3,706 non-stock firms in the dataset.
A Hoppenstedt volume reports data for one to three years prior to the release year
of the volume. For instance, the 1952 volume mostly reports data for 1951, while
the 1958/59 volume mostly covers 1956. For the firms in Aktiengesellschaften, I can
calculate the growth of employment, revenue per worker, total assets, liabilities, and
bank debt from 1951 to 1960. For the firms in Grossunternehmen, it is possible to
calculate employment growth from 1951 to 1956. Some firm entries in the 1952/53
volumes report 1949 employment values, so I can calculate the pre-reform growth of
these firms from 1949 to 1951. The measure of growth is the symmetric growth rate,
a second-order approximation to the growth rate of the natural logarithm. It naturally
limits the influence of outliers and accommodates zeros in the outcome variable, for
example due to firm exit (Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh 1998a).14 To accommodate
comparisons of growth rates across periods of different lengths, I calculate all the firm
growth rates as average annual growth rates, by dividing the symmetric growth over
the whole period by the number of years in the period.15
From the 1941 and 1970 Grossunternehmen and the 1970/71 Aktiengesellschaften
volumes, I record only the relationship banks. No data on relationship banks exist
in the Aktiengesellschaften volumes prior to 1952. Recording relationship banks over
a longer time horizon is helpful in identifying changes in relationships, because few
German firms add new relationship banks every year (Dwenger, Fossen, and Simmler
2015). There is a successful match for 373 firms between the 1941 and 1952 vol-
umes. From the 1970/71 volumes, I match the relationship banks of 4,191 firms to the
1952/53 volumes.
3.4.2 Summary Statistics on Firms
Table 5.16 summarizes the main firm dataset. The median stock corporation in the
sample was of a similar size and age to the median non-stock firm, both having close
to 350 employees in 1951.16 The very largest firms, however, were stock corporations,
which means the average stock corporation was larger than the average non-stock firm.
Both stock capital and bank debt were important parts of stock corporations’ financing,
amounting to an average of 37 percent and 10 percent of total assets, respectively. The
percent ratio of bank debt over assets changed by an annual average of -0.11 percentage
points from 1951 to 1960, which suggests bank debt grew at a marginally lower rate
14Formally, the symmetric growth of y from t-1 to t is gy = 2 · (yt−yt−1)(yt+yt−1) . It is bounded in the interval
[-2,2].
15For example, the total symmetric growth rate from 1951 to 1960 is divided by 9, the number of
years between the base and final year. This gives the average annual growth rate.
16To be registered as stock corporation, firms had to hold at least 100,000 Deutsche Mark in stock
capital. The advantage of stock corporations is that they could raise funds by issuing new stock capital.
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than assets. The average annual symmetric growth rate of aggregate employment in
West Germany was 0.04 from 1951 to 1956 and 0.03 from 1951 to 1960. The average
growth rates of firms in the sample were identical to these aggregate growth rates,
suggesting the firms are fairly representative for the period.
In total, the firms with non-missing employment data in the sample cover 15 per-
cent of West Germany’s 14.6 million employees in 1951 (Bundesministerium für Ar-
beit 1951). In the sample, 14 percent of stock corporations and 6 percent of non-stock
firms have fewer than 50 employees. The number of firms in the 1951 population is
unavailable, but as rough guide, the fraction of establishments with fewer than 50 em-
ployees was above 98 percent (Statistisches Bundesamt 1952). 70 percent of firms in
the sample are in the manufacturing sector, compared to 32 percent of establishments
in the population. All specifications in the results section control for firm size and in-
dustry when estimating average effects, to ensure the findings depend on variation in
exposure among firms of similar size and industry. I also explore heterogeneity related
to size and industry.
In 1951, stock corporations had on average 3.2 relationship banks. Non-stock firms
had on average 2.5. I calculate two main treatment dummies. The first, called "relation-
ship bank treated in 1952/57", indicates whether one of the firm’s relationship banks
in 1951 was treated by the postwar banking reforms, either in 1952 or 1957. The sec-
ond, called "relationship bank treated in 1952", measures whether a 1951 relationship
bank was treated by the 1952 reform, i.e. whether the firm had a relationship to a
treated bank outside of North-Rhine Westphalia. 68 percent of stock corporations and
69 percent of non-stock firms have a relationship bank treated in 1952 or 1957, while
46 percent and 41 percent have a relationship bank treated in 1952.
To test whether firms with a treated relationship bank differed from other firms, I
regress the two main treatment dummies on firm observables in Table 5.17. Column (1)
shows that larger and older stock corporations were more likely to have a relationship
bank that was treated in 1952 or 1957. The coefficients on the balance sheet variables
in column (2) are small and insignificant, indicating that stock corporations with a
treated bank were not more reliant on stock capital financing or bank debt financing,
conditional on size and age. Columns (3) and (4) similarly reveal that larger and older
non-stock firms were more likely to have a bank treated in 1952 or 1957, but that being
an exporter was conditionally uncorrelated with having a treated bank.
The regressions in columns (5) and (6) use the matched sample. The outcome of
interest in the matched sample is whether a relationship bank was treated in 1952.
There is no correlation between having a bank treated in 1952 and size or age, for
either stock corporations or non-stock firms. Unreported additional tests also reveal no
correlation with firm stock capital financing, bank debt financing, and export status.
These results strengthen the argument that the matched sample provides a credible
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natural experiment, since observationally equivalent firms were exposed to differential
bank size shocks.17
3.4.3 Data and Summary Statistics on Banks
Data on banks supplement the firm-level analysis. The Deutsche Bundesbank reports
lending and deposits aggregated at the level of groups of banks, starting in 1948. One
of the groups includes all the treated banks. Most similar to the treated banks is the
group of other commercial banks. These other commercial banks all operated for
profit. Most were active within only one state, although a handful had branches in two
or three states. The group of other commercial banks does not include small, single-
branch private banks (Privatbanken).
The data by the Deutsche Bundesbank do not include banks’ cost statements and
information on individual banks. I therefore additionally hand-digitize financial figures
from annual bank reports. The treated banks were universal, commercial, branching
banks. To find a set of comparable institutions, I use the banking handbook by Hof-
mann (1949). There were 16 universal, commercial banks with a branch network in
operation in 1949, apart from the treated banks. I was able to locate the 1952 and
1960 annual reports of 9 of these untreated banks in German libraries and archives,
in addition to the reports of the treated banks. The reports of many treated and un-
treated banks for the years before 1952 have not been preserved. The treated banks
consolidated after the first reform in September 1952, so the effect of the reforms on
the December 1952 figures is likely small.
Table 5.18 compares the treated to the 9 untreated banks. I aggregate figures for the
treated banks at the level of the three national banks that were formed after the second
reform in 1957. Hofmann (1949) lists the three banks with the largest branch network
apart from the treated banks: Bayerische Hypotheken- & Wechsel-Bank, Bayerische
Vereinsbank, and Oldenburgische Landesbank. These three banks serve as a suitable
direct comparison to the treated banks, since they had a similar number of branches
to the treated banks during the first and second phases of Allied policy. The table
reports figures for these three comparison banks and also the average value of all the 9
untreated banks, which includes the three comparison banks.
The first three columns show the mechanical impact of the reforms on bank size.
Total assets for each banking group are fixed at their 1952 values and then divided
by the number of individual banks in the relevant period. As the reforms lowered the
number of banks in the treated groups, the average size of each institution in the treated
17The improved sample balance in the matched sample is mainly due to the first restriction of only
using firms with a relationship bank treated in either 1952 or 1957 in the sample. Applying only the first
restriction, the data also reject the hypotheses that firms with a relationship bank treated in 1952 and
1957 (outside NRW) were older or larger than firms with a relationship bank treated only in 1957 (in
NRW). The results on firm growth presented below similarly hold when using only the first restriction.
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groups rose. For instance, the two reforms increased average bank size in the Deutsche
Bank group by a factor of ten, since there were 10 state-level banks during the breakup.
The untreated banks naturally remained unaffected.
Column (1) show that the average total assets of a treated bank in 1952 were 323
million Deutsche Mark, while for the average untreated bank total assets were 330
million. Columns (4) to (6) present three cost ratios commonly used to measure bank
efficiency, discussed in more detail in the results section. The 1952 values for all banks
are relatively close. These numbers indicate that the untreated banks are a suitable
control group for the treated banks.
3.4.4 Data and Summary Statistics on Municipalities
The municipal employment data are hand-digitized from the annual publication Statis-
tisches Jahrbuch deutscher Gemeinden. I digitize employment data for 1949, 1951,
1956, and 1960, matching the years for which I have firm employment data. The an-
nual bank reports identify whether a municipality had a treated bank branch. Sectoral
employment shares are from the 1950 Betriebszählung (census of enterprises). Aver-
age employment in the municipalities in the sample was 64,992 in 1951. 86 percent of
municipalities had a bank branch treated in either 1952 or 1957. 52 percent had a bank
branch treated in the first reform of 1952.
3.5 Results on the Growth of Firms
This section presents the main results of the paper. It analyzes the effect of the postwar
banking reforms on the growth of firms, separately for stock corporations and non-
stock firms.
3.5.1 The Effect on the Growth of Stock Corporations
Table 5.19 estimates the effect of the reforms on stock corporations. The specifications
are based on equation 3.5. The outcome in Panel A is the average annual growth rate
of bank debt. The regressor of interest is a dummy for whether a bank treated in
1952 or 1957 was among the firm’s relationship banks in 1951. The untreated group
includes firms with relationship banks that were neither treated in 1952 nor in 1957.
If the reforms led to an increase in firms’ bank loan supply, the coefficient should be
positive. The point estimate in column (1) implies that the growth of bank debt of firms
with a treated bank was approximately 0.1 percentage points lower per year, compared
to firms with no treated relationship bank. The 95 percent confidence interval excludes
growth differences greater than 3 percentage points.
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One potential concern is that broad regional differences or heterogeneous shocks to
certain industries may mask the true effect. Column (2) includes the full interaction of
18 industry fixed effects18 with fixed effects for the Northern, Western, and Southern
regions of Germany, equivalent to the banking zones 1952-57. To account for variation
in growth due to firm size and age (Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda 2013), column
(3) adds controls for ln firm age and ln firm assets in 1951, again interacted with
three zonal fixed effects. These control variables ensure region-specific shocks to firms
in certain industries, of certain sizes, or certain ages do not affect the results. The
coefficients remain close to zero and statistically insignificant. There is no evidence
that firms with treated banks experienced an improvement in their bank loan supply
relative to other firms.
The outcome in Panel B is the average annual change in the percent ratio of bank
debt over total assets. If firms with a treated relationship bank had access to cheaper
bank debt, they should have funded themselves with more bank debt, increasing the
ratio. The use of the ratio of bank debt over total assets as outcome is conceptually
equivalent to controlling for changes in the firms’ total demand for funding, for ex-
ample by using firm fixed effects. The coefficient in column (1) implies that firms
with treated banks raised their ratio of bank debt over assets by a statistically insignif-
icant 0.14 percentage points. This point estimate is small, as it amounts to 10 percent
of a standard deviation of the outcome variable. The 95 percent confidence interval
excludes increases in the ratio greater than 0.5 percentage points.
Panels C and D similarly report small and insignificant effects on employment and
revenue per worker, respectively. The 95 percent confidence intervals exclude growth
increases greater than 0.9 and 1.4 percentage points, respectively. There is no evidence
that the reforms led firms to hire more workers or improve revenue productivity.
3.5.2 The Effect on the Growth of Non-Stock Firms
Table 5.20 analyzes non-stock firms. The outcome variables is the average annual em-
ployment growth from 1951 to 1956. The regressor of interest in this table is a dummy
for whether the firm had a relationship bank that was treated in 1952 (i.e. a treated bank
outside of NRW). The untreated group includes firms with relationship banks that were
neither treated in 1952 nor in 1957. It also includes firms with relationship banks that
were only treated in 1957. The sample in columns (1) and (2) includes all firms with
available employment data. Since data on assets do not exist for this sample, I control
for size using fixed effects for four bins of firm employment (0-49, 50-249, 250-999,
18The industries are agriculture & mining, food & drink, clothes & textiles, wooden products, chem-
icals & pharmaceuticals, rubber & glass, metals manufacturing, production of machinery, repair & re-
search, energy supply, water & waste management, construction & real estate, trade & retail, transport,
gastronomy & art, information & communication, and finance & insurance.
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1000+). The sample in columns (3) and (4) use the more restrictive, "matched" sample.
I do not use the zonal fixed effects in columns (3) and (4) because the matched sample
identifies the effect using only cross-zonal variation.
The results in Table 5.20 present no evidence that the bank reforms affected em-
ployment growth, in either the full or the matched sample. For instance, the point
estimate in column (2), using the full sample with all controls, implies employment
growth at firms with a treated relationship bank was 0.1 percentage points lower per
year. The 95 percent confidence interval excludes growth improvements above 0.7 per-
centage points. The point estimate in the matched sample in column (4) also implies an
insignificant growth decrease of 0.1 percentage points and the 95 percent confidence
interval rejects improvements above 1.2 percentage points. The similar coefficients in
the full and the matched samples suggest no unobservable shocks are correlated with
the treatment indicator in the full sample, strengthening the identification assumption.
Other papers studying the effects of banking shocks on firms report large point
estimates compared to the coefficients reported in this paper so far. For instance, Lib-
erti, Seru, and Vig (2016) find that the introduction of a credit registry in Argentina
improved the efficiency of bank credit allocation, increasing lending to firms by 61
percent within two years. Bertrand, Schoar, and Thesmar (2007) study the effects of
the 1980s deregulation of the French banking sector on bank-dependent firms, analyz-
ing heterogeneity by firm profitability. More profitable firms (firms with a one standard
deviation higher pre-reform return on assets) experienced a relative increase in the ra-
tio of bank debt over total assets by 2.3 percentage points in the decade following the
deregulation. There was a 23 percent increase in employment in bank-dependent in-
dustries relative to other industries (moving from the 25th to 75th percentile of the
industry bank debt-to-assets ratio). Other papers study bank lending cuts. Due to the
interbank liquidity freeze in 2007, the annual bank debt growth of the average Ital-
ian firm was 2.9 percentage points lower and employment growth was 0.5 percentage
points lower from 2006 to 2010 (Cingano, Manaresi, and Sette 2016a). Spanish firms
attached to weak banks experienced a reduction in the annual growth of bank debt
by 1.3 percentage points and of employment by 0.7 percentage points from 2006 to
2010 (Bentolila, Jansen, Jiménez, and Ruano forthcoming). The large magnitude of
the effects in the other studies, relative to the estimates of this paper, strengthens the
conclusion that the postwar reforms had no economically significant impact on the
growth of the average firm. The analysis of bank financial figures further below also
supports this conclusion.
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3.5.3 The Effect on the Growth of Opaque Firms
A theoretical disadvantage of big banks is that they may be worse at dealing with
opaque firms, which requires collecting and processing soft information. The literature
has traditionally used firm size as a proxy for opacity (Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan,
and Stein 2005). Table 5.21 estimates the effect of having a relationship bank treated
in 1952 on firm employment growth from 1951 to 1956, for different bins of firm
size. The coefficients for the smallest firm size bins of 0-9, 10-19, 20-29, and 30-39
employees are all negative. While they are statistically insignificant due to the small
sample sizes, they imply economically significant decreases in employment growth
between 2.3 and 6.9 percentage points. The point estimates for the larger firms are of
smaller magnitude and insignificant.
To create a more systematic classification of opaque firms, I identify three indica-
tors for opacity: size, age, and asset tangibility. First, a literature argues that small
firms face more idiosyncratic risk, have lower savings, and are difficult to assess for
lenders. Studies typically use a cut-off of 50 employees to identify small firms (Gertler
and Gilchrist 1994; Chodorow-Reich 2014a). Second, young firms are less likely to
have an established reputation and paper trail to prove their creditworthiness. The lit-
erature usually defines young firms as firms under the age of 10 (Rajan and Zingales
1998; Hurst and Pugsley 2011). Third, technological differences across industries lead
to variation in the share of assets that can be easily used as collateral. Firms with a
low fraction of collateralizable assets are more likely to rely on their banks to use soft
information, since it is difficult to unambiguously value and document their assets.
Following Braun (2005) and Manova (2012), I use an industry measure of asset tangi-
bility (industry average of fixed tangible assets over total assets) to identify firms with
low collateral value. I classify firms as opaque if they have fewer than 50 employees,
are younger than 10 years old in 1952, or are in the bottom ten percent by industry
asset tangibility.
Table 5.22 restricts the sample to opaque firms. In columns (1) to (5), the various
outcome variables measure growth from 1951 to 1960, so the regressor of interest
indicates firms with relationship banks that were treated in 1952 or 1957. Column (1)
reports that for opaque stock corporations with a treated relationship bank, the ratio
of bank debt over assets fell by an annual average of 1.4 percentage points from 1951
to 1960. The effect is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. This
suggests that opaque stock corporations suffered a decrease in their bank loan supply.
Column (2) finds that the ratio of stock capital to assets increased by 0.6 percentage
points for firms with a treated bank, although the effect is imprecisely estimated. The
effect on the growth of total assets in column (3) implies a reduction of 1.1 percentage
points, but the coefficient is statistically insignificant. This leaves open the possibility
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that stock corporations were not able to close all of the funding gap by issuing new
stock capital. However, there was no effect on employment growth, as column (4)
reports a point estimate of zero.
Opaque firms with few alternative sources of bank debt should have suffered the
largest decrease in their bank loan supply. In line with this hypothesis, column (5)
reports that opaque firms with higher intensive-margin dependence on the treated banks
were more affected. There was a significant and economically large effect on the
ratio of bank debt over assets on firms, for which more than half of relationship banks
were treated. For firms where less than half were treated, the effect was smaller and
statistically insignificant.
Columns (6) and (7) estimate the employment effects on opaque, non-stock firms.
The outcome variables measure growth from 1951 to 1956, so the regressors of interest
indicates whether firms had relationship banks that were treated in 1952. Column (6)
shows that the employment growth of opaque firms was 2.9 percentage points lower,
when more than half of relationship banks were treated. The coefficient is statistically
significant at the 10 percent level. The effect remains of similar magnitude and signifi-
cant when I use only the matched sample in column (7). The effect on firms, for which
less than half of their relationship banks were treated, is negative, but smaller and in-
significant in columns (6) and (7). These estimates suggest the employment outcomes
of non-stock firms are more vulnerable to bank loan supply than stock corporations.
A likely reason is that non-stock firms cannot fund themselves by issuing additional
stock capital.19
In summary, the results in Table 5.22 indicate that opaque firms experienced de-
creased bank loan supply after the reforms, with negative consequences for the em-
ployment of opaque non-stock firms.20
3.5.4 Robustness Checks on the Growth of Firms
The robustness checks in Table 5.23 provide further evidence that firms with a treated
relationship bank did not benefit from the reforms. Column (1) uses both stock and
non-stock firms in the sample to test whether there was a pre-trend in employment
growth from 1949 to 1951. The coefficient on firms with a treated bank is small,
positive, and statistically insignificant. There is also no difference in the growth of
firms with a bank treated in 1952 (i.e. with a treated bank not in NRW).
19I also examined age and asset tangibility separately. The effect of having a relationship bank treated
in 1952 on employment growth from 1951 to 1956 is -0.020 (0.017) for firms under 10 years old and
0.001 (0.003) for firms at least 10 years old. The effect on firms in the bottom 10 percent by industry
asset tangibility is -0.011 (0.011) and in the top 90 percent is 0.000 (0.004).
20Appendix Table 6.21 shows that non-opaque firms were not affected. The coefficients in the sample
of non-opaque firms in columns (1) and (2) are all close to zero and insignificant. There were no het-
erogeneous effects by banking group, as the effects on opaque firms in columns (3) and (4) of Appendix
Table 6.21 are negative and economically significant.
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Columns (2) to (4) restrict the sample to firms that are particularly likely to benefit
from shocks to the efficiency of their banks. Column (2) analyzes stock corporations
with a high (above-median) ratio of bank debt over total liabilities in 1951. These
firms particularly depend on bank debt for financing. Column (3) analyzes stock cor-
porations with a low ratio of stock capital over total assets. These firms require more
outside financing in general. Column (4) restricts the sample to firms that export some
of their products, as reported in the 1952 Grossunternehmen volume for non-stock
firms. Due to the high default risk and working capital requirements, many exporters
rely on outside financing (Amiti and Weinstein 2011a). The coefficients in columns
(2) to (4) are all small and statistically insignificant. If the reforms had any impact on
the financial services offered by banks, the groups of bank-dependent firms in columns
(2) to (4) should have been most strongly affected. The absence of a significant effect
suggests that firms did not benefit from the reforms.
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 5.23 test the robustness by using different treatment
variables. Column (5) shows that firms, for which more than half of their relationship
banks were treated, did not experience faster employment growth. Column (6) shows
that there was no heterogeneity in the treatment effect by whether the firm had a re-
lationship bank belonging to the former Commerzbank, Deutsche, or Dresdner Bank.
The coefficients in column (6) are all close to zero and insignificant.
Column (7) explores the possibility that the treated banks improved the growth of
the relationship customers that they newly added after the reform of 1952. I create a
dummy for whether a firm had no treated relationship bank in 1951, but had added
a treated bank as relationship bank by 1956. An endogeneity problem arises in the
interpretation of the coefficient on this dummy because firms that add new relation-
ship banks are also likely to have higher loan demand. To correct for this, I restrict
the sample to only firms that increased the number of their relationship banks from
1951 to 1956. The idea is to only compare firms with increased loan demand. Us-
ing this sample, the point estimate implies a 0.2 percentage point increase in growth,
which is statistically and economically insignificant. The reforms did not improve the
employment growth of their existing nor of their new relationship customers.
As additional robustness check, Appendix Table 6.22 uses the 1940 relationship
banks to define the treatment indicators. 87 percent of firms with a treated relationship
bank in 1940 still had a treated relationship bank in 1952. Given this stability, it is not
surprising that the results remain unchanged. There is no differential growth before
the reforms, non-opaque firms were unaffected by the reforms, and opaque firms grew
more slowly after the reforms.
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3.6 Results Using Bank Data
This section uses bank-level data to investigate the effects of the banking reforms on the
treated banks. The findings confirm and supplement the firm-level results established
in the previous section.
3.6.1 Financial Figures of Banks
Figure 5.24 uses data from the Deutsche Bundesbank. Panel A plots the lending stock
to firms and households (non-banks) for two groups of banks. The treated group in-
cludes the sum of lending by all treated banks. The untreated group includes lending
by the other commercial banks.21 Before the first reform in 1952, the two lines evolved
in parallel. This suggests the treated banks and their customers were not exposed to
different shocks than the untreated banks, in line with the parallel-trends assumption.
After the first reform, the loan growth of the treated banks slowed relative to the un-
treated group and continued to do so after the second reform. Panel B shows the
growth of deposits by non-banks. Deposits by non-banks funded the majority of new
bank lending (Ahrens 2007).22 Accordingly, the relative growth pattern of non-bank
deposits in Panel B mirrors that of lending. Deposits of the treated banks grew in
parallel to the untreated group before the 1952 reform and more slowly thereafter.
Panel C examines interbank lending. The reforms in 1952 and 1957 forced a
change in how the treated banks reported loans among each other. A cross-state loan
among treated bank branches of the same pre-war banking group was an interbank loan
before the reforms, and an internal loan after 1957. Hence, after the first reform, the
treated banks reported a lower increase in interbank lending than the untreated group.
The pattern for interbank deposits, shown in Panel D, was similar, as interbank deposits
of the treated banks grew more slowly after the reforms.
One key aim of the treated banks in the postwar period was to increase their market
share in lending and deposit-taking (Ahrens 2007). If the consolidations led to effi-
ciency gains, the treated banks should have been able to increase lending and deposits
relative to the other commercial banks, for example by offering more favorable interest
rates. Figure 5.24 provides no evidence that the treated banks were able to do this.
Table 5.24 reports the growth of financial statistics from 1952 to 1960 for the
treated banks, three comparison banks, and the mean difference between the treated
and 9 untreated banks.23 Panel A examines lending and profit growth. For both mea-
21As robustness check, Appendix Figure 6.10 uses all other banks as control group, including the
not-for-profit credit unions and public banks. The relative growth of treated and control group is similar.
22The alternative source of funding is to issue new equity capital. Several changes to accounting
regulations in the postwar period make it impossible to construct a consistent series for bank equity
capital, and hence for bank leverage (Horstmann 1991; Ahrens 2007).
23Section 3.4.3 explains the selection of the years 1952 and 1960, the three comparison banks, and the
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sures, the treated banks lie well below the three comparison banks. Commerzbank
had the relatively strongest lending and profit growth among the treated banks, since it
pursued an aggressive policy of branch expansion after 1952 (Ahrens 2007). Nonethe-
less, it grew more slowly than the three comparison banks. Column (7) reports the
difference between the mean growth of the treated banks and the mean growth of
9 untreated, commercial banks. Lending by treated banks grew approximately 27.7
percentage points more slowly and profits approximately 5.7 percentage points more
slowly. These findings confirm that the treated banks did not increase lending after the
reforms and that they did not become more profitable.
Panel B analyzes the change in banks’ cost efficiency. The ratio of non-interest
expenses over total assets is a common measure of cost efficiency. Non-interest ex-
penses include a variety of operating costs, including the cost of employees, office
materials, and maintenance. If there are significant fixed costs to banking, as some
theories suggest, the ratio should fall with bank size. The data show that the treated
banks experienced lower improvements in the ratio, relative to the three comparison
banks and also relative to all 9 untreated banks. To test the robustness of the result,
I calculate two additional ratios: non-interest expenses scaled by revenue, a measure
of the average cost required to earn one unit of revenue, and employee compensation
scaled by total assets. The ratios of the treated banks fell by less than the ratios of
the three comparison banks and the 9 untreated banks. The results suggest that the
consolidations did not improve cost efficiency.
Panel C examines whether more firms had the treated banks as relationship banks
after the reforms, relative to other banks. At the firm-level, I calculate the fraction of
relationship banks that were part of a given banking group. The figures in Panel C
report the average fraction of all firms in the dataset, by banking group and years. In
general, the magnitude of changes in the average fraction is small for all banks. From
1951 to 1970, Deutsche Bank saw the strongest decrease at around 2.3 percentage
points and Commerzbank the largest increase at around 2.9 percentage points. Overall,
there is no evidence that the treated banks became more prevalent as relationship banks
after the reforms.
The data on banking groups from the Deutsche Bundesbank and the bank-level
financial statistics paint a consistent picture. There is no evidence that the treated banks
grew faster or became more efficient after the reforms. These results are consistent
with the firm-level evidence from the previous section, which found that firms with a
treated relationship bank did not benefit from the reforms.
9 untreated banks. It also shows that the financial statistics of the treated, the three comparison banks,
and the 9 untreated banks were similar in 1952.
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3.6.2 Media Mentions of the Treated Banks
The results presented so far suggest the treated banks did not become more efficient
after the reforms and that their relationship customers did not grow faster. So why
were most treated bank managers in favor of reconsolidating? A literature on empire-
building has suggested that managers benefit from running big firms, independent of
whether big firms are more efficient (Jensen 1986; Stein 2003). One benefit of size
may be that big banks and their managers are more present in the media. An empirical
literature shows that media presence affects consumer choices, political opinions, and
voting (Enikolopov and Petrova 2015; Bursztyn and Cantoni 2016). Furthermore, as
argued by Zingales (2017), firms with high media presence may be able to influence
politicians and regulators more effectively.
Table 5.25 examines the effect of the reforms on media presence. The data are from
the archives of two influential publications, the German weekly magazine Der Spiegel
and the British daily newspaper Financial Times. I calculate the number of times
the name of a treated bank or the name of a treated bank executive were mentioned
in articles in these publications, separately for three periods of equal length before,
between, and after the reforms. I exclude articles from the count that directly report on
the postwar banking reforms. Most counted articles either discuss the financial figures
of the treated banks or cite the opinion of a bank executive on a particular political or
economic issue.
The mentions of treated banks and executives increased strongly after both reforms.
There were over 8 times as many mentions of a treated bank after the second reform
than before the first reform in Der Spiegel, and over 3 times as many mentions of a
treated bank executive. There is hardly any difference in the number of mentions of
the word "bank" or "Deutschland" between the two periods, indicating that an increase
in the number of articles about banks or Germany cannot explain the effect. Mentions
of the banks and executives in the Financial Times increased by over 259 times and 71
times, respectively. Changes in the mentions of "bank" (1.7) and "Germany" (2.5) can-
not explain this increase. These figures suggest that one bank of size 10 receives more
mentions in the media than do 10 banks of size one combined. Hence, consolidations
can raise the overall media presence of the involved organizations.
A simple explanation of the results is that the media only reports on firms whose
actions can potentially affect a large number of readers. Banks operating at the state-
level can affect only the population of one state. The actions of a national bank are
potentially relevant to the entire nation. The consolidation of several state-level banks
could move the resulting national bank beyond the threshold required for the media to
mention it regularly. Independent of the explanation for the results, the causal effect
of bank size on media presence found in this section could account for the desire of
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mangers to increase the size of their banks.
3.7 Results on the New Relationship Banks of Firms
This section tests whether there is heterogeneity in the types of firms that added the
treated banks as new relationship banks. The dimensions of heterogeneity I examine
are firm opacity and riskiness.
The outcome in this section is the fraction of a firm’s relationship banks in 1970
that were treated in one of the reforms. This variable is preferable to a dummy because
it takes into account that firms in the sample increased the average number of relation-
ship banks from 2.8 to 3.5 from 1951 to 1970. The analyses test whether opaque and
risky firms were more likely to add the treated banks as relationship banks, relative
to the other, untreated banks. Since the establishment of new relationships takes time
(Dwenger, Fossen, and Simmler 2015), I define the outcome variables using the 1970
relationship banks.
3.7.1 The New Relationship Banks of Opaque Firms
Opaque firms, as defined for the purpose of this section, had fewer than 50 employees
in 1951 or were in the bottom ten percent by industry asset tangibility.24 This definition
differs from the previous one of Section 3.5.3 because it does not include firms younger
than 10 years in 1952. By 1970, these firms were at least 18 years old, invalidating the
argument that they are opaque because they could not have an established reputation
and paper trail.25
Banking relationships in Germany rarely end. For instance, 94 percent of firms
with a treated relationship bank in 1951 still had a treated relationship bank in 1970.
Therefore, I begin by focusing on the establishment of new relationships, which is
more common. To do so, I restrict the samples in columns (1) to (3) of Table 5.26
to only firms without a treated relationship bank in 1951. The point estimate in col-
umn (1) of Table 5.26 implies that the fraction of treated relationship banks was 5.6
percentage points lower among opaque firms in 1970, compared to non-opaque firms.
The point estimate is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Column (2) splits
the treatment indicator into four subcategories, for firms with fewer than 20 employees,
between 20 and 49 employees, asset tangibility below 0.15, and from 0.15 to 0.2. All
four coefficients are negative, indicating that all dimensions of opacity were relevant.
24The use of pre-reform size to define opacity ensures that opacity is not endogenous to the causal
effects of the reform. For instance, the addition of a treated relationship bank could have restricted firm
employment growth for some opaque firms, keeping these firms under 50 employees. An unreported
robustness check using firms with fewer than 50 employees in 1970 confirms the results found below.
25In an unreported robustness check, I find that firms founded after 1965 had a lower fraction of
treated relationship banks in 1970, confirming the results below that opaque firms were less likely to
add treated relationship banks.
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Column (3) adds industry and zonal fixed effects to the specification. The coefficient
remains robust. This implies the effect cannot be explained by the treated banks spe-
cializing in certain industries and zones.
The result in column (4) reveals there was no pre-trend. I restrict the sample to
firms with no treated relationship bank in 1940 or firms founded after 1940. The co-
efficient on opaque firms is close to zero and insignificant. Apart from the war, the
period from 1940 to 1951 includes the first phase of the breakup. The result implies
that during this period, the fraction of treated relationship banks among opaque firms
did not grow more slowly than at non-opaque firms.
The analysis so far has focused on the establishment of new banking relation-
ships, by restricting the samples to firms without a treated relationship bank in 1951.
Columns (5) and (6) instead restrict the sample to firms with a treated relationship bank
in 1951. Column (5) uses the 1970 fraction of treated relationship banks as outcome,
while column (6) uses the 1951 fraction. The coefficient on opaque firms estimates the
difference in the fraction of relationship banks that were treated between opaque and
non-opaque firms, conditional on the firm having a relationship to a treated bank. The
point estimates in columns (5) and (6) are identical. Both are statistically not different
from zero. This suggests there was no differential change in the fraction of treated
relationship banks from 1951 to 1970 between opaque and non-opaque relationship
customers of the treated banks. This conclusion implies that the reforms did not affect
the banking relationships of existing customers of the treated banks. The finding sug-
gests that opaque firms found it difficult to switch banks even when they faced reduced
bank loan supply after the reforms.
3.7.2 The New Relationship Banks of Risky Firms
Theories of moral hazard and bank-internal agency problems suggest that big banks
may be more willing to lend to risky firms. Table 5.27 examines whether risky firms
were more likely to increase the fraction of treated relationship banks following the
reforms. The first measure of firm risk is the ratio of stock capital over total assets in
1951. This ratio is a measure of funding stability and risk absorption capacity. The
higher the ratio, the less likely that the firm will become bankrupt or default on its
loans.
As before in the analysis of opaque firms, I begin by studying the establishment
of new relationships. The sample in column (1) includes only firms without a treated
relationship bank in 1951. The specification contains dummies for four quarterly bins
of the ratio. I control for a dummy for opaque firms, to ensure the results cannot be
explained by the effects of opacity. The estimates show no significant difference in the
fraction of treated relationship banks in 1970 for firms with a ratio below 0.75. How-
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ever, the coefficient on firms in the highest category, with a ratio above 0.75, is negative
and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. It implies that the fraction of treated
relationship banks was 8.7 percentage points lower for firms in the top quarter of the
capital-to-assets ratio, compared to firms in the lowest quarter. This result suggests
that low-risk firms were less likely than medium- and high-risk firms to establish new
relationships with the treated banks. Column (2) adds zonal and industry fixed effects
to the specification. The coefficient on the highest bin grows more negative and re-
mains significant. This suggests that the increase in risky relationship customers of the
treated banks took place within zones and industries.
The third column restricts the sample to firms with a treated relationship bank
in 1951. The coefficients on the bins of the ratio are all positive and increase with
the ratio. This implies that before the reforms, firms with high capital-to-assets ratio
had a higher fraction of treated relationship banks, conditional on having a treated
relationship bank. Column (4) reveals that these findings still held in 1970. The point
estimates in column (4) are close in magnitude to the estimates in column (3) and
lie well within their 95 percent confidence intervals. These results confirm that the
reforms did not affect the banking relationships of existing customers of the treated
banks, consistent with the results on opaque firms above. The decrease in exposure to
low-risk firms came through the selective formation of new relationships, rather than
the selective continuation of existing relationships.
Column (5) tests the robustness of the finding by using the volatility of employ-
ment growth as measure of risk. I calculate the standard deviation of the annual em-
ployment growth rates from 1949 to 1951. Firms in the top half of the distribution
are called "volatile employment" firms. The sample in column (5) includes only firms
with no treated relationship bank in 1951. The point estimate implies that firms with
volatile employment increased the fraction of treated relationship banks by a statisti-
cally significant 5.8 percentage points, relative to other firms. The regressor of interest
in column (6) is a dummy for "volatile revenue" firms, calculated the same way as
volatile employment above. The coefficient is positive, but imprecisely estimated. The
analysis in column (6) adds new information based on new firms, because only 13
percent of firms used in column (6) are also in the sample of column (5).
One might wonder whether by moving away from opaque and towards risky firms,
the treated banks started lending to more productive firms. Column (7) test this hy-
pothesis. The coefficient on a dummy for firms in the top half of the distribution of
revenue per worker is negative and insignificant, suggesting there is no evidence for a
move towards productive firms.
Summary statistics on the relationship customers of the treated banks confirm that
the treated banks became more exposed to risky firms and less exposed to opaque firms.
The fraction of firms with high capital-to-assets ratio and the fraction of opaque firms
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among the relationship customers of the treated banks decreased, while the fractions
among the untreated banks increased.26
3.8 Results on Municipalities
The final step of the empirical analysis studies the effect of the reforms at a higher level
of economic aggregation, on municipal employment growth. The firm-level analysis
revealed that firms with a treated relationship bank did not benefit from the reforms
and that opaque firms suffered. The municipal-level analysis includes other potential
channels of the reforms that the firm-level analysis could not directly capture, including
for example local general equilibrium effects or the effects on households.
The specifications regress municipal employment growth on measures of depen-
dence on the treated banks. The first measure is whether the municipality had a treated
bank branch in 1952. The coefficient in column (1) of table 5.28 implies that the em-
ployment growth of municipalities with a treated bank branch was 11.7 percentage
points lower from 1951 to 1960. The effect is statistically significant at the 5 percent
level. Column (2) adds fixed effects for federal states, five quantiles of total employ-
ment, and the Ruhr area. The coefficient remains stable and significant. Column (3)
uses a different regressor, the average fraction of treated relationship banks for firms
in the municipality, calculated using the Hoppenstedt firm data. The point estimate
implies that in a municipality served exclusively by the treated banks, employment
growth was 28.5 percentage points lower from 1951 to 1960. The coefficient is signif-
icant at the 1 percent level.
The outcome in column (4) is the employment growth rate from 1951 to 1956. In
this period, only the treated banks outside NRW were affected by the first reform of
1952. The coefficient for municipalities with one of these branches implies a 6.2 per-
centage point decrease in the employment growth rate. The effect is significant at the
10 percent level. The coefficient on municipalities with treated bank branches in NRW
is less than one-third of the magnitude and insignificant. Column (5) reports a posi-
tive and insignificant correlation between growth from 1949 to 1951 and a dummy for
municipalities with a treated bank branch, suggesting there was no negative pre-trend
before the reform. Column (6) performs a robustness check using the growth rate from
1951 to 1960 as outcome. The specification includes the full interaction of zonal fixed
effects with the following controls: the employment growth rate from 1949 to 1951,
five quantiles of total employment, the share of employment in manufacturing, the
share of employment in the primary sector, and the employment share of war-time dis-
26Another valid test of whether the treated banks took more risks would be to analyze the growth of
bank debt at risky firms with a treated relationship bank. Small sample sizes do not permit such a test.
For instance, a regression akin to column (1) of table 5.22, using only volatile employment firms in the
sample, has only 5 observations.
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placed. The coefficient is of similar magnitude to the one in the baseline specification
of column (1) and significant at the 10 percent level.
The evidence points towards significant employment losses for municipalities that
were more exposed to the treated banks. The small sample sizes in the specifications,
ranging from 72 to 91 municipalities, suggest caution is warranted in interpreting the
municipality-level results. Nonetheless, the evidence is consistent with the firm- and
bank-level results, providing no evidence of a positive employment effect from the
banking reforms.
3.9 Conclusion
This paper studies the effects of two Allied banking reforms in postwar Germany. The
reforms permitted treated state-level banks, formerly belonging to three national insti-
tutions, to reconsolidate into national banks. Firms with a treated relationship bank did
not use more bank debt and did not grow faster after the reforms. The treated banks did
not increase total lending, were not able to attract more deposits, and did not achieve
lower cost efficiency ratios, relative to comparable, untreated banks. The results are
inconsistent with theories that argue the real economy benefits from increases in bank
size.
The evidence supports theories that suggests there are real costs to increases in
bank size. Opaque (small, young, low-collateral) relationship customers of the treated
banks experienced lower employment growth after the reforms. Other opaque firms
were less likely to establish new banking relationships with the treated banks. These
findings are in line with theories that suggest big banks are worse at processing soft
information and dealing with opaque firms. Treated banks were more likely to establish
new relationships with risky firms after the reforms, which is consistent with theories
emphasizing moral hazard or internal agency problems in big banks. Consistent with
the firm-level results, the employment growth of municipalities with a treated bank
branch did not improve after the reforms. Taken together, the results of this paper find
no evidence that increases in bank size benefit real economic growth. The results throw
into question the standard arguments against size-dependent banking regulation.
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Chapter 5
Tables and Figures
5.1 Tables
Table 5.1: Summary statistics for the firm panel
mean sd p5 p50 p95
Firm CB dep 0.16 0.23 0 0 0.50
No of relationship banks 3 1.54 1 3 6
Employment 913.71 11,592.54 19 132 2,030
Wage 32.04 47.15 15.51 29.46 46.37
Capital 57,711.61 544,582.57 225.75 5,467.81 196,539.06
Liabilities 152,628.46 3,657,557.10 1,552.79 8,848.93 213,144.20
Export share 11.02 21.31 0 0 64
Import share 5.24 16.73 0 0 40
Age 47.60 45.90 13 31 126
Bank debt/liabilities 0.48 0.26 0.05 0.49 0.90
Liabilities/assets 0.66 0.21 0.26 0.68 0.98
Firms 2,011
Notes: The data are from the firm panel for the year 2006. Monetary values are in year 2000 thousands
of Euro. Capital is the book value of fixed tangible assets. The wage is the total wage bill divided by the
number of employees. The export share is the percentage of exports out of total revenue, and the import
share is the percentage of imports out of total costs.
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics for the county dataset
mean sd p5 p50 p95
County CB dep 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.23
2000 GDP (in year 2010 bn Euro) 6.01 9.12 1.46 3.63 14.31
2000 Population (in 1000s) 203.28 229.39 52.68 147.12 487.13
2000 Employment (in 1000s) 98.27 126.49 29.90 64.50 220.40
Former GDR 0.16 0.37 0 0 1
Landesbank in crisis 0.67 0.47 0 1 1
Distance instrument -1.63 0.97 -3.43 -1.51 -0.28
GDP Growth 2008-12 2.66 6.18 -7.25 2.73 11.76
Employment Growth 2008-12 2.79 3.22 -1.98 2.77 7.21
Observations 385
Notes: The data are from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany. The distance instrument is the
negative of the county’s distance to the closest postwar Commerzbank head office, in 100 kilometers.
Landesbank in crisis is a dummy for whether the county’s Landesbank suffered losses in the financial
crisis (Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen 2011). Growth rates are in percent.
Table 5.3: Firm survey on banks’ willingness to grant loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
YEAR 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Firm CB dep -0.111 -0.095 -0.473 -0.316 0.059 0.379
(0.157) (0.140) (0.190) (0.182) (0.197) (0.184)
Dep var from 2006 0.631 0.522 0.380 0.365 0.335 0.206
(0.041) (0.047) (0.051) (0.055) (0.055) (0.050)
Observations 856 988 1,032 946 898 503
R2 0.460 0.371 0.204 0.213 0.207 0.199
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Bin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ln age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates from cross-sectional firm regressions for different years. The out-
come variable is the answer to the question: “How do you evaluate the current willingness of banks to
grant loans to businesses: cooperative (coded as 1), normal (0), or restrictive (-1)?” It is standardized
to have zero mean and unit variance. The coefficients are interpreted as the standard deviation increase
in banks’ willingness to grant loans from increasing Commerzbank dependence by one. The control
variables include fixed effects for 36 industries, 16 federal states, 4 size bins (1-49, 50-249, 250-999,
and over 1000 employees in the year 2006), and the ln of firm age. Standard errors are clustered at the
level of the county.
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Table 5.4: Firm bank loans and Commerzbank dependence
(1) (2) (3)
Firm CB dep*d -0.101 -0.166 -0.205
(0.079) (0.080) (0.078)
Observations 12,066 12,066 12,066
R2 0.009 0.078 0.094
Number of firms 2,011 2,011 2,011
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
County FE*d No Yes Yes
ln age*d No Yes Yes
Size Bin FE*d No Yes Yes
Industry FE*d No No Yes
Import and Export Share*d No No Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates from firm OLS panel regressions. The outcome in all columns is
firm ln bank loans. Firm CB dep is the fraction of the firm’s relationship banks that were Commerzbank
branches in 2006. d is a dummy for the years following the lending cut, 2009 to 2012. The following
time-invariant control variables are calculated for the year 2006 and interacted with d: fixed effects for
70 industries, 357 counties, and 4 firm size bins (1-49, 50-249, 250-999, and over 1000 employees); the
ln of firm age; the export share (fraction of exports out of total revenue); and the import share (fraction of
imports out of total costs). The data include the years 2007 to 2012. R2 is the within-firm R2. Standard
errors are two-way clustered at the level of the county and the industry.
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Table 5.6: Firm employment and Commerzbank dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm CB dep*d -0.044 -0.047 -0.053
(0.021) (0.016) (0.015)
Low bank debt dep*Firm CB dep*d -0.035
(0.032)
High bank debt dep*Firm CB dep*d -0.071
(0.020)
(0 < Firm CB dep ≤ 0.25)*d 0.007
(0.016)
(0.25 < Firm CB dep ≤ 0.5)*d -0.017
(0.008)
(0.5 < Firm CB dep ≤ 1)*d -0.065
(0.018)
Observations 12,066 12,066 12,066 12,066 12,066
R2 0.026 0.098 0.124 0.125 0.125
Number of firms 2,011 2,011 2,011 2,011 2,011
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE*d No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Bin FE*d No Yes Yes Yes Yes
ln age*d No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE*d No No Yes Yes Yes
Import and Export Share*d No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates from firm OLS panel regressions. The outcome in all columns is
firm ln employment. Firms with low (high) bank debt dependence have up to (over) 50 percent of their
liabilities with banks. The control variables, the standard error calculations, the years covered by the
data, and the definition of R2 are explained in Table 5.4.
Table 5.7: Further firm outcomes and Commerzbank dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OUTCOME Capital Val add Val add/capital Val add/empl Wage Int rate
Firm CB dep*d -0.130 -0.061 0.069 -0.008 0.001 -0.003
(0.038) (0.028) (0.038) (0.024) (0.011) (0.003)
Observations 12,066 12,066 12,066 12,066 12,066 12,024
R2 0.131 0.116 0.116 0.091 0.069 0.073
Number of firms 2,011 2,011 2,011 2,011 2,011 2,004
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls*d Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates from firm OLS panel regressions. The respective outcome is given
in the column title. Capital is the ln book value of fixed tangible assets. Value added (val add) is the
ln of revenue minus expenditure on intermediates. Value added per worker is ln(val add/empl) and
per unit of capital is ln(val add/cap). The wage is the ln of the wage bill divided by the number of
employees. The interest rate is the interest paid over total liabilities. The control variables, the standard
error calculations, the years covered by the data, and the definition of R2 are explained in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.8: County outcomes and Commerzbank dependence (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OUTCOME GDP GDP GDP Empl Net migr
County CB dep*d -0.132 -0.165 -0.141 -0.138 0.003
(0.063) (0.066) (0.077) (0.042) (0.006)
Observations 5,005 5,005 5,005 5,005 1,925
R2 0.301 0.341 0.350 0.494 0.592
Number of counties 385 385 385 385 385
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Former GDR FE*d No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Shares*d No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Export and Import Shares*d No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Landesbank in crisis*d No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population*d No No Yes No No
Pop density*d No No Yes No No
GDP per capita*d No No Yes No No
Debt Index*d No No Yes No No
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Notes: This table reports estimates from county OLS panel regressions of county outcomes on Com-
merzbank dependence (CB dep) interacted with d, a dummy for the years following the lending cut,
2009 to 2012. The outcome in columns (1) to (3) is ln GDP, in column (4) ln employment, and in
column (5) net migration (immigration - out-migration) normalized by 2006 employment. The industry
shares are 17 variables, giving the fraction of firms in each of the 17 industries in 2006 (agriculture,
mining, manufacturing, utilities, recycling, construction, retail trade and vehicle repairs, transportation
and storage, hospitality, information, finance, real estate, business services, other services, public sector,
education, health). The export share is the fraction of exports out of total revenue and the import share
is the fraction of imports out of total costs, both averaged across firms in the county for 2006. Landes-
bank in crisis is a dummy for whether the county’s Landesbank suffered losses in the financial crisis.
Population density, total population (in ln) and GDP per capita (in ln) are from 2000. Debt index is a
2003 measure of county household leverage, calculated by credit rating agency Schufa (Privatverschul-
dungsindex). The regressions are weighted by year 2000 population. Standard errors are clustered at
the level of 42 quantiles of the county’s industrial production share (GDP share of mining, manufactur-
ing, utilities, recycling, construction). The GDP and employment data include the years 2000 to 2012.
Migration data for all counties are only available for the years 2008 to 2012. R2 is the within-county
R2.
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Table 5.9: County outcomes and Commerzbank dependence (IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OUTCOME CB dep CB dep GDP GDP GDP Empl Net migr
Distance instrument*d 0.028 0.042
(0.005) (0.006)
County CB dep*d -0.335 -0.367 -0.345 -0.208 0.026
(0.118) (0.182) (0.173) (0.113) (0.020)
Observations 5,005 5,005 5,005 5,005 5,005 5,005 1,925
R2 0.876 0.941 0.322 0.348 0.355 0.504 0.590
Number of counties 385 385 385 385 385 385 385
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Former GDR FE*d Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Distances*d No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Shares*d No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Export and Import Shares*d No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Landesbank in crisis*d No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population*d No Yes No No Yes No No
Pop density*d No Yes No No Yes No No
GDP per capita*d No Yes No No Yes No No
Debt Index*d No Yes No No Yes No No
Estimator OLS OLS IV IV IV IV IV
Notes: This table reports estimates from county panel regressions. Columns (1) and (2) report the first
stage and columns (3) to (7) the IV regressions. The distance instrument is the negative of the county’s
distance to the closest postwar Commerzbank head office, in 100 kilometers. The linear distances
include the county’s distances to Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Berlin, and Dresden. The outcomes,
other control variables, weights, standard error calculations, the years covered by the data, and the
definition of R2 are explained in Table 5.8.
Table 5.10: The direct and indirect effects on firm employment growth
(1) (2)
Firm CB dep -0.030 -0.036
(0.009) (0.009)
CB dep of other firms in county -0.166 -0.170
(0.076) (0.082)
Observations 48,101 48,101
R2 0.012 0.017
Firm Controls Yes Yes
County Controls No Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates from cross-sectional firm OLS regressions. The outcome is the
symmetric growth rate of firm employment from 2008 to 2012. CB dep of other firms in county is the
average firm Commerzbank dependence of all the other firms in the county. The firm control variables
are the same as in Table 5.4, except there are no county fixed effects. The county controls and the
standard error calculations are the same as in Table 5.8.
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Table 5.11: The implied county employment change based on different estimates
Estimate from Estimated Point 95 percent CI
Row section Estimator Dataset effect estimate Lower Upper
1 1.5.2 OLS Firm Panel Only Direct -0.32 -0.49 -0.14
2 1.6.2 OLS County Panel Direct & Indirect -0.83 -1.31 -0.34
3 1.6.3 IV County Panel Direct & Indirect -1.25 -2.58 -0.09
4 1.7.1 OLS Firm Cross-section Direct & Indirect -1.24 -2.17 -0.29
Notes: This table reports different estimates of the county employment loss from increasing county
Commerzbank dependence by a standard deviation (6 percentage points). Row 1 uses the estimate of
the direct effect from column (3) of Table 5.6. Row 2 uses the county OLS estimate from Table 5.8,
column (4). Row 3 uses the county IV estimate from Table 5.9, column (6). Row 4 uses the sum of
direct and indirect effects from column (2) of Table 5.10.
Table 5.12: Firm patents and Commerzbank dependence
(1) (2) (3)
Growth rate Patents Patents
OUTCOME of patents post lending cut pre lending cut
Patenting*Firm CB dep -0.548 -0.770 0.206
(0.245) (0.409) (0.409)
Non-patenting*Firm CB dep 0.037
(0.065)
Ln Patents 1990-2004 0.671 0.687
(0.088) (0.116)
Observations 2,011 382 382
R2 0.251
ln age Yes Yes Yes
Size Bin FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes No No
State FE No Yes Yes
Import and Export Share Yes Yes Yes
Only patenting firms in sample No Yes Yes
Estimator OLS Neg bin Neg bin
Notes: A patenting firm is defined as a firm that has produced at least one patent from 1990 to 2004.
The outcome in column (1) is the symmetric growth rate of the number of patents between the periods
before (2005-08) and after Commerzbank’s lending cut (2009-12). If a firm produces no patents in
either period, the growth rate is set to zero. The control variables and the standard error calculations in
column (1) are the same as in Table 5.4. Standard errors in columns (2) and (3) are clustered at the level
of the industry.
117
Table 5.13: Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Buyers vs Refinancers
Buyers All
Refinancers
Refinancers in our
Estimation Sample
Age 36.47 42.08 40.85
(10.13) (9.77) (8.90)
Couple 0.52 0.54 0.54
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Income 55,282.17 55,949.83 57,602.96
(556,583.42) (145,816.42) (81,440.65)
Income Change (logs) 0.08 0.08
(0.36) (0.35)
Interest Rate 4.39 4.51 3.98
(1.40) (1.40) (1.50)
House Price 229,375.32 248,328.76 256,517.10
(326,209.46) (361,735.65) (187,020.25)
LTV 70.72 56.53 61.50
(21.67) (21.80) (18.96)
Observations 7,119,807 5,935,441 1,384,346
Panel B: Refinancers in our Estimation Sample
Refinance
On-Time
Refinance
Off-Time
Missing Duration
Age 39.77 41.58 41.37
(8.69) (8.79) (9.04)
Couple 0.55 0.53 0.54
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Income 54,516.32 53,442.66 62,005.61
(48,424.02) (52,355.65) (108,733.95)
Income Change (logs) 0.08 0.11 0.07
(0.31) (0.38) (0.37)
Interest Rate 4.22 3.60 3.97
(1.51) (1.33) (1.53)
House Price 245,030.89 233,110.00 276,638.16
(163,127.94) (158,358.87) (213,289.69)
LTV 61.56 63.04 60.72
(18.30) (19.27) (19.27)
Observations 483,852 288,578 611,916
Notes: The table reports means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for different samples. Panel A
compares descriptive statistics for home buyers (column 1), all refinancers (column 2), and refinancers
in our estimation sample (column 3). Our estimation sample includes homeowners who we observe
refinancing at least twice, and for whom we have sufficient information to precisely measure equity
extraction. Panel B compares descriptive statistics for three subsamples of the refinancers in our estima-
tion sample: households who refinance on-time (between two months before and six months after the
onset of their reset rate), households who refinance off-time, and households where we do not observe
the exact onset of the reset rate. 118
Table 5.14: Equity Extraction Elasticities by Refinance Timing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Full Sample
Equity Extraction Elasticity 0.234 0.208 0.204 0.197
(0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 1,384,346 1,384,346 1,311,734 1,173,626
Panel B: On-Time Sample
Equity Extraction Elasticity 0.245 0.183 0.175 0.166
(0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 483,852 483,852 460,077 459,571
Panel C: Off-Time Sample
Equity Extraction Elasticity 0.317 0.269 0.263 0.252
(0.004) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Observations 288,578 288,578 274,600 273,727
Panel D: Sample With Missing Durations
Equity Extraction Elasticity 0.188 0.201 0.202 0.197
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Observations 611,916 611,916 577,057 440,328
Control Variables:
Month FE × × ×
Household FE × × ×
County x Year FE × ×
Household Controls ×
Notes: The table reports estimates of the equity extraction elasticity across different specifications and
samples. Panel A considers the full sample (summarizing the results of the preceding figures), panel B
considers the sample of on-time refinancers (defined as those who refinance between 2 months before
and 6 months after reset rate onset), panel C considers the sample of off-time refinancers (defined as
those who refinance more than 2 months before or more than 6 months after reset rate onset), and panel
D considers the sample of refinancers with missing duration information. Standard errors are clustered
by household and shown in parentheses. The household controls included in column (4) are income
level, income growth, the last mortgage interest rate, the age of the borrower, a dummy for couples,
and dummies for a range of self-reported reasons for the current and the last refinance (pure refinance /
home improvement / debt consolidation / other).
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Table 5.15: Equity Extraction Elasticities Using Instrumental Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IV Equity Extraction Elasticity 0.150 0.163 0.284 0.295 0.283
(0.004) (0.004) (0.026) (0.056) (0.056)
Observations 772,430 772,430 772,430 737,168 733,614
Control Variables:
Contract Duration FE × × × ×
Month FE × × ×
Household FE × × ×
County x Year FE × ×
Household Controls ×
Notes: The table reports estimates of the equity extraction elasticity using instrumental variables. The
instruments are interactions of dummies for the last mortgage contract duration (time until reset), year
and region. The table shows IV elasticities from five different specifications, with the richest specifica-
tion in column (5) corresponding to equations (2.5)-(2.6). The household controls included in column
(5) are income level, income growth, the last mortgage interest rate, the age of the borrower, a dummy
for couples, and dummies for a range of self-reported reasons for the current and the last refinance (pure
refinance / home improvement / debt consolidation / other). Standard errors are clustered by household
and given in parentheses. The IV elasticities with fixed effects (equal to 0.28-0.29) are slightly higher
than the OLS elasticities, but overall the table confirms the qualitative results.
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Table 5.17: Firms with a treated relationship bank and firm observables in 1951
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rel. bank
Outcome Rel. bank treated in 1952/57 treated in 1952
Employment 0.063 0.047 0.061 0.068 -0.001 0.005
(0.008) (0.024) (0.009) (0.012) (0.017) (0.021)
Age 0.055 0.099 0.038 0.043 0.016 -0.032
(0.023) (0.037) (0.011) (0.013) (0.042) (0.025)
Assets 0.024
(0.026)
Stock capital / assets 0.007
(0.043)
Bank debt / assets 0.000
(0.014)
Exporter -0.013
(0.023)
Observations 1,170 480 2,226 1,675 279 501
R2 0.070 0.079 0.026 0.026 0.001 0.003
Sample All All All All Matched Matched
Firm type Stock Stock Non-stock Non-stock Stock Non-stock
Notes: The data are for the year 1951. The outcome in columns (1) to (4) is a dummy for whether
whether the firm had a bank treated in 1952 or 1957 among its relationship banks in 1951. In columns
(5) and (6), the outcome is a dummy for whether a 1951 relationship bank was treated in 1952. All
regressors are in natural logarithms. Standard errors are robust.
122
Ta
bl
e
5.
18
:S
um
m
ar
y
st
at
is
tic
s
by
ba
nk
in
g
gr
ou
p
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
A
ss
et
s
in
19
52
/n
o
of
ba
nk
s
in
C
os
tr
at
io
s
in
19
52
(i
n
%
)
B
an
ki
ng
gr
ou
p
Tr
ea
te
d
19
47
/4
8-
52
19
52
-5
7
19
57
-
N
on
−i
nt
co
st
A
ss
et
s
N
on
−i
nt
co
st
R
ev
en
ue
E
m
pl
co
m
p
A
ss
et
s
D
eu
ts
ch
e
B
an
k
Y
es
44
9
1,
49
6
4,
48
8
2.
89
62
.8
2
2.
27
D
re
sd
ne
rB
an
k
Y
es
29
8
1,
09
1
3,
27
3
2.
64
74
.7
7
1.
93
C
om
m
er
zb
an
k
Y
es
21
3
63
8
1,
91
5
2.
85
72
.4
7
2.
09
B
ay
.H
yp
.-
&
W
ec
hs
el
-B
an
k
N
o
1,
26
8
Nochange
Nochange
2.
92
58
.1
9
2.
22
B
ay
.V
er
ei
ns
ba
nk
N
o
70
0
3.
04
69
.6
8
2.
31
O
ld
en
bu
rg
is
ch
e
L
an
de
sb
an
k
N
o
82
4.
43
74
.4
3
3.
72
A
ve
ra
ge
of
9
un
tr
ea
te
d
ba
nk
s
N
o
33
0
3.
17
64
.2
3
2.
23
N
ot
es
:
A
ss
et
s
ar
e
in
m
ill
io
n
D
eu
ts
ch
e
M
ar
k.
T
he
da
ta
ar
e
ha
nd
-d
ig
iti
ze
d
fr
om
th
e
an
nu
al
re
po
rt
s
of
th
e
ba
nk
s.
T
he
9
un
tr
ea
te
d
ba
nk
s
ar
e:
B
ad
is
ch
e
B
an
k,
B
ay
.
H
yp
.-
&
W
ec
hs
el
-B
an
k,
B
ay
.V
er
ei
ns
ba
nk
,H
an
de
ls
-u
nd
G
ew
er
be
ba
nk
H
ei
lb
ro
nn
,H
an
de
ls
ba
nk
L
üb
ec
k,
N
or
dd
eu
ts
ch
e
K
re
di
tb
an
k,
O
ld
en
bu
rg
is
ch
e
L
an
de
sb
an
k,
V
er
ei
ns
ba
nk
H
am
bu
rg
,
W
ür
tte
m
be
rg
is
ch
e
B
an
k.
123
Table 5.19: The effect on the growth of stock corporations
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Bank debt growth 1951-60
Rel. bank treated -0.001 -0.005 0.006
in 1952/57 (0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
Observations 421 421 421
R2 0.000 0.134 0.152
Panel B: 100·Bk debtAssets difference 1951-60
Rel. bank treated 0.144 0.085 0.226
in 1952/57 (0.171) (0.193) (0.188)
Observations 421 421 421
R2 0.002 0.095 0.125
Panel C: Employment growth 1951-60
Rel. bank treated 0.001 0.000 -0.001
in 1952/57 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 821 734 685
R2 0.000 0.107 0.112
Panel D: Revenue per worker growth 1951-60
Rel. bank treated 0.004 0.002 -0.000
in 1952/57 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 345 299 293
R2 0.002 0.195 0.303
Industry FE*Zone FE No Yes Yes
ln age*Zone FE No No Yes
Size control*Zone FE No No Yes
Notes: The table reports estimates of the effect of having a treated relationship bank on the growth of
firm variables. Growth in panels A, C, and D is the average annual symmetric growth rate, i.e. the
symmetric growth rate from 1951 to 1960 divided by 9, the number of years between 1951 and 1960.
The 1951-60 difference in 100·Bank debtAssets is the change in the percent ratio of bank debt over assets from
1951 to 1960, divided by 9. Relationship bank treated in 1952/57 is a dummy for whether the firm had
a bank treated in 1952 or 1957 among its relationship banks in 1951. The control variables include 18
industry fixed effects and the natural logarithm of the firm’s age. Both are fully interacted with fixed
effects for the Northern, Western, and Southern banking zones that were in existence from 1952 to 1957.
The size control in this table is the natural logarithm of 1951 firm assets, also interacted with the zonal
fixed effects. Standard errors are robust. The samples include only stock corporations.
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Table 5.20: The effect on the growth of non-stock firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome Employment growth 1951-56
Rel. bank treated -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001
in 1952 (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 1,521 1,472 353 342
R2 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.110
Industry FE*Zone FE No Yes No No
ln age*Zone FE No Yes No No
Size control*Zone FE No Yes No No
Industry FE No No No Yes
ln age No No No Yes
Size control No No No Yes
Sample All Matched
Notes: The table reports estimates of the effect of having a relationship bank treated in 1952 on the
average annual symmetric growth rate of employment, i.e. the symmetric growth rate from 1951 to
1956 divided by 5, the number of years between 1951 and 1956. Relationship bank treated in 1952 is a
dummy for whether a 1951 relationship bank was treated in 1952. The size control variables in this table
are four fixed effects for the firm’s employment in 1951 (1-49, 50-249, 250-999, 1000+ employees). The
other control variables are explained in Table 5.19. Standard errors are robust. The samples include only
non-stock firms.
Table 5.21: The effect on employment growth 1951-56, by firm size
Number of Employees Coefficient Std. Err. Observations
0 - 9 -0.035 (0.029) 8
10 - 19 -0.040 (0.035) 15
20 - 29 -0.069 (0.029) 19
30 - 39 -0.023 (0.042) 27
40 - 49 0.008 (0.025) 19
50 - 59 -0.015 (0.030) 24
60 - 499 0.000 (0.004) 1,064
≥ 500 0.005 (0.007) 345
Notes: The table reports estimates of the effect of having a relationship bank treated in 1952 on the
average annual symmetric growth rate of employment 1951-56, i.e. the symmetric growth rate from
1951 to 1956 divided by 5, the number of years between 1951 and 1956. Each row reports a different
regression, limiting the sample to only firms in the given range of employment. The specifications
include no control variables. Standard errors are robust. The samples include only non-stock firms.
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Table 5.23: Robustness checks for the effect on firm growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Employment growth
Outcome 1949-
51
1951-60 1951-56
Rel. bank treated 0.005 -0.007 -0.005
in 1952/57 (0.023) (0.011) (0.008)
Rel. bank treated -0.000 0.002 0.005
in 1952 (0.023) (0.009) (0.013)
0 < Fraction rel. banks -0.002
treated in 1952 ≤ 0.5 (0.004)
0.5 < Fraction rel. banks 0.002
treated in 1952 ≤ 1 (0.007)
Commerzbank rel. -0.000
bank treated in 1952 (0.006)
Deutsche Bank rel. -0.004
bank treated in 1952 (0.004)
Dresdner Bank rel. 0.002
bank treated in 1952 (0.005)
Added a bank treated 0.002
in 1952 as rel. bank (0.015)
Observations 1,147 225 338 464 1,472 1,472 308
R2 0.139 0.297 0.198 0.168 0.063 0.063 0.231
Controls*zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample All High
bk.
debt
Low
cap.
Exporters All All Added
banks
Firm type Both Stock Stock Non-
Stock
Non-
Stock
Non-
Stock
Non-
Stock
Notes: Fraction of relationship banks treated is the ratio of the number of treated relationship banks over
the total number of relationship banks. The sample includes only firms: with a ratio of bank debt over
total liabilities above the median in 1951 in column (1); with a ratio of stock capital over assets below
the median in column (2); that export some of their products in 1951 in column (4); that increased their
total number of relationship banks from 1951 to 1956 in column (7). The outcome variables, regressors,
and control variables are explained in Tables 5.19 and 5.20. Standard errors are robust.
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Table 5.24: Financial statistics by banking group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Deutsche
Bank
Dresdner
Bank
Commerz-
bank
Bay.
Hyp.-
&
Wechsel-
Bank
Bay.
Vereins-
bank
Olden-
burgische
Lan-
des-
bank
Mean
Difference:
Treated -
9 Untreated
(Std. Err.)
Panel A: Growth of lending and profits 1952-60 (symmetric growth)
Lending 0.70 0.56 1.09 1.23 1.29 1.36 -0.277
(0.172)
Profits 1.38 1.46 1.62 2 1.70 1.89 -0.057
(0.126)
Panel B: Change in cost efficiency ratios 1952-60 (in percentage points)
Non−int cost
Assets -0.27 -0.10 -0.68 -1.05 -1.53 -1.54 0.80
(0.31)
Non−int cost
Revenue -7.29 -19.92 -15.32 -25.19 -38.99 -10.23 1.53
(6.79)
Empl comp
Assets 0.00 -0.16 -0.41 -0.76 -1.17 -1.62 0.45
(0.28)
Panel C: The average fraction among firms’ relationship banks by period (in percent)
1951 18.87 10.84 6.66 2.48 1.53 0.04
1958-61 18.56 10.87 7.97 2.47 1.42 0.03
1970 16.58 10.79 9.57 2.46 1.78 0.02
Notes: The growth in Panel A is the symmetric growth rate from 1952 to 1960. The change in Panel
B is the difference of the given percent ratios, i.e. the difference in percentage points. The fractions
in Panel C are the average values (using all firms in the Hoppenstedt volumes from the given period)
of the number of treated relationship banks over the total number of relationship banks, in percent.
Column (7) reports the difference in the mean growth of the three treated banking groups relative to
9 untreated banks. The 9 untreated banks are: Badische Bank, Bay. Hyp.- & Wechsel-Bank, Bay.
Vereinsbank, Handels- und Gewerbebank Heilbronn, Handelsbank Lübeck, Norddeutsche Kreditbank,
Oldenburgische Landesbank, Vereinsbank Hamburg, Württembergische Bank.
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Table 5.25: The number of media mentions of treated banks and their executives
(1) (2) (3)
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
30/06/1947 - 30/03/1952 - 25/12/1956 -
29/03/1952 24/12/1956 24/09/1961
Panel A: Der Spiegel (German weekly news magazine)
Name of a treated bank 15 46 121
Name of a treated bank executive 6 12 20
The word "bank" 487 407 479
The word "Deutschland" 3,145 3,086 3,062
Panel B: Financial Times (British daily newspaper)
Name of a treated bank 3 261 779
Name of a treated bank executive 2 36 143
The word "bank" 22,160 30,035 37,168
The word "Germany" 4,065 8,129 10,311
Notes: The table reports the number of times that the item listed in the left column was mentioned in an
article in the given period. The data are based on the author’s calculations from the online archives of
Der Spiegel and the Financial Times, accessed 29 August 2017.
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Table 5.26: New banking relationships with opaque firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction of treated rel. banks in
Outcome 1970 1970 1970 1951 1970 1951
Opaque firm -0.056 -0.054 -0.001 0.023 0.023
(0.019) (0.021) (0.046) (0.015) (0.020)
0 < Employees < 20 -0.072
(0.030)
20 ≤ Employees < 50 -0.086
(0.026)
0 < Ind. Tangibility < 0.15 -0.030
(0.033)
0.15 ≤ Ind. Tangibility <
0.2
-0.012
(0.053)
Observations 719 719 719 317 2,286 1,648
R2 0.010 0.013 0.068 0.000 0.001 0.001
Zone FE No No Yes No No No
Industry FE No No Yes No No No
Sample restricted to only firms with:
No treated rel. bank in
1951
Yes Yes Yes No No No
No treated rel. bank in
1940
No No No Yes No No
Treated rel. bank in 1951 No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: The outcome is the number of treated relationship banks over the total number of relationship
banks in the given year. A firm is opaque if it has fewer than 50 employees in 1951 or is in the bottom ten
percent of industry asset tangibility (fixed tangible over total assets). The control variables are explained
in Table 5.20. Standard errors are robust.
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Table 5.27: New banking relationships with risky firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Fraction of treated rel. banks in
Outcome 1970 1970 1951 1970 1970 1970 1970
0.25 ≤ CapAssets < 0.5 0.035 0.040 0.036 0.012
(0.035) (0.038) (0.019) (0.027)
0.5 ≤ CapAssets < 0.75 -0.007 0.017 0.078 0.081
(0.052) (0.058) (0.034) (0.046)
0.75 ≤ CapAssets ≤ 1 -0.087 -0.138 0.161 0.250
(0.031) (0.071) (0.077) (0.105)
Volatile employment firm 0.058
(0.027)
Volatile revenue firm 0.084
(0.065)
High productivity firm -0.038
(0.029)
Observations 158 155 581 402 74 265 294
R2 0.028 0.203 0.056 0.111 0.257 0.109 0.118
Opaque firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zone FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample restricted to only firms with:
No treated rel. bank in 1951 Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Treated rel. bank in 1951 No No Yes Yes No No No
Notes: The outcome is the ratio of the number of treated relationship banks over the total number
of relationship banks in the given year. Cap / assets is the ratio of stock capital over total assets. The
standard deviation of the annual employment (or revenue) growth in the period 1949 to 1951 is above the
median for a volatile employment (or revenue) firm. High productivity firms have revenue per worker
above the median. A firm is opaque if it has fewer than 50 employees in 1951 or is in the bottom ten
percent of industry asset tangibility (fixed tangible over total assets). The control variables are explained
in Table 5.20. Standard errors are robust.
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Table 5.28: The effect on municipal employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employment growth
Outcome 1951-60 1951-60 1951-60 1951-56 1949-51 1951-60
Treated bank branch -0.117 -0.118 0.075 -0.116
(0.045) (0.049) (0.068) (0.053)
Avg fraction of treated -0.285
banks among firms’ (0.104)
rel. banks
Treated bank branch -0.062
not in NRW (0.033)
Treated bank branch -0.019
in NRW (0.044)
Observations 79 79 74 91 83 72
R2 0.340 0.350 0.344 0.202 0.441 0.508
Federal state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Size bin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Ruhr FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Detailed controls*zone FE No No No No No Yes
Notes: The table reports estimates of the effect of having a treated bank branch in the municipality (as
measured in 1952) on municipal employment. The outcomes are symmetric growth rates of employment
in the given period. Treated bank branches belong to banks treated by the first reform of 1952, the second
reform of 1957, or both. Treated bank branches not in NRW (North-Rhine Westphalia) were treated in
1952 and 1957, while treated bank branches in NRW were only treated in 1957. The average fraction
of treated banks among firms’ relationship banks is the average, over firms located in the municipality,
of the firms’ fraction of treated relationship banks out of the all relationship banks. Size bins are five
quantiles of total employment in the municipality. The detailed controls include the full interaction of
zonal fixed effects with the following variables: the growth rate from 1949 to 1951, five quantiles of
total employment, the share of employment in manufacturing, the share of employment in the primary
sector, and the employment share of war-time displaced. Standard errors are robust.
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5.2 Figures
Figure 5.1: The lending stock of German banks
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
0
Ln
 le
nd
in
g 
st
oc
k 
(re
lat
ive
 to
 20
04
)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
All other banks Commerzbank
All other commercial banks
Notes: This figure plots the ln lending stock to German non-financial customers, relative to the year
2004, in 2010 billion Euro. The data for Commerzbank include lending by branches of Commerzbank
and Dresdner Bank. I sum their lending stock for the years before the 2009 take-over, using data from
the annual reports. For "all other banks", I use aggregated data from the Deutsche Bundesbank on
German banks and subtract lending by Commerzbank. For "all other commercial banks", I subtract
lending by Commerzbank, the savings banks, the Landesbanken, and the cooperative banks.
Figure 5.2: Commerzbank’s equity capital, write-downs, and profits
Notes: The left panel shows Commerzbank’s profits & write-downs and equity capital. Write-downs
arise from changes in revaluation reserves, cash flow hedges and currency reserves. The right panel
shows the composition of Commerzbank’s profits. Interest income is interest received from loans and
securities minus interest paid on deposits. Trading & investment income is the sum of net trading
income, net income on hedge accounting, and net investment income. Pre-tax profit is interest income
plus trading & investment income minus costs. The values are in year 2010 billion Euro. I aggregate
the positions of Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank for the years before the 2009 take-over. The data are
from the annual bank reports.
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Figure 5.3: Firm and county Commerzbank dependence
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Notes: The figure shows histograms of firm Commerzbank dependence for the 2,011 firms in the firm
panel (on the left) and of county Commerzbank dependence for the 385 counties in the dataset (on the
right).
Figure 5.4: Firm employment effects
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Notes: This figure plots the time series of the mean ln employment of firms with and without Com-
merzbank as one of their relationship banks. The time series are divided by their 2006 value. The data
are from the firm panel.
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Figure 5.5: County GDP growth, Commerzbank dependence, and the distance instru-
ment
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Notes: The left figure plots county GDP growth from 2007 to 2012 against county Commerzbank depen-
dence. The right figure plots county GDP growth against the distance instrument, where both variables
are residualized of the linear distances to Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Berlin, and Dresden, and of
a dummy for the former GDR. Both linear slope coefficients are negative and significant at the 1 percent
level.
Figure 5.6: Reduced-form impact of the instrument on the county GDP growth rate
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Notes: This figure is based on a single regression, in which the dependent variable is the county’s
annual GDP growth rate. The plotted point estimates are the coefficients on the instrument, interacted
with annual dummy variables. The vertical lines are 90 percent confidence intervals. The regression
includes year and county fixed effects and the full set of control variables from Table 5.9, including the
linear distances. The standard errors are calculated as in Table 5.8.
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Figure 5.7: The size of the indirect effect by industry type
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Notes: This figure illustrates heterogeneity in the indirect effect by industry type. The plotted point es-
timates are the effect of the Commerzbank dependence of all other firms in the county on the symmetric
growth rate of firm employment between 2008 and 2012. The estimates are from a single regression
that controls for the firm’s direct Commerzbank dependence and the other control variables from Table
5.10. The vertical lines are 90 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 5.8: Homeowners Refinance Around the Onset of the Reset Rate
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Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the time between mortgage financing events. Households
who refinance between 2 months before and 6 months after the onset of their reset rate are shown in
light gray, households who refinance more than 6 months after the onset of their reset rate are shown in
black, and households who refinance more than 2 months before the onset of their reset rate are shown
in white. The data in this figure exclude households for whom we do not observe the date of reset rate
onset.
137
Figure 5.9: House Prices vs Appraisals (New Purchases)
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Notes: The figure shows the distribution of within-house differences between the actual house price and
the appraisal price for transacted properties. This includes both first time buyers and home movers, but
not refinancers.
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Figure 5.10: House Prices vs Appraisals (Refinanced Homes)
A: No Other Controls
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B: With Controls
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Notes: The figure compares actual house prices (for transacted properties) with appraisal prices (for re-
financed properties) over time. Panel A plots the raw time series of actual and appraised prices, obtained
by regressing each of the price series on a full set of quarter dummies and plotting the estimated coef-
ficients. Panel B augments the price regressions on quarter dummies with controls for twenty quantiles
of the age distribution as well as twenty quantiles of the postcode-level price distribution (see equation
(2.1)). The panel plots the coefficients on the quarter dummies, plus a constant equal to the effect of
the average age and the average postcode. This panel shows that, once we correct for compositional
differences in age and postcode, there is no significant appraisal bias.
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Figure 5.11: Distribution of Raw House Price Growth
Households With ≥ 2 Mortgage Observations
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Notes: The figure shows the distribution of raw house price growth among households for whom we
observe at least two mortgage financing events. House price growth is measured as the log change in
house prices between the current and the last mortgage event, multiplied by 100 (i.e., approximately
percentage house price growth).
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Figure 5.12: Distribution of Raw vs Residualized House Price Growth
Households With ≥ 3 Mortgage Observations
A: Raw Price Growth
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B: Residualized Price Growth After Absorbing Fixed Effects
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Notes: The figure shows distributions of house price growth among households for whom we observe
at least three mortgage financing events. Panel A shows the distribution of raw house price growth,
while Panel B shows the distribution of residualized house price growth after absorbing household fixed
effects, month fixed effects, and county-by-year fixed effects. In both panels, house price growth is
measured as the log change in house prices between the current and the last mortgage event, multiplied
by 100 (i.e., approximately percentage house price growth).
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Figure 5.13: The Timing of Refinance Events and House Price Changes
Conceptual Example
House Price
Year
0 1 2 3 4 5
3-Year Fixed
6
3-Year Fixed
2-Year Fixed
2-Year Fixed
2-Year Fixed
Notes: The figure illustrates, in a conceptual example, how differences in contract duration choices
create variation in house price changes across households. The graph compares two homeowners who
start out at the same time (time 0), live in houses with the same price cycle (the solid blue line), but
have different preferences over low-interest rate durations. One homeowner prefers 2-year fixed interest
rate loans, while the other prefers 3-year fixed interest loans. The homeowner in two-year contracts
refinances three times over a 6-year period, facing either positive or negative price shocks at each event,
whereas the homeowner in 3-year contracts refinances only two times facing a zero price shock each
time. Our empirical strategy exploits such within-person variation in price growth driven by duration
choices.
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Figure 5.14: House Price Changes vs Last Duration x Time of Refinance
A: Large Difference in Price Change
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B: Small Difference in Price Change
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Notes: This figure is the empirical counterpart to the preceding conceptual figure. It plots average house
price growth between refinance events for homeowners who refinance at different points in time (in
January of different years) by bins of the duration of their last mortgage (number of years between the
current and the last refinance events). The two panels show the same graphs, but highlight two different
homeowners who experience very different within-person price patterns due to past duration choices.
The homeowner in Panel A experiences a large negative price change in January 2010, followed by a
large positive change in January 2013. The homeowner in Panel B also refinances in January 2010 and
January 2013, but experiences similar price changes in the two events. Our empirical approach uses
such within-person variation for identification.
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Figure 5.15: Mortgage Debt and House Prices
A: Debt Growth vs House Price Growth
Elasticity = 0.30 (0.002)
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Notes: Panel A plots the average mortgage debt growth in different bins of house price growth, pooling
all years 2005-15. Debt growth and house price growth are measured as log changes between refinance
events multiplied by 100 (i.e., approximately percentage changes). The dashed lines represent 95%
confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the household level. Panel A also shows the
average elasticity of mortgage debt with respect to house prices across all years. Panel B reports the
elasticity for each year separately, showing that the elasticity is pro-cyclical.
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Figure 5.16: Equity Extraction and House Prices
A: Equity Extraction vs House Price Growth
Elasticity = 0.23 (0.002)
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B: Equity Extraction Elasticity by Year
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Notes: This figure corresponds to the previous figure, but considers equity extraction when refinancing
(as opposed to total debt growth between refinance events) as the outcome variable. Equity extraction is
measured as the log difference between mortgage debt after refinancing and the outstanding mortgage
debt just before refinancing (i.e., the debt the household would hold if she simply rolled over the existing
mortgage debt at the time of refinancing), multiplied by 100. Panel A plots average equity extraction
in different bins of house price growth, pooling all years 2005-15. The dashed lines represent 95%
confidence intervals, with standard errors clustered by household. Panel A also reports the average
equity extraction elasticity across all years, while Panel B shows the equity extraction elasticity for each
year separately.
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Figure 5.17: Equity Extraction and House Prices With Fixed Effects
A: Household and Month Fixed Effects
Elasticity = 0.21 (0.005)
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B: Household, Month, and County × Year Fixed Effects
Elasticity = 0.20 (0.006)
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Notes: These panels plot conditional equity extraction in different bins of house price growth based
on the fixed effects specification (2.3), pooling all years 2005-15. The plotted points are the estimated
coefficients on house price growth dummies, adding a constant equal to the mean predicted value of
equity extraction from all the other covariates. In Panel A, the other covariates are fixed effects for
household and month. In Panel B, the other covariates are fixed effects for household, month, and
county x year. The dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by
household. Each panel reports the average equity extraction elasticity based on a log-linear specification.
The figure shows an almost perfectly log-linear relationship between equity extraction and house prices,
and it shows that the relationship is unaffected by county x year (conditional on the other fixed effects).
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Figure 5.18: Equity Extraction and House Prices With Fixed Effects and Household
Controls
A: Equity Extraction vs House Price Growth
Elasticity = 0.20 (0.006)
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B: Equity Extraction Elasticity by Year
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Notes: Panel A plots conditional equity extraction in different bins of house price growth based on the
specification with fixed effects and household-level controls in equation (2.4). The panel is constructed
exactly like the previous figure that is based on specifications without household-level controls. The
household controls included here are income level, income growth, mortgage interest rate, age, a dummy
for couples, and dummies for a range of self-reported reasons for the current and the last refinances. The
figure shows that the inclusion of such rich controls makes no difference to the results. While Panel A is
based on all years 2005-15, Panel B shows the equity extraction elasticity for each year separately. The
rich specification considered here has reduced, but not eliminated, the cyclicality in the equity extraction
elasticity.
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Figure 5.19: Heterogeneity in Borrowing Elasticity by LTV and Age
A: Pre-LTV B: Pre-LTV
No Other Controls Controls for Age, Income, and Income Growth
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Notes: The figure shows heterogeneity in the equity extraction elasticity by LTV (top panels) and by
age (bottom panels). The heterogeneity analysis is based on a pre-determined LTV ratio, namely the
LTV ratio at time t absent any equity extraction/injection at time t and absent any house price growth
between t and t−1. The left panels are based on univariate specifications that investigate each dimension
of heterogeneity on its own, while the right panels are based on multivariate specifications allowing for
heterogeneity in four dimensions simultaneously: LTV, age, income level, and income growth. The
multivariate specification is shown in equation (2.7). The dashed lines give 95% confidence intervals
based on standard errors clustered by household. The top panels show a strong increasing relationship
between LTV and the borrowing elasticity, consistent with collateral effects. The bottom panels show a
negative or flat relationship between age and the borrowing elasticity, inconsistent with wealth effects.
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Figure 5.20: Heterogeneity in Borrowing Elasticity by Income and Income Growth
A: Income B: Income
No Other Controls Controls for Age, Pre-LTV, and Income Growth
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Notes: The figure shows heterogeneity in the equity extraction elasticity by income level (top panels)
and by income growth (bottom panels). The income level is measured at the time of the last refinance
event, while income growth is measured as the log-change since the last refinance event. The left panels
are based on univariate specifications that investigate each dimension of heterogeneity on its own, while
the right panels are based on multivariate specifications allowing for heterogeneity in four dimensions
simultaneously: LTV, age, income level, and income growth. The multivariate specification is shown in
equation (2.7). The dashed lines give 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by
household. The figure shows that there is relatively little heterogeneity in the borrowing elasticity by
either income level or income growth.
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Figure 5.21: Heterogeneity in Borrowing Elasticity by Notches Moved
A: No Other Controls
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B: Household and Month Fixed Effects
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Notes: The figure shows heterogeneity in the equity extraction elasticity by notches moved due to house
price changes. There are interest rate notches at LTV thresholds of 50%, 60%, 70%, 75%, 80%, 85%,
and 90%. We define the collateral constraint as being relaxed (reinforced) when house price variation
moves the homeowner at least one notch down (up) and thus reduces (increases) the interest rate on
borrowing. Otherwise, the collateral constraint is defined as “unchanged.” Panel A shows elasticity
estimates when including no other controls, while Panel B allows for household and month fixed effects.
The dashed lines give 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by household.
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Figure 5.22: House Price Growth and Bunching at Collateral Notches
A: Effect of House Price Growth on LTV Distribution
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B: Effect of Equity Extraction on LTV Distribution
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Notes: The figure is based on a sample of households who are pulled down to a lower notch by house
price growth. The two panels show density distributions of three different LTV measures. The pre-
LTV = DPit/Pit−1 is the homeowner’s LTV at time t given past mortgage choices (i.e., the debt level
and amortization schedule chosen at time t − 1, not including equity extraction at time t) and the old
house price. The passive LTV = DPit/Pit is the homeowner’s LTV given past mortgage choices and the
new house price. The chosen LTV = Dit/Pit includes any equity extraction made at time t. The x-
axis in each panel represents the distance between a given LTV measure and the next-notch-up from
the passive LTV. Panel A illustrates the effects of house price growth by comparing the distributions
of pre-LTV and passive LTV. This panel shows that house price growth moves homeowners from the
positive to the negative range and eliminates bunching at interest rate notches. Panel B illustrates the
effects of borrowing responses by comparing the distributions of the passive LTV and the chosen LTV.
This panel shows that equity extraction largely recreates the qualitative pattern that existed before house
price growth.
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Figure 5.23: Maps of the postwar banking zones
A: 1947/48-1952 B: 1952-1957
State-level breakup Three banking zones
Notes: The figure shows the two phases of the breakup. The first reform in 1952 lifted the state-level
restrictions and allowed banks to operate in three regional zones. The reform in 1957 removed all
restrictions.
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Figure 5.24: Lending and deposits
A: Lending to non-banks B: Deposits by non-banks
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C: Lending to banks D: Deposits by banks
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Notes: The data are for the December of the given year and provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank.
The treated group includes banks affected by the breakup and subsequent reforms. The untreated group
includes the untreated commercial banks. The first reform in 1952 lifted the state-level restrictions and
introduced zonal restrictions. The reform in 1957 removed all restrictions.
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Chapter 6
Appendix
6.1 Firm Summary Statistics
I present summary statistics for the firm panel by six bins of Commerzbank depen-
dence in Appendix Table 6.7. In general, the table shows no linear relationship between
Commerzbank dependence and firm characteristics. For instance, mean employment
is less than 800 in the top two bins, for firms with Commerzbank dependence over 0.4.
Employment is largest for firms in the mid-category, while the bins with low Com-
merzbank dependence have mean employment between 800 and 1,000. The average
wage is fairly stable across the bins. The mean of total liabilities behaves similarly
to employment. Firms with no Commerzbank dependence are somewhat of an outlier
as they hold a large stock of liabilities given their employment and capital stock. The
standard errors are large, however, indicating that the differences between the bins are
not statistically significant. To conduct a test with greater statistical power, I pool all
firms with a Commerzbank relationship and compare them to firms with zero Com-
merzbank dependence. I find no statistically significant difference between the two
groups (t-statistic: 0.31). Bank loans over total liabilities are similar across bins. This
suggests that the degree of Commerzbank dependence is not correlated with firms’
dependence on banks.
Appendix Table 6.2 carries out a regression-based test of whether Commerzbank
dependence is correlated with firm observables before the lending cut. I regress firm
Commerzbank dependence (CB dep f ) on a cross-section of firm observables from
2006. The coefficients have the interpretation of the approximate change in Com-
merzbank dependence following a 100 percent increase in the regressor. Only the
coefficient on ln capital has a coefficient that is statistically significantly different from
zero. The estimate implies that a 100 percent increase in the capital stock is associ-
ated with a 0.014 decrease in Commerzbank dependence. There is no difference in the
value of financial assets or the amount of bank loans. I therefore conclude that while
there are slight differences between firms dependent on Commerzbank and other firms
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in the firm panel, they are not large.
6.2 Commerzbank’s Trading Losses
This section provides more institutional detail on the trading losses that forced Com-
merzbank to cut lending.
6.2.1 Interpreting Financial Analyst Research Reports
Understanding the details of Commerzbank’s trading losses is not trivial, because al-
most no bank publishes its detailed financial asset holdings. A more promising re-
source are research reports by financial analysts. I use the investment database Thom-
son Reuters Investext to extract relevant research reports on Commerzbank before and
during the financial crisis. I focus on the period from 2008 to 2009, as these were the
loss-making years, extracting all the available reports from Thomson Reuters Investext
for this period. I also consider the most relevant reports from the years before and af-
ter, to understand the build-up of Commerzbank’s trading portfolio and the years after
the lending cut. Overall, I analyze the 110 research reports listed at the end of the
references section of the Appendix.
I formulate nine questions in Table 6.8 that relate to the origin and nature of Com-
merzbank’s trading losses. For each question, I begin by counting the number of re-
ports that can provide any relevant information to a question. I then categorize the
reports into three categories. Either they offer a clear conclusion (Answer yes/no) or
they give information without committing either way (Answer unclear).
To illustrate my method, consider question 1 of Table 6.8. This questions asks
whether trading income was more volatile at Commerzbank than at other German
banks. One report mentions that Commerzbank’s trading portfolio remained "resilient
when even the large investment banks were struggling", so it gets classified as answer-
ing no to question 1 (Kepler Cheuvreux 6/11/2006). Many reports analyze movements
in trading income, describing strengths and weaknesses, but do not make an explicit
judgment on the relative volatility of the trading portfolio. These get classified as pro-
viding an unclear answer to question 1.
Questions 2, 8, and 9 are categorized in the same manner as question 1. Questions
3 to 7 are of a different style, asking whether a certain factor is mentioned explicitly
as cause of Commerzbank’s losses during the financial crisis of 2008/09. There are no
unclear answers for these questions.
Commerzbank announced its acquisition of Dresdner Bank in 2008 and completed
it in January 2009. From mid-2008 onward, there are few reports that analyze Dresdner
Bank separately, so I report results combining the information for the new, enlarged
155
Commerzbank for the period after 2008. When I generally refer to Commerzbank, this
includes Dresdner Bank.
In what follows, I describe the narrative of Commerzbank’s trading losses, drawing
on the reports of Table 6.8, financial statements, and additional secondary sources.
6.2.2 The Expansion Into Trading During the Early 2000s
From the early 2000s onward, German banks began increasing their international ac-
tivities. The main actors were the large commercial banks, Commerzbank, Deutsche
Bank, and Dresdner Bank (which was acquired by Commerzbank in January 2009),
as well as the publicly owned Landesbanken. Unlike their competitors from France,
Spain, and Italy, this internationalization was not driven by retail branching into for-
eign countries. Instead, German banks focused on trading on international financial
markets (Hardie and Howarth 2013).
There was political support for this expansion, as Germany was suffering from
anemic growth and a recession in 2003. Politicians hoped trading profits would al-
low banks to raise credit supply. For example, the federal 2003 Kleinunternehmer-
förderungsgesetz (law for the promotion of small businesses) introduced tax benefits
for financial institutions involved in securitization, and the 2005 coalition agreement
mentioned the development of securitization markets as a policy goal. The securiti-
zation of German assets had only been legally regulated from 1997, so these markets
were small and unimportant before and during the financial crisis of 2008/09.
Commerzbank took part in this trading expansion, but not to an extraordinary de-
gree relative to the other banks. The share of trading assets out of total assets at Com-
merzbank rose from 12 percent in 1999 to 22 percent in 2005, the eve of the United
States subprime mortgage crisis. The other two large commercial banks had a bigger
trading division than Commerzbank already in the 1990s, because Commerzbank’s
historic focus had been corporate credit. Dresdner Bank’s share of trading assets out
of total assets was 35 percent in 2005 (1999 data unavailable), and Deutsche Bank
went from 27 percent in 1999 to 45 percent in 2005 (source: bank annual reports). For
the Landesbanken, there was a similar range, with HSH Nordbank at 13.4 percent in
2006 and WestLB at 32.5 in 2007 ( Hardie and Howarth 2013).
Commerzbank’s and Dresdner Bank’s increased trading activities coincided with
two developments on financial markets. First, the rise of subprime mortgage lend-
ing in the United States, which peaked in 2006. German banks invested heavily in
investment-grade-rated asset-backed securities based on the United States mortgage
market and sold by American investment banks. Second, the expansion of the Ice-
landic banking sector. The total assets of Icelandic banks increased more than sixfold
(in real terms) between 2003 and 2007 and their total assets grew to 10 times the value
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of Icelandic GDP. The Icelandic banks relied on financing from European bond mar-
kets, interbank credit lines, and wholesale market funding (Flannery 2009). By lending
to the Icelandic banks, Commerzbank became more exposed to Iceland than the other
German banks. However, this was not considered a risky strategy by the analysts at the
time.
For the period 2004 to 2007, the research reports relevant to question 1 of Table
6.8 do not suggest that Commerzbank’s and Dresdner Bank’s trading income was more
volatile or riskier than trading income of Deutsche Bank or the Landesbanken. Nine
reports describe the year-by-year changes in trading income at different banks without
identifying which banks were more volatile. I classify reports of this kind as giving
no clear answer. If indeed there was excess volatility in trading incomes or if analysts
believed that the trading portfolio was riskier, one would have expected the analysts to
mention this in the reports. The lack of a clear statement can therefore be interpreted
as evidence against higher volatility at Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank. Two of the
reports mention that Commerzbank’s trading income was stable relative to the other
banks ("normal trading profit" Deutsche Bank Equity Research 7/02/2006; "trading
result continued its remarkable stability" Kepler Cheuvreux 6/11/2006).
The capital ratios of German banks strengthen the impression that Commerzbank
did not take on more risk than other German banks before the crisis. In 2005, the tier 1
capital ratio at Commerzbank was at 8 percent, Dresdner Bank at 10 percent, Deutsche
Bank at 8.7 percent, and the aggregate of German banks at 7.8 percent.
6.2.3 The Relation Between Trading and Loan Portfolios
Question 2 of Table 6.8 asks whether the loan portfolios of Commerzbank and Dres-
dner Bank were riskier or more cyclical than other banks’. The answer is no. The
research reports considered the loan portfolios of Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank a
source of income stability and strength. The reports argue that the banks’ long-term
banking relationships to firms and households were reliable sources of income, be-
cause the German market is based on relationship lending and because the German
economy is relatively stable. (For example: "We like Commerzbank, which benefits
from relatively high exposure to German corporate lending." Deutsche Bank Equity
Research 16/01/2004; Commerzbank’s "strong progression in Mittelstand" JPMorgan
10/08/2007; Dresdner Bank’s "retail client base is an important lever for revenues"
Natixis 22/11/2006). In particular, Commerzbank was known for its strong position
in the Mittelstand, the German group of small and medium-sized firms ("firmly estab-
lished relationships with this client group, which is not easily penetrated by the large
international banks, but has demand for a broad range of lucrative products." Bear
Stearns & Co. Inc. 5/09/2005). Figure 5.2 confirms the remarkable stability of interest
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income before the lending cut.
There is no evidence in any of the reports that Commerzbank’s or Dresdner Bank’s
trading portfolios were supposed to hedge the loan portfolio (question 3 of Table
6.8). The reports analyze the income streams for the lending division entirely sepa-
rately from the trading and investment banking divisions ("conceptually separate Com-
merzbank into three banks" CA Cheuvreux 13/11/2008). One would have expected the
bank management to point out cross-hedges between the lending and the trading port-
folios in their communication to the analysts, in order to convince them that overall
income was relatively stable. The fact that they did not suggests there were no such
hedges.
Figure 5.2 shows that trading income varied in every year between 2004 to 2008,
while net interest income remained on a gentle upward trend throughout the period.
Following the trading losses in 2008, we would have expected the performance of
firms dependent on Commerzbank and net interest income to improve, if there had
been a hedging relationship. Instead, there was initially no change in 2008, followed
by the firms underperforming and net interest income slowly declining in the following
years. Thus the behavior of trading and net interest income confirms that there was no
hedging relationship.
6.2.4 The Trading Losses 2007-09
Why did Commerzbank suffer severe losses during the financial crisis? None of the 83
relevant reports I examined blame the losses on the German loan portfolio (question 4
in Table 6.8). Given the discussion in the previous subsection on the nature of the loan
portfolio and the stability of net interest income, this is not surprising. Several reports
praise the income generated by the corporate loan and retail divisions from 2007 until
the final quarter of 2008, even as trading losses were unfolding. (For example: "Mittel-
stand once again with a strong performance" ESN/equinet Bank 4/11/2008; Dresdner’s
"retail business continues to generate healthy returns" Deutsche Bank Equity Research
28/02/2008).
87 percent of reports explicitly mention losses and write-downs in asset-backed
securities (ABS) related to the United States subprime mortgage crisis as loss drivers
at Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank. These ABS include collateralized debt obliga-
tions, residential mortgage-backed securities, and credit default swaps. As the price of
the ABS fell, the banks had to write down their values and sell at a loss. The research
reports cite figures released by the banks to financial analysts to underscore the influ-
ence of the ABS on the banks. Dresdner Bank lost 1.3 billion Euro on its ABS trading
portfolio in 2007, which on its own can explain around 75 percent of the difference
in its trading income to the previous year. The remainder is accounted for by spill-
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over effects from the subprime mortgage crisis to other financial markets, as liquidity
and confidence in trading markets declined (breakdown of figures in CA Cheuvreux
24/04/2008). The story for Commerzbank is similar, as around 84 percent of its 2007
trading losses are due to losses in subprime ABS (Credit Suisse - Europe 25/03/2008).
By mid-2008, Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank were severely weakened, but
there were no acute fears of bankruptcy. They were in a similar position to the other
German banks (Commerzbank "handled the financial crisis relatively well" Kepler
Cheuvreux 7/08/2008; "Dresdner has not done worse than other banks" Deutsche Bank
Equity Research 28/02/2008). This changed when Lehman Brothers declared insol-
vency on 15 September 2008. As wholesale funding markets froze, the three large
Icelandic banks were taken into government custody in October 2008, and their inter-
national creditors lost their deposits. Figures released to analysts by Commerzbank and
Dresdner Bank confirm that the bulk of the losses in 2008 and 2009 can be explained by
the ABS trading portfolios and items that had to be written down because of Lehman
Brothers’ and the Icelandic banks’ insolvency (see, for instance, ESN 1/12/2009 and
Credit Suisse - Europe 26/02/2009). These were the main factors behind the equity
capital shortages at Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank (questions 5 to 7 in Table 6.8).
The importance of the insolvency of Lehman Brothers and the Icelandic banks can
be seen in the timing of the 2008 quarterly results. Both Commerzbank and Dresdner
Bank achieved positive earnings in the first and second quarters. The significant 2008
losses that we see in Figure 5.2 are entirely driven by third and fourth quarter trading
losses and write-downs. Losses related to ABS write-downs continued throughout
2009.
The German bond markets did not deteriorate in this period, so Commerzbank’s
and Dresdner Bank’s ABS losses were unrelated to the German economy. Germany
saw a low default rate of around 0.3 percent for securitized transactions issued between
2005 and 2007, while in the United States subprime mortgage market the default rate
was around 20 percent (International Monetary Fund 2011). The index for German
mortgage covered bonds (iBoxx Euro Hypothekenpfandbriefe) rose by 18 percent be-
tween the end of 2006 and 2009. The index for German corporate bonds (RDAX)
gained 17 percent in the same period. In comparison, the index for US AAA-rated
subprime ABS (ABX.HE-AAA 07-1) fell by around 65 percent and the index for A-
rated subprime ABS (ABX.HE-A 07-1) by over 95 percent.
The reason for the trading losses was the failure of the management of Com-
merzbank and Dresdner Bank to recognize the institutional instability that the financial
crisis had caused in other institutions. Commerzbank wrote in its 2008 annual report:
"We were encouraged by the US Treasury Department’s rescue of Bear Stearns and
for too long shared the market’s mistaken belief that Lehman was too big to fail."
Similarly, it had been too tentative in reducing its exposure to the Icelandic banks.
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This is what differentiated it from Deutsche Bank, which profited from conse-
quently hedging its ABS portfolio and shorting the subprime mortgage market, after
the first signs of distress became apparent in 2007 (Fox-Pitt Kelton Cochran Caronia
Waller 2/01/2008; O’Donnell and Nann 2008; Landler 2008). A number of Landes-
banken followed a similar trading strategy as Commerzbank, for example Bayern LB,
Sachsen LB, and West LB. However, they were publicly owned, and could rely on
quick government funding at all stages of the crisis, preventing equity capital short-
ages and hence a lending cut (see 6.5 for details on the Landesbanken).
6.2.5 Commerzbank’s 2009 Acquisition of Dresdner Bank
The insurance company Allianz had acquired Dresdner Bank in 2001. The aim was to
exploit economies of scale and build a nationwide branch network offering "bankas-
surance", the combined retail of banking and insurance products. By 2007, it became
clear that the plan had failed. The research reports and the media blamed management
errors and the complexity of the task of merging the world’s largest insurer with Ger-
many’s third-largest bank (CA Cheuvreux 24/04/2008). In late 2007 Allianz decided
to give up the plan of "bankassurance", sell Dresdner, and refocus on its core business
of insurance.
Commerzbank’s management had first expressed interest in expanding in 2007.
Commerzbank wanted to enlarge its German retail banking customer base and it was
worried about being a takeover target itself (Schultz 2008). Dresdner Bank, with its
solid and traditional retail banking division, was a natural option. The proposed ac-
quisition got much political support, as German politicians were fond of the idea of a
second "national banking champion", next to Deutsche Bank. German finance minister
Steinbrück and Commerzbank head Blessing appeared on national television together
to explain the deal.
Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank had got relatively well through the first two
quarters of 2008. The acquisition plan was announced on 31 August 2008 and to
be completed on 12 January of 2009. The analyst reports welcomed the deal. Out
of eleven reports released around the time of the announcement, nine were explicitly
positive (question 8 in Table 6.8). Morgan Stanley, for instance, welcomed the deal as
"making perfect strategic sense" (Morgan Stanley 1/09/2008). One report delivered no
clear judgment, and one argued the purchase price Commerzbank had to pay was too
high.
The unexpected Lehman Brothers bankruptcy threw both banks into severe finan-
cial distress. Given their similar trading strategy discussed in the previous subsection, it
is not surprising that the Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank contributed approximately
evenly to the 12 billion Euro in negative profits and write-downs of the combined, en-
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larged Commerzbank in 2008 (based on my own calculations using the banks’ annual
reports). 48 percent of the12 billion Euro were due to operations at the "old" Com-
merzbank and 52 percent due to the "old" Dresdner Bank. It is thus likely that both
banks would have had to cut lending even if it had not been for the acquisition. Test-
ing for heterogeneity, I find that the lending cut affected firms and counties similarly,
independent of whether they were initially served by Commerzbank or Dresdner Bank.
6.2.6 Recovery by 2011
The German government fund Soffin supported Commerzbank twice, on 3 November
2008 and on 8 January 2009, but was unable to entirely prevent a lending cut. Overall,
Soffin provided Commerzbank with 18.2 billion Euro in equity and bought a 25 per-
cent stake in the bank, around two-thirds of Soffin’s total engagement. Commerzbank
was the only large lender in Germany to be subsidized by Soffin. Only three other,
specialized banks received capital from Soffin (two smaller real estate banks, Aareal
Bank and Hypo Real Estate Group, and the former Landesbank West LB/Portigon),
which shows that Commerzbank was uniquely affected.
The equity capital losses had forced Commerzbank to shrink its assets, in order to
improve the tier 1 capital ratio, reduce risk exposure, and gain the trust of investors.
This resulted in a lending cut to its customers in 2009 and 2010. The Commerzbank
management subsequently refocused the bank on its core business of lending to Ger-
man firms and households, whilst downsizing the trading and investment banking di-
vision. The research reports generally comment favorably on the success of the new
strategy (question 9 in Table 6.8). Losses due to the subprime mortgage crisis are
not mentioned anymore from 2011. One key piece of evidence for Commerzbank’s
recovery is that around 14.3 billion of the 18.2 billion in equity had been repaid by
Commerzbank to the government by mid-2011. From 2010 onward, lending by Com-
merzbank moved in parallel to other commercial banks once again (Figure 5.1).
6.3 Further Firm Survey Results
Appendix Table 6.9 reports robustness checks on the survey results of Section 1.4.1.
Column (1) shows that the effect in 2009 is not driven by the inclusion of the lagged
dependent variable from 2006. The effect also remains stable and statistically signif-
icant at the 10 percent level when including county fixed effects in column (2). The
year 2003 is an interesting comparison to 2009, because it was also a recessionary year.
It is the first year, in which the question on bank loans was asked in the survey. The
results in columns (3) to (6) of Appendix Table 6.9 show no association between Com-
merzbank dependence and bank loan supply or firms’ product demand conditions in
2003. This implies that Commerzbank’s loan supply was not more cyclical than other
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banks’. It also suggests that firms dependent on Commerzbank did not face different
demand conditions in recessions.
I examine three survey questions on demand conditions, to test whether differences
in product demand might affect the performance of firms dependent on Commerzbank.
Appendix Table 6.10 analyzes responses to the question “Are your business activities
constrained by low demand or too few orders: yes or no?”, Table 6.11 to “Currently
we perceive our backlog of orders to be: comparatively large, sufficient / typical for
the season, or too small?”, and Table 6.12 to “Tendencies in the previous month - The
demand situation has: improved, remained unchanged, or deteriorated?”. Firms are
asked these questions at multiple times during the year, so I use the annual average of
responses as outcome variable in the regressions. For these demand questions, none of
the coefficients on Commerzbank dependence are statistically significant in any year,
and most are of small magnitude. This indicates that neither before, during, or after
Commerzbank’s lending cut were there differences in the product demand for firms
dependent on Commerzbank.
6.4 Firm Financial Assets
The bulk of Commerzbank’s trading losses occurred between 2007 and 2009. I test
whether firms dependent on Commerzbank experienced a decrease in the value of their
financial assets at the same time. If Commerzbank gave firms investment advice cor-
related with the strategy of its own trading division, one would expect such an effect.
Appendix Table 6.13 presents the results. The outcome is the symmetric growth
rate of the value of the firm’s financial assets in the given period. If a firm begins
and ends the period with no financial assets, the growth rate is set to zero. There is no
association between Commerzbank dependence and the change in financial assets from
2007 to 2009. The insignificant point estimate in column (2) implies that the growth
of financial assets from 2007 to 2009 at a firm fully dependent on Commerzbank was
3.6 percentage points higher than at a firm with no Commerzbank relationship. This
result makes sense, given that the analyst reports presented in 6.2 suggest there was
little coordination across the trading and corporate lending divisions at Commerzbank.
Columns (1) analyzes the year before 2007, column (3) the year after 2009, column
(4) a bivariate specification without controls, and column (5) adds county fixed effects.
There is no significant effect in any specification.
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6.5 An Identification Strategy Based on Savings Banks’ Support to the
Landesbanken
6.5.1 The Literature Analyzing Affected Savings Banks
Germany has eleven Landesbanken. Each operates in a restricted region, either one
federal state or a group of states. The Landesbanken are jointly owned by the fed-
eral states and the savings banks of their region. During the financial crisis, five
Landesbanken announced significant losses in their trading portfolios: Sachsen LB,
HSH Nordbank, WestLB, Bayern LB, and Landesbank Baden-Württemberg. Follow-
ing Popov and Rocholl (2015), I define a savings bank to be "affected" if it owns one
of the five Landesbanken with trading losses during the crisis.
Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen (2011), Hochfellner, Montes, Schmalz, and Sosyura
(2015), and Popov and Rocholl (2015) argue that the affected savings banks finan-
cially supported the Landesbanken they owned, and that this led the savings banks to
cut lending. Below, I add further evidence to their analysis. First, I find little evi-
dence that affected savings banks contributed significantly to the support measures to
the Landesbanken, lost equity capital, or reduced lending following losses at their Lan-
desbanken.1 Second, I replicate the findings in Popov and Rocholl (2015) (henceforth
PR). I show that the correlation between firm performance and affected savings banks
disappears once I add the firm-level controls I use in my paper. There is also no asso-
ciation between firm growth and having an affected Landesbank as relationship bank,
and there is no effect on counties.
6.5.2 The Public Support Measures to the Landesbanken
6.5.2.1 Support to Sachsen LB
A detailed narrative for the case of Sachsen LB, the first Landesbank to announce
losses, is available from the European Commission investigation report on whether
the public support given to Sachsen LB constituted illegal state aid (Kroes 2008). In
the middle of August 2007, financial markets became suspicious that Sachsen LB was
heavily affected by the subprime mortgage crisis. The bank was unable to finance itself
on wholesale markets as a result.
On 17 August, the funding problems were publicly announced. On the same day,
German banking regulators, the state government of Saxony, and representatives of the
savings banks and other Landesbanken agreed that the other Landesbanken and Deka-
Bank (jointly owned by all the German Landesbanken and all German savings banks)
would purchase a set of subprime assets from Sachsen LB. On 26 August, the Landes-
1A research report by Fitch confirms this: "Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe Vollständiger Ratingbericht",
15 July 2014, page 16
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bank Baden-Württemberg agreed to take over Sachsen LB and immediately injected
capital. When further unexpected losses arose in late 2007, the state government of
Saxony provided a guarantee for losses from Sachsen LB’s securities portfolio of 2.75
billion Euro to Landesbank Baden-Württemberg, in addition to financing a separate
investment vehicle that contained troubled assets with 8.75 billion. Sachsen LB and
Landesbank Baden-Württemberg were not required to pay back the public funding.
Because Sachsen LB was publicly owned, the public support measures were decided
within days after it ran into difficulties. There was only a very short period of dis-
tress, during which Sachsen LB and the associated savings would have had time to cut
lending.
The European Commission does not mention any capital injections or guarantees
by the regional savings banks of Saxony to Sachsen LB. The annual report of the sav-
ings banks that partially owned Sachsen LB (Sachsen Finanzgruppe Geschäftsbericht
2007, page 4) reports "the sale of Sachsen LB produced no financial burden for the
savings banks." The average equity capital of the savings banks that partially owned
Sachsen LB grew by 8 percent in 2007, the year of Sachsen LB’s distress and subse-
quent sale. As comparison, Commerzbank lost 68 percent of its equity capital from
2007 to 2009. The aggregate equity capital of German banks except Commerzbank
rose by seven percent from 2007 to 2009. Overall, there is little evidence to suggests
that the savings banks were strongly affected by the losses at Sachsen LB.
6.5.2.2 Support to HSH Nordbank
In 2008, the owners of HSH Nordbank provided 2 billion Euro of equity capital to
the bank (Almunia 2011a). The savings bank association of Schleswig-Holstein con-
tributed 78 million Euro of this in the form of silent participation and 170 million Euro
in the form of a convertible bond. Following further losses, a second rescue package
in 2009 included 3 billion Euro in equity capital and liquidity guarantees totaling 27
billion. The savings banks did not participate in this second package. The contribution
of the savings banks to the support measures to HSH Nordbank amounted to less than
one percent of the total package and to 0.7 percent of the savings banks’ 2008 total
assets. Lending to businesses by the savings banks of Schleswig-Holstein rose by 3.8
percent and new mortgage issuance rose by 17 percent in 2008 (data from the annual
reports).
6.5.2.3 Support to West LB
The European Commission (Almunia 2011b) reports two support measures for
WestLB from 2007 to 2010. The first measure in January 2008 was a guarantee to
secure toxic assets held in WestLB’s subsidiary Phoenix Light. The savings banks as-
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sociation of North-Rhine Westphalia guaranteed 1 billion Euro. The federal state and
municipal governments guaranteed 4 billion Euro.
The second measure in November 2009 involved a 3 billion Euro capital injection
by Soffin, the German government fund. In addition, it was agreed that the savings
banks would only be responsible for 4.5 billion Euro of losses, independent of what the
actual requirements of WestLB would be. These 4.5 billion Euro would have to be paid
only after 25 years. In the meantime, the government would guarantee for the amount.
Under standard financial regulations, the savings banks would have been responsible
for 50 percent of losses immediately, as they held a 50 percent stake in WestLB. The
combined equity capital of savings banks in 2008 was 14.4 billion Euro. This capital
buffer and the possibility to accrue earnings over 25 years before paying for losses
ensured the savings banks would not become insolvent due to their involvement with
WestLB. The support measures for WestLB occurred in 2008 and 2009. Between the
end of 2007 and 2009, the aggregate equity capital of savings banks in North-Rhine
Westphalia rose by 11 percent.
6.5.2.4 Support to Bayern LB
Bayern LB reported losses from its exposure to asset-backed securities starting in
February 2008. In December 2008, Bayern LB received 10 billion Euro in equity
capital and a guarantee for losses of 4.8 billion from the federal state government of
Bavaria. The savings bank association of Bavaria did not contribute to these measures
(Almunia 2013). The losses at Bayern LB led to write-downs of a moderate size at the
Bavarian savings banks, a total of 0.5 billion Euro in the year 2008, relative to total
assets of 160 billion Euro (Krämer 2009). All Bavarian savings banks recorded a posi-
tive profit for 2008. The annual reports of Bayern LB state that aggregate loans by the
savings banks in Bavaria rose by 4 percent between the end of 2007 and 2009.
6.5.2.5 Support to Landesbank Baden-Württemberg
Until late 2008, Landesbank Baden-Württemberg had not recorded serious losses.
It was perceived strong enough by its management to take over Sachsen LB in
2007 (Kroes 2009). But after the Lehman Brothers insolvency, Landesbank Baden-
Württemberg urgently required funding due to write-downs and trading losses on se-
curities. On 21 November, Landesbank Baden-Württemberg announced that it would
receive 5 billion Euro in equity capital from its owners. The contribution was in pro-
portion to the ownership share (Gubitz 2013). The state’s savings banks association
owned 35.6 percent of Landesbank Baden-Württemberg and therefore contributed 1.8
billion Euro. This is not a negligible amount, considering the aggregate equity capital
of the savings banks in Baden-Württemberg was 7.1 billion Euro at the end of 2007.
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Nevertheless, between the end of 2007 and 2009, the aggregate equity capital of sav-
ings banks in Baden-Württemberg rose by 6 percent. Lending to non-banks increased
by 5 percent (data from the annual reports).
6.5.2.6 Lending by the Affected Savings Banks
I analyze the Bureau van Dijk database Bankscope, which reports the lending stock for
over 90 percent of the German savings banks.2 I find that the affected savings banks,
on average, increased their lending to non-financial customers by 2 percent between
2006 and 2008, and by 7 percent from 2006 and 2010. This suggests they did not cut
lending. To test this conclusion further, I run bank-level regressions of the growth of
lending on a dummy for affected savings banks. I use the change in lending between
2006 and 2010 as outcome.
The results are in Appendix Table 6.14. Column (1) compares the affected to un-
affected savings banks. Savings banks across Germany are similar in structure, scope,
and customer type, so this is a natural comparison. Affected savings banks grew their
lending by 8 percent more relative to the unaffected.3 Column (2) compares the af-
fected savings banks to all similar banks, by adding dummies for bank size, federal
state, cooperative banks, real estate banks, and commercial banks. Column (3) con-
trols for the pre-trend. The outcome in column (4) is the change in lending between
2006 and 2008. Column (5) uses the symmetric growth of lending between 2006 and
2010 as outcome to limit the influence of outliers. There is no evidence in any specifi-
cation that affected savings banks reduced their lending relative to other banks.
The savings banks that owned WestLB and Landesbank Baden-Württemberg con-
tributed more to the rescue of their respective Landesbanken than the other affected
savings banks, as I describe above. I add a dummy for affected savings banks in these
two regions in column (6). The point estimate is positive, small, and insignificant,
which indicates no difference in loan growth.
6.5.3 The Relationship Between Affected Savings Banks and Firm Employment
The results on equity capital and lending in the previous subsection raise the question
whether the correlation between relationship to an affected savings bank and firm em-
ployment losses in PR can be interpreted as a causal effect. I extend the analysis in
PR to examine this question. I replicate the sample in PR using the description in their
paper. I use my Creditreform dataset to identify firms’ relationship banks in the year
2006. The treatment variable is a dummy for whether a firm has an affected savings
2Bankscope also includes information on the history of the banks, including bank mergers. I hand-
code all mergers since 2006 based on this information. For the years before a merger, I sum the lending
stock of the merging banks, and keep one observation per institution, as of 2012.
3The results are unchanged when I weight regressions by the banks’ lending stock in 2006.
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bank among its relationship banks, interacted with a dummy for the treatment period
in PR, the years 2009 to 2012.
PR present their main results in Table 3 of their paper. They find that firms with an
affected savings bank among their relationship banks reduced employment by an av-
erage of 1.1 percent in the period 2009 to 2012. The results of my replication exercise
are in Appendix Table 6.15. In all the regressions, standard errors are clustered at the
level of the firm. Columns (3) to (7) estimate panel specifications identical to PR. The
point estimate in column (3) implies an employment loss of 0.5 percent at firms with
an affected savings bank among their relationship banks. Columns (1) to (2) of Table
6.15 estimate cross-sectional specifications, using my large employment cross-section
dataset. The outcome is the ln employment difference between 2008 and 2012, which
corresponds to the ln outcome variable in PR. The estimate in column (1) implies that
firms with an affected savings bank among their relationship banks experienced an em-
ployment loss of 1.5 percent. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent
level. Hence, I can replicate their findings.
I propose two additional control variables. These are the age and industry of the
firm, measured in the year 2006. Firm age is important because the literature has fre-
quently found correlations between age and growth (Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda
2013). In my data, dependence on an affected savings bank is positively and signif-
icantly correlated with age, even when conditioning on firm size. The reason is that
savings banks traditionally have a public mandate to lend to business startups. I control
for industry at the two-digit level of the German classification scheme WZ2008. Since
savings banks only operate in their municipality, differences in the industrial compo-
sition of the municipal economy will lead to differences in the exposure of banks to
industries. Controlling for ln age and industry shrinks the estimate in the employment
cross-section dataset in column (2) towards zero, and it becomes statistically insignif-
icant. Similarly, the point estimate in the panel specification of column (4) switches
sign to positive, is of small magnitude, and insignificant. The 95 percent confidence
interval in column (4) excludes employment losses greater than 0.5 percent. The coef-
ficient on age has the expected negative sign and is significant.
Column (5) uses fixed effects for age bins, rather than ln age, to control for age-
related differences in employment growth. The three age bins are for firms founded
before 1990, from 1990 to 2000, and after 2000. The coefficient on savings banks
remains small, positive, and statistically insignificant. Column (6) adds a number of
controls that PR propose: the natural logarithm of firm assets, the capital-to-assets
ratio, the profit-to-assets ratio, and the cash flow-to-assets ratio. To measure profits,
I use the German balance sheet item Betriebsergebnis and to measure cash-flow I use
Jahresüberschuss. PR control for the annual, time-varying value of these variables.
This could be problematic, because assets, capital, profit, and cash-flow are likely to
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be outcomes of a credit shock. The coefficient on the affected savings banks in column
(6) remains positive, but becomes statistically significant, suggesting the estimates are
biased.
In column (7), I add a dummy to the specification that indicates whether the firm
has a Commerzbank branch among its relationship banks, interacted with a post-
treatment dummy. This measures a firm’s relationship to Commerzbank the same way
that PR measure a firm’s relationship to an affected savings bank. The coefficient is
significant at the 1 percent level. It implies that firms with Commerzbank as one of
their relationship banks reduced employment by 1.9 percent. I also test whether firms
that had one of the affected Landesbanken as relationship bank reduced employment.
The coefficient is close to zero and statistically insignificant.
6.5.4 The Relationship Between Affected Savings Banks, Regional Growth, and
Household Debt
I call a county "affected" if it is served by one of the affected savings banks. I test if
affected counties grew more slowly using a county panel specification, such as the one
in Table 5.8, column (1). The coefficient on the dummy for affected counties is 0.009
(standard error: 0.008). Thus, there is no effect of dependence on affected savings
banks on county growth.
I examine the relationship between household debt and affected savings banks by
using the nationally representative GSOEP. Around one-third of total bank loans to
German households are issued by the savings banks and Landesbanken, so changes
in their household loan supply may have significant consequences. The regressions
I run are equivalent to the ones I report in Table 5.5 of my paper. The outcome is
the symmetric growth rate of private debt from 2007 to 2012. 97 percent of GSOEP
respondents entered the information before August 2007, so the observation for 2007
represents the state before the losses at the Landesbanken were announced. The re-
gressor of interest is a dummy for individuals in affected counties. The coefficient on
the dummy is small and insignificant at -0.01 (standard error: 0.03). Controlling for ln
mortgage debt in 2002, ln other debt in 2002, and a dummy for any debt in 2002, the
coefficient on the dummy becomes positive, but remains insignificant and small (point
estimate: 0.01, standard error: 0.03). This suggests that household debt in the affected
counties did not change.
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6.6 An Identification Strategy Based on Other Banks’ Trading Losses
6.6.1 The Literature on Other Banks with Trading Losses
A recent paper by Dwenger, Fossen, and Simmler (2015) (henceforth DFS) uses two
instruments to identify exogenous variation in German firms’ bank loan supply in the
recent crisis. The first is a firm’s dependence on an affected savings bank, which is
the same variation PR use. I discuss this in detail in 6.5. The second instrument in
DFS is the average of the trading losses of the firm’s relationship banks. In their Table
1, DFS list the main German banks affected by trading losses. The table includes a
number of Landesbanken, IKB, Deutsche Bank, HypoVereinsbank, DZ Bank, KfW,
and Commerzbank (including Dresdner Bank).
Below, I extend the analysis in DFS by showing that their results are entirely driven
by Commerzbank’s lending cut. I find no evidence for a lending cut by any other
bank. I then explain why the trading losses did not force other banks to cut lending.
A number of institutional details played a role, such as a banks’ hedging strategies,
ownership structures, and pre-crisis capital buffers.
6.6.2 Replicating the Dataset of DFS
I follow Section 3 and Footnote 27 of DFS to replicate their dataset. Their sample spans
the years 2006 to 2010. As first regressor, I calculate the firm’s fraction of relationship
banks that had trading losses, out of all the firm’s relationship banks. I call this the
firm’s dependence on banks with trading losses. I define banks with trading losses
as the banks listed in Table 1 of DFS. As an example: If a firm has two relationship
banks, one being IKB and the other Commerzbank, the dependence on banks with
trading losses would be 1. I also calculate the firm’s dependence on all the other banks
with trading losses, except Commerzbank. The firm from the previous example would
have a value of 0.5 for this measure. DFS use two outcome variables, the ln annual
growth rates of employment and fixed assets.
6.6.3 The Relationship Between Banks with Trading Losses and Firm Employ-
ment
Appendix Table 6.16 presents results for the type of specification used by DFS. Col-
umn (1) shows a negative and statistically significant effect on employment of depen-
dence on a bank with trading losses. It implies that the annual growth rate of employ-
ment at a firm fully dependent on banks with trading losses was 1.2 percentage points
lower in the years 2006 to 2010. This is the reduced-form effect that DFS capture in
their IV specification of their Table 5. Column (2) tests the robustness of the coeffi-
cient by adding the firm controls from my paper. These controls are not in DFS. The
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coefficient falls to one-third of its value and becomes statistically insignificant.
In column (3), I split the regressor into two. I include my measure of firm Com-
merzbank dependence and the measure of dependence on all the other banks with
trading losses, except Commerzbank. The coefficient on Commerzbank is negative
and statistically significant. It implies a reduction in the annual employment growth of
firms entirely dependent on Commerzbank by 1.1 percentage points.4 The point esti-
mate on the measure of dependence on the other banks with trading losses is positive,
small, and insignificant. Columns (4) and (5) replace the interaction dummy d with a
dummy for the years 2008 to 2010 and a dummy for 2007 to 2010, respectively. This
tests whether the other banks had an effect in the early years of the financial crisis. I
find no effect. In column (6), I add the lagged growth rate of sales to the specification,
as suggested by DFS. I also add county fixed effects interacted with d. This controls for
cross-regional differences, for example due to regional demand shocks or differences
in business regulation. The coefficients remain similar.
I investigate whether the zero coefficient on the other banks with trading losses
masks heterogeneous effects across the individual banks. I have already examined the
affected Landesbanken in 6.5, so here I focus on the other banks mentioned in Table
1 of DFS. I add measures of dependence on each of these banks to the regression in
column (7). None of the point estimates are statistically significant and they all imply
smaller losses than the coefficient on Commerzbank dependence. In column (8), I
use the annual growth rate of fixed assets as the outcome variable and run the same
specification. The results confirm that there was no significant effect of dependence on
these banks on firm growth.
The first three columns of Appendix Table 6.17 re-examine the employment effect
of dependence on banks with trading losses using the sample and specification of my
large employment cross-section. The results are similar to what I find when I use the
sample and specification of DFS.
As a final check, I run county-level regressions analogous to the ones reported in
Table 5.8. The outcome is ln county GDP. The regressor of interest is the average
dependence of firms in the county on other banks with trading losses, except Com-
merzbank, interacted with a dummy for the years 2009 to 2012. I find a small and
insignificant coefficient on the county dependence on these other banks with trading
losses, in unreported results. The effect of county Commerzbank dependence in the
same regression remains robust.
4The coefficients in Table 5.6 refer to the employment loss over four years, while this point estimate
refers to the annual loss. Therefore, both types of regression estimate an employment loss between 4
to 5 percent from Commerzbank’s lending cut, despite the considerable differences in sampling design
and specification.
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6.6.4 Institutional Details on the Other Banks With Trading Losses
I briefly explain why trading losses at these other banks did not have effects on firms.
The case of KfW is similar to the Landesbanken discussed in 6.5. It is the national de-
velopment bank, jointly owned by the government of Germany and the federal states.
When trading losses at KfW became apparent, the government immediately stepped in.
In fact, KfW was charged with several public credit extension programs to help house-
holds during the financial crisis. For example, KfW raised its mortgage commitments
to households by 26.5 percent during the crisis.
IKB does not play an important role in the loan supply of German firms. In my
Creditreform sample of relationship banks, only 0.1 percent of firms list IKB as one of
their relationship banks. For the firms that do have an IKB relationship, over 90 percent
have at least two other relationship banks. Therefore, when IKB became financially
affected, firms were able to switch to their other relationship lenders. Similarly, in
Table 5.6 I find that firms with positive, but low Commerzbank dependent did not cut
employment following Commerzbank’s lending cut.
DZ Bank and HypoVereinsbank had large equity capital buffers, so they were able
to absorb trading losses relatively well. The tier 1 capital ratio at DZ Bank was 14
percent in 2006. DZ Bank is the central bank of the cooperative sector and owned
by the cooperative banks, which were not generally affected by the crisis and would
have been able to provide support in the hypothetical scenario of a capital shortage.
Similarly, the tier 1 capital ratio of HypoVereinsbank was 15.7 percent in 2006. Hy-
poVereinsbank is part of the international UniCredit Group, which eased its access to
funding.
Deutsche Bank profited from consequently hedging its ABS portfolio and shorting
the subprime mortgage market, after the first signs of distress became apparent in 2007
(see the research report by Fox-Pitt Kelton Cochran Caronia Waller, "European Banks:
Credit Crisis - Stock Impact", 2 January 2008). While it made losses on the ABS trad-
ing portfolio, these were evened out by its hedging strategy. This enabled Deutsche
Bank to expand its lending in Germany during the financial crisis. For example, mort-
gage lending in its private customer division rose by 21.7 percent between 2007 and
2010.5
5The point estimates on Deutsche Bank dependence in columns (7) and (8) Appendix Table 6.16
are both negative and statistically insignificant. In column (4) of Appendix Table 6.17, I show that
this is not a general pattern. The sample is the large employment cross-section and the outcome is
the ln employment growth rate. The coefficient on Deutsche Bank dependence is small, statistically
insignificant, and positive.
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6.7 A Proxy for the Change in Bank Loans
Data on county-level loans are not available in Germany. This section proposes a proxy
to measure by how much county-level bank loans fell due to Commerzbank’s lending
cut.
6.7.1 Constructing a Proxy for the Change in Bank Loans due to Com-
merzbank’s Lending Cut
The proxy for county-level bank loans is based on two quantities. First, the aggregate
reduction in bank loans by Commerzbank. I calculate this as the difference between
Commerzbank’s lending stock to German customers in 2007 and a counterfactual value
for 2010. To calculate the counterfactual value, I assume that in the absence of the
trading losses, Commerzbank’s lending stock would have developed in parallel to the
other banks from 2007 to 2010.
The second quantity aims to measure the share that loans to each county took in
Commerzbank’s loan portfolio before the lending cut. I use the Creditreform dataset of
relationship banks to measure this. For each firm, I calculate how many Commerzbank
branches are among its relationship banks. I sum the number of Commerzbank rela-
tionships in each county. Similarly, I sum the number of Commerzbank relationship
in the whole dataset. The second quantity is then the number of Commerzbank rela-
tionships in each county divided of Commerzbank relationships in the whole dataset.
I call this second quantity the "Commerzbank loan share of the county."
The product of the two quantities is a proxy for how much bank loans fell in a
county because of Commerzbank’s lending cut. The accuracy of this proxy relies on
two assumptions. The first assumption is that the Commerzbank loan share of the
county (the second quantity) can be accurately measured using the method described
above. This requires that the number of Commerzbank relationships in the Creditre-
form dataset is proportional to the true number of relationship for each county. To
gauge how likely this assumption is to hold, I use the German Business Register
as benchmark. There are some differences between the Creditreform dataset and the
Business Register. For example, in the Business Register, 13.9 percent of firms are
located in the former GDR (excluding Berlin). In the Creditreform dataset, it is 17.2
percent. If this represents a consistent bias towards the former GDR, the proxy would
overestimate the lending cut to counties in the former GDR.
The second assumption states that Commerzbank reduced its lending to a county in
proportion to the Commerzbank loan share of the county (the second quantity). Figure
6.2 shows that the effect of Commerzbank dependence on bank loans is stable across
different dimensions of firm heterogeneity, which supports this assumption.
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6.7.2 Result Using the Proxy
I turn to estimating the effects of changes in bank loans on GDP growth, using the
proxy calculated above. The outcome is county GDP growth between 2008 and 2012,
normalized by the level of county GDP in 2007. The regressor of interest is the proxy,
also normalized by county GDP in 2007. This eases the interpretation of the coeffi-
cient as the effect of a one Euro increase in bank loans on the level of GDP. The control
variables, weights, and standard error calculations are identical to Table 5.8. The (un-
reported) results imply a one Euro decrease in bank loans leads to a 1.58 Euro fall in
GDP, with a standard error of 0.53. In comparison, Peek and Rosengren (2000) find
that a one USD drop in bank loans corresponds to a loss of USD 1.11 in construction
activity. The regression using the proxy therefore confirms that the lending cut low-
ered county growth. It is important to recall that the estimate is likely to overstate the
causal effect of bank loans, because there are multiple other channels through which a
lending cut affects firm and county growth (see Section 1.2.1).
6.8 The Effect of Export Dependence on Counties and Firms
Section 1.7.2 shows that the effects of Commerzbank’s temporary lending cut persisted
beyond the duration of the lending cut. Are such persistent effects a general response
to economic shocks? In this section, I use the fall in export demand during the Great
Recession to investigate whether the effects of export demand shocks persist (Eaton,
Kortum, Neiman, and Romalis 2016; Behrens, Corcos, and Mion 2013).
I exploit heterogeneity across firms and counties in export dependence. Aggregate
trade statistics show that German real exports fell by 14.3 percent from 2008 to 2009.
By 2011, exports had recovered, as they grew by 24 percent from 2009 to 2011. If
export demand shocks only have transitory effects, then counties and firms with high
export dependence should have experienced lower growth during the years of the ex-
port demand shock, but by 2011 they should have recovered.
For both firms and counties, I construct a dummy variable for being in the top
quartile of the distribution of the export share. Appendix Table 6.18 reports that GDP
in export-dependent counties was on average 1.1 percent lower in 2009 and 2010. The
point estimate for 2011, however, is of the opposite sign, larger in absolute terms, and
statistically different. This means that export-dependent counties entirely made up the
output shortfall in under two years. The dynamics are similar for firms, as shown
in Appendix Table 6.19. Employment at export-dependent firms was on average 1.8
percent lower in 2009 and 2010. But by 2011, they had recovered to the level of the
other firms, outgrowing them by 2 percent in 2011. Hence, export-dependent firms and
counties converged to the growth path of unaffected firms and counties in under two
years.
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Year Month Day Source of Report Title of Report
2004 1 16 Deutsche Bank Equity Research German Banks: The Re-Turn
2004 1 23 JPMorgan Commerzbank : Management Meeting - Feedback On Outlook
2004 8 4 Morgan Stanley Commerzbank: Quality Concerns
2005 1 7 CA Cheuvreux
Commerzbank: Refocusing On Core Business Following 
Securities Restructuring
2005 8 3 Deutsche Bank Equity Research Commerzbank AG : A Nice Surprise
2005 9 5 Bear Stearns & Co. Inc. CBKG.DE: Commerzbank: Last Man Standing
2006 2 7 Deutsche Bank Equity Research Commerzbank AG : Back To Normality. Downgrade To Hold.
2006 11 6 Kepler Cheuvreux Commerzbank : Upside After A Solid Quarter
2006 11 22 Natixis
Allianz - Dresdner Bank, A New Growth Driver For The 
Group
2007 1 10 UBS Equities German Banks Revisited
2007 6 26 Bank Vontobel AG Allianz - Once More Rumours Dresdner Bank Is Being Sold
2007 8 10 JPMorgan
Commerzbank - 2Q07: Good Domestic Trends, Disappointing 
Treasury
2007 10 30 fairesearch
Commerzbank - Subprime And Other One-Offs In 3Q07 - 
30Th October, 2007.
2007 12 17 JPMorgan
Allianz : Allianz Is Oversold, In Our View; We Think The 
Only Downside Risk Is A Rights Issue - Very Unlikely
2008 1 2 Bear Stearns & Co. Inc.
CBKG.DE: Difficult Times Ahead For Commercial Real 
Estate
2008 1 2
Fox-Pitt Kelton Cochran Caronia 
Waller European Banks: Credit Crisis - Stock Impact
2008 1 16 Natixis Commerzbank - No Visibility In The Short Term
2008 1 17 JPMorgan Allianz : Less Exposure To Credit Crunch, More Cost Cutting
2008 1 18 Bear Stearns & Co. Inc.
CBKG.DE: Tidying Up With More Sub Prime Provisions 
Amending Estimates
2008 1 18 Deutsche Bank Equity Research German Banks : Quantifying The Revenue Risk
2008 1 28 UBS Equities
Commerzbank "Factoring In A Tougher Environment" 
(Neutral) Zieschang
2008 2 14 Thomson Reuters StreetEvents
Crzby - Event Transcript Of Commerzbank AG Conference 
Call, Feb. 14, 2008 / 8:15Am Et
2008 2 15 Bear Stearns & Co. Inc.
CBKG.DE: Q4 2007 Results Solid Results In Difficult 
Markets
2008 2 15 Societe Generale
Commerzbank-Target Price Downgrade Q4 07 - A Solid End 
To 2007 With Manageable "Crisis" Impact
2008 2 15 UniCredit Research Commerzbank (Hold) - Q4 Numbers Lower Than Expected
2008 2 27 Auerbach Grayson & Co., Inc.
Allianz Holding - Excellent Results For Insurance Business 
And Asset Management (Germany)
2008 2 28 Deutsche Bank Equity Research Allianz : Breaking The Bank?
2008 3 25 Credit Suisse - Europe CBKG.F: Commerzbank - Resilience > Perception
2008 4 8 Moody's
Negative Outlook For German Banking System Reflects 
Impact Of Credit Crisis And Sectoral Challenges
2008 4 24 CA Cheuvreux Allianz: Main Value Drivers Intact
2008 4 25 Natixis Allianz - Strong Upside Potential Despite Crisis
Research Reports Listed by Date
2008 5 8 UniCredit Research
Commerzbank (Hold) - Unspectacular Q1 Numbers, In Our 
View
2008 5 13 Deutsche Bank Equity Research German Banks : Amended: Still Facing Headwinds
2008 6 5 CA Cheuvreux
Commerzbank: (E)Merging Opportunites - The Resurrection 
Of German Banking Consolidation
2008 6 24 Natixis Allianz - What Does The Future Hold For Dresdner
2008 8 6 JPMorgan
Commerzbank : Q208 First Glance- Good Underlying But 
Focus On Cre Large LLP - Alert
2008 8 6
Macquarie (formerly Oppenheim 
Research) – Historical Strong Q2 Results
2008 8 7 Kepler Cheuvreux
Landsbanki Kepler Research: Reduce On Commerzbank (Q2 
Earnings)
2008 8 7 UBS Equities Commerzbank "As Good As It Gets?" (Neutral) Zieschang
2008 8 28 JPMorgan
Commerzbank : Working Through The Numbers Of A 
Potential Commerz/Dresdner Deal
2008 9 1 Morgan Stanley Commerzbank: Dresdner Deal: Initial Take
2008 9 1 Warburg Research GmbH Commerzbank
2008 9 2 Fortis Bank Financial Markets
Credit Research - Banks: All Recommendations Revised Down 
On Dresdner And Commerzbank, Benoit Feliho, Christine 
Passieux
2008 9 2 Kepler Cheuvreux
Landsbanki Kepler Research: Reduce On Commerzbank 
(AGM)
2008 9 2
Macquarie (formerly Oppenheim 
Research) – Historical No Guts, No Glory?
2008 9 2 Moody's Moody's Downgrades Dresdner Bank's Ratings To Aa3
2008 9 4 MF Global (Historical)
Mf Global Securities - Commerzbank - Buy - Tp €25 - 
Initiation Report
2008 9 12 Natixis Commerzbank - Integration Time
2008 10 31 UniCredit Research Commerzbank (Hold) - Preview Of Q3/08 Figures
2008 11 3
Macquarie (formerly Oppenheim 
Research) – Historical Superior Way To Raise Capital
2008 11 3 Raymond James Europe RJEE/RJFI Commerzbank - Q3 2008 Earnings And Capital Raising.
2008 11 3 Thomson Reuters StreetEvents
Crzby Conference Call Final Transcript, 3-Nov-08 9:00Am 
Cet
2008 11 4 ESN/ equinet Bank
Equinet (4.11.2008): Commerzbank With Weak Q3 Results 
(Hold, Tp Eur 10)
2008 11 4 Natixis Commerzbank - A Sound Move
2008 11 5 Warburg Research GmbH Commerzbank
2008 11 13 CA Cheuvreux
Commerzbank: The Good, The Bad And The New Bank 
Integrating Complexity
2008 11 28 Natixis Commerzbank - Revisions To Terms Of Dresdner Acquisition
2008 12 12
Macquarie (formerly Oppenheim 
Research) – Historical Downgrade To Sell - Falling Behind
2008 12 12
Macquarie (formerly Oppenheim 
Research) – Historical Falling Behind
2009 1 1 Global Markets Direct Commerzbank AG - Financial And Strategic Analysis Review
2009 1 7 JPMorgan
Commerzbank : Challenges Ahead - Resuming Coverage With 
Uw
2009 1 7 UBS Equities Commerzbank "Tough Times Ahead" (Neutral) Zieschang
2009 1 9 UBS Equities Commerzbank "Taxpayer Steps In Again" (Neutral) Zieschang
2009 1 12 ESN
German Banks : German Banks: Still No Light At The End Of 
The Tunnel
2009 1 13 Moody's
Moody's Afﬁrms Commerzbank'S Aa3 Long-Term Ratings, 
Stable Outlook
2009 1 13 Moody's
Moody's Afﬁrms Dresdner Bank's Aa3 Long-Term Ratings, 
Stable Outlook
2009 2 12 Morgan Stanley
Commerzbank: Many Hurdles & Very Little Visibility: 
Underweight
2009 2 19 Kepler Cheuvreux Commerzbank - Yellow Submarine
2009 2 26 Credit Suisse - Europe
Credit Suisse Breakfast Banker - Financial News - Thursday, 
26 February 2009
2009 2 26 JPMorgan
Commerzbank : Dresdner Q4 Numbers Cause Further Erosion 
Of Nav - Alert
2009 3 20 UniCredit Research Sector Report - German Banks
2009 3 30 Deutsche Bank Equity Research Commerzbank: Flirting With Disaster
2009 5 11
Macquarie (formerly Oppenheim 
Research) – Historical Capital Position Worse Than Assumed
2009 5 12 Credit Suisse - Europe CBKG.F: Commerzbank - Cash Is King
2009 5 12 Standard & Poor's
Commerzbank AG And Dresdner Bank AG Outlooks To 
Negative On Worsening Credit Conditions; A/A-1 Ratings 
Afﬁrmed
2009 5 12 Warburg Research GmbH Commerzbank
2009 5 13 JPMorgan Commerzbank : Capital Raising Required
2009 8 6 BHF-BANK AG Commerzbank - Sell, Target Price: Eur 4.00
2009 8 6 Deutsche Bank Equity Research Commerzbank : A Levered View On Abs Prices
2009 8 7 Auerbach Grayson & Co., Inc.
Auerbach Grayson: Commerzbank - Losses In Q2, But 
Without Any Nasty Surprises (Germany)
2009 8 7 JPMorgan Commerzbank : Q209, Still In The Red
2009 8 7 Kepler Cheuvreux Commerzbank - Not A Good Restructuring Play
2009 8 7 Societe Generale
Commerzbank - Quarterly Results - Too Early To Judge 
Whether Major Dilution Can Be Avoided
2009 8 10 Warburg Research GmbH Commerzbank
2009 8 13
Fox-Pitt Kelton Cochran Caronia 
Waller Questioning Capital – Downgrade To Underperform 
2009 8 20 UBS Equities Commerzbank "Downgrade To Sell" (Sell) Zieschang
2009 11 5 Auerbach Grayson & Co., Inc.
Auerbach Grayson: Commerzbank - Weak Q3 Results 
(Germany)
2009 11 5 Deutsche Bank Equity Research Commerzbank : Unconvincing Proposition Despite Subsidies
2009 11 5 JPMorgan Commerzbank : Results Q309 - Alert
2009 11 5
Macquarie (formerly Oppenheim 
Research) – Historical Quality Of Results Matters
2009 11 5 Natixis
Commerzbank - Earnings Boosted By A €435M Provision 
Release On Toxic Assets
2009 11 6 Natixis Commerzbank - Too Many Balance Sheet Risks
2009 11 27 Deutsche Bank Equity Research Commerzbank : Roadmap 2012 In Spotlight
2009 11 30 Warburg Research GmbH Commerzbank
2010 2 23 JPMorgan Q409 Results Snapshot Before The Call - Alert
2010 2 23
Macquarie (formerly Oppenheim 
Research) – Historical Negative Earnings Surprise Driven By Trading
2010 2 23 Raymond James Europe RJEE/RJFI Commerzbank: Worrying Q4 Figures But Upbeat Guidance
2010 2 24 Credit Suisse - Europe CBKG.F: Commerzbank - Still Under Water
2010 2 24 Deutsche Bank Equity Research Commerzbank : 2010 - Transition To Operating Profitability
2010 2 24 Societe Generale
Commerzbank - 12M Target Downgrade - Tangible Book 
Takes Another Hit In Q4. Soffin Repayment Still Unresolved
2010 2 24 UBS Equities
Commerzbank "Tough Quarter And Subdued 2010 Outlook" 
(Sell) Zieschang
2010 2 25 ESN/ equinet Bank Commerzbank - Review Q4 Results (Reduce, Tp Eur 4.60)
2011 2 23 CA Cheuvreux
Commerzbank - 2/Outperform - Q4-10 Results Well Above 
Estimates
2011 2 23 JPMorgan
Commerzbank : Q4 Earnings Above Consensus, Focus On 
Soffin Repayment And Rwa Reduction - Alert
2012 2 23 Deutsche Bank Equity Research
Commerzbank : Cinderellabank Has Not Arrived At The Ball 
(Yet)
2012 2 23 JPMorgan
Commerzbank : Q411 Results: Better Than Expected Adj. Pbt 
But All Eyes Remain On Capital - Alert
2012 2 24 Morgan Stanley Commerzbank: Capital Ok, Eps Still At Risk
2012 2 24 Societe Generale
Commerzbank - Full-Year Results - Capital Shortfall Reduced 
– Poor Organic Capital Generation And Too Many Risks
2012 2 27 ESN/ equinet Bank
Commerzbank Q4 Results All In All In Line With Exp., 
Capital Increase Should Ease Investors' Concerns About 
CBK'S Capital Position - Company Update
2012 2 28 UBS Equities Commerzbank "Sell Rating Reiterated" (Sell) Zieschang
6.10 Appendix Tables
Table 6.1: Establishment of Commerzbank branches in West Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1948-1970 1948-1970 1948-1970 1925-1948 Pre-1925
Distance instrument 0.094 0.090 0.077 0.021 0.010
(0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.020) (0.017)
Observations 324 324 324 324 324
R2 0.122 0.122 0.136 0.088 0.359
Zonal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Urban FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ln population No No Yes Yes Yes
Population density No No Yes Yes Yes
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Notes: This table examines the effect of Commerzbank’s postwar break-up on its branch network. It
reports regressions using a cross-section of West German counties. The data are hand-collected from the
historic annual reports of Commerzbank. The outcome variable is a dummy for whether Commerzbank
established a branch in the county during the respective period given in the column title. The regressor
of interest is the distance instrument, the negative of the county’s distance to the closest postwar Com-
merzbank head office, in 100 kilometers. The zonal fixed effects are dummies for the three postwar
banking zones of North Rhine-Westphalia, Northern, and Southern Germany. The urban fixed effect is a
dummy for counties with a year 2000 population density greater than 1,000 inhabitants per square kilo-
meter. The ln population and population density are continuous variables from the year 2000. Standard
errors are robust. Columns (1) to (3) show that from 1948 to 1970, Commerzbank was more likely to
establish a new branch in counties close to its temporary, postwar head offices. Columns (4) and (5)
report no significant association in the period before or after.
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Table 6.2: Commerzbank dependence and firm variables in 2006
(1) (2)
ln age -0.015 -0.011
(0.009) (0.010)
ln value added 0.018 0.022
(0.015) (0.020)
ln capital -0.014 -0.024
(0.006) (0.008)
Investment rate 0.009 -0.009
(0.016) (0.020)
ln employment 0.011 0.010
(0.012) (0.016)
ln liabilites 0.008 0.009
(0.012) (0.012)
ln bank loans 0.002 0.000
(0.007) (0.007)
ln financial assets 0.001
(0.002)
Observations 2,011 1,618
R2 0.307 0.340
Industry FE Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes
Estimator OLS OLS
Notes: This table reports estimates from cross-sectional firm regressions of CB dep on firm variables.
The data are from the firm panel for the year 2006. The variables are defined as in Table 5.1. The re-
gression includes fixed effects for 70 industries and 357 counties. Standard errors are two-way clustered
at the level of the industry and the county.
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Table 6.4: The distance instrument and county characteristics
(1) (2)
OUTCOMES
(1) GDP Growth 2005-08 Coeff -0.005 -0.005
Std Err (0.004) (0.006)
R2 0.008 0.035
(2) GDP Growth 2000-05 Coeff -0.004 0.000
Std Err (0.004) (0.008)
R2 0.011 0.030
(3) GDP Growth 2002-03 (recession year) Coeff 0.001 -0.003
Std Err (0.002) (0.004)
R2 0.004 0.019
(4) Empl Growth 2005-08 Coeff -0.003 0.004
Std Err (0.002) (0.003)
R2 0.010 0.049
(5) Professional services share Coeff 0.028 -0.001
Std Err (0.017) (0.043)
R2 0.098 0.111
(6) Shipping share Coeff 0.000 0.001
Std Err (0.000) (0.001)
R2 0.001 0.072
(7) Metal manufacturing share Coeff -0.052 -0.021
Std Err (0.012) (0.023)
R2 0.068 0.128
(8) Other manufacturing share Coeff -0.008 -0.032
Std Err (0.009) (0.024)
R2 0.009 0.061
(9) Non-tradable share Coeff 0.006 -0.005
Std Err (0.010) (0.022)
R2 0.014 0.033
(10) Unemployment rate Coeff 0.015 0.000
Std Err (0.002) (0.004)
R2 0.526 0.644
(11) Debt index Coeff 0.086 0.026
Std Err (0.012) (0.034)
R2 0.154 0.299
CONTROLS
Linear distances to postwar head offices No Yes
Former GDR FE Yes Yes
Notes: The reported estimates are coefficients on the distance instrument from cross-sectional OLS
county regressions. Each coefficient is from a different regression. A positive coefficient implies the
outcome value is greater for counties close to a postwar head office. Rows (1) to (4) show that the
distance instrument is not correlated with county growth before Commerzbank’s lending cut. Rows (5),
(7), (10), and (11) show statistically significant raw correlations between the distance instrument and the
county employment shares of professional services, the metal manufacturing share, the unemployment
rate, and the household debt index. These correlations disappear once one conditions on the three linear
distances to Commerzbank’s three postwar head offices Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, and Hamburg. There are
no statistically significant correlations between the distance instrument and the other industry shares.
The distance instrument is the negative of the county’s distance to the closest postwar head office,
in 100 kilometers. The growth rates are in natural logarithms. The industry shares are employment
shares in 2006. Professional services include WZ2008 industry categories 69-75; shipping 50; metal
manufacturing 23-29; other manufacturing 9-22 and 30-32; and non-tradables are defined in Section
1.7.1. The unemployment rate is from 2006. Debt index is a 2003 measure of county household leverage,
calculated by credit rating agency Schufa (Privatverschuldungsindex). The weights and standard error
calculations are explained in Table 5.8.
183
Table 6.5: High-innovation industries
WZ2008 Code Industry
20.2 Manufacture of pesticides and other agrochemical products
21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and preparations
25.4 Manufacture of weapons and ammunition
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
30.3 Manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery
30.4 Manufacture of military fighting vehicles
20.1 Manufacture of basic chemicals, fertilisers and nitrogen compounds,
plastics and synthetic rubber in primary forms
20.4 Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and
polishing preparations, perfumes and toilet preparations
20.5 Manufacture of other chemical products (explosives,
glues, essential oils, man-made fibres)
27 Manufacture of electrical equipment (electric motors, generators, transformers and
electricity distribution and control apparatus)
28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment (e.g. engines,
turbines, fluid power equipment, gears, furnaces, solar heat collectors,
lifting and handling equipment, power-driven hand tools, non-domestic
cooling and ventilation equipment, machinery for mining, quarrying and construction)
29.1 Manufacture of motor vehicles
29.3 Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles
30.2 Manufacture of railway locomotives and rolling stock
33.2 Installation of industrial machinery and equipment
Notes: This table reports the industries with an internal share of R&D spending over revenue above 2.5
percent (OECD cut-off), classified by Gehrke, Frietsch, Neuhäusler, Rammer, and Leidmann (2010).
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Table 6.6: Low-innovation industries
WZ2008 Code Industry
8.1 Quarrying of stone, sand and clay
9 Mining support service activities (for petroleoum, natural gas
and other mining and quarrying)
16.1 Sawmilling and planing of wood
23.7 Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone
25.1 Manufacture of structural metal products
35.3 Steam and air conditioning supply
36 Water collection, treatment and supply
37 Sewerage
38.2 Waste treatment and disposal
39 Remediation activities and other waste management services
41.1 Development of building projects
43.9 Other specialised construction activities
45.1 Sale of motor vehicles
46.5 Wholesale of information and communication equipment
46.9 Non-specialised wholesale trade
47.3 Retail sale of automotive fuel in specialised stores
49.3 Other passenger land transport
49.4 Freight transport by road and removal services
50 Water transport (passenger and freight)
52.1 Warehousing and storage
53.2 Other postal and courier activities
56.1 Restaurants and mobile food service activities
59.2 Sound recording and music publishing activities
68.1 Buying and selling of own real estate
70.1 Activities of head offices
74.1 Specialised design activities
74.2 Photographic activities
78 Employment activities (employment placement and agency)
80 Security and investigation activities
81.1 Combined facilities support activities
81.3 Landscape service activities
82 Office administration, office support, and other business support
Notes: This table reports the industries with the lowest innovation activities, classified by Gehrke, Fri-
etsch, Neuhäusler, Rammer, and Leidmann (2013) using data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel.
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Table 6.9: Robustness checks for the firm survey results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OUTCOME Bank Bank Bank Demand Orders Demand
loans loans loans constraint backlog change
YEAR 2009 2009 2003 2003 2003 2003
Firm CB dep -0.393 -0.381 0.040 -0.119 0.184 -0.080
(0.185) (0.232) (0.367) (0.350) (0.292) (0.317)
Dep var from 2006 0.376
(0.084)
Observations 1,032 1.032 642 756 768 768
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Bin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ln age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates from OLS cross-sectional firm regressions for different years, using
data from the confidential ifo Business Expectations Panel. The outcome variables, the interpretation of
the coefficients, and standard error calculations are explained in Tables 5.3, 6.10, 6.11, and 6.12.
Table 6.10: Firm survey on product demand constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
YEAR 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Firm CB dep -0.191 -0.196 -0.076 -0.121 0.281 0.194
(0.121) (0.133) (0.148) (0.156) (0.175) (0.197)
Dep var from 2006 0.655 0.561 0.409 0.450 0.503 0.421
(0.032) (0.035) (0.034) (0.037) (0.044) (0.045)
Observations 980 991 1,032 945 856 808
R2 0.482 0.370 0.262 0.287 0.304 0.259
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Bin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ln age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates from OLS cross-sectional firm regressions for different years, using
data from the confidential ifo Business Expectations Panel. The outcome variable is the answer to the
question: “Are your business activities constrained by low demand or too few orders: yes or no?” It is
standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. The coefficients are interpreted as the standard devi-
ation increase in demand constraints from increasing Commerzbank dependence by one. The variables
are defined and the standard errors calculated as in Table 5.3.
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Table 6.11: Firm survey on the backlog of product orders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
YEAR 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Firm CB dep 0.108 0.119 0.025 0.051 0.048 -0.304
(0.105) (0.140) (0.155) (0.186) (0.160) (0.223)
Dep var from 2006 0.662 0.527 0.416 0.453 0.489 0.390
(0.028) (0.039) (0.045) (0.043) (0.041) (0.050)
Observations 914 910 919 852 802 737
R2 0.632 0.412 0.273 0.312 0.342 0.230
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Bin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ln age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates from OLS cross-sectional firm regressions for different years, using
data from the confidential ifo Business Expectations Panel. The outcome variable is the answer to the
question: “Currently we perceive our backlog of orders to be: comparatively large, sufficient / typical
for the season, or too small?” It is standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. The coefficients are
interpreted as the standard deviation increase in the backlog of orders from increasing Commerzbank
dependence by one. The variables are defined and the standard errors calculated as in Table 5.3.
Table 6.12: Firm survey on product demand changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
YEAR 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Firm CB dep 0.130 0.014 -0.008 -0.243 -0.050 -0.042
(0.151) (0.155) (0.192) (0.177) (0.169) (0.222)
Dep var from 2006 0.549 0.437 0.376 0.455 0.486 0.328
(0.054) (0.056) (0.057) (0.059) (0.064) (0.079)
Observations 914 910 919 852 802 736
R2 0.424 0.278 0.227 0.324 0.317 0.181
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Bin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ln age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates from OLS cross-sectional firm regressions for different years, using
data from the confidential ifo Business Expectations Panel. The outcome variable is the answer to
the question: “Tendencies in the previous month - The demand situation has: improved, remained
unchanged, or deteriorated?” The coefficients are interpreted as the standard deviation improvement in
the demand situation from increasing Commerzbank dependence by one. The variables are defined and
the standard errors calculated as in Table 5.3.
189
Table 6.13: Firm financial assets and Commerzbank dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES 2006-07 2007-09 2009-10 2007-09 2007-09
Firm CB dep -0.022 0.036 0.022 0.018 -0.040
(0.094) (0.092) (0.084) (0.068) (0.112)
Observations 1,816 1,816 1,816 1,816 1,816
R2 0.062 0.060 0.059 0.000 0.219
ln age Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Size Bin FE Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes No Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes No No
County FE No No No No Yes
Import and Export Share Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Notes: This table reports estimates from cross-sectional firm regressions. The outcome is the symmetric
growth rate of the value of the firm’s financial assets in the given period. If a firm begins and ends the
period with no financial assets, the growth rate is set to zero. The control variables and the standard
error calculations are the same as in Table 5.6.
Table 6.14: Loan growth and affected savings banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
Affected savings bank 0.080 0.031 0.083 0.045 0.080 0.078
(0.014) (0.066) (0.077) (0.009) (0.014) (0.017)
Savings bank -0.116 -0.088 -0.115 -0.116
(0.019) (0.013) (0.015) (0.019)
Loan growth 2003-05 0.015
(0.112)
Savings bank in BW or NRW 0.005
(0.016)
Observations 1,284 1,284 953 1,528 1,513 1,284
R2 0.005 0.023 0.025 0.005 0.008 0.005
State FE No Yes Yes Yes No No
Bank Type FE No Yes Yes Yes No No
Bank Size FE No Yes Yes Yes No No
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Notes: This table reports estimates from cross-sectional regressions of bank loan growth on a dummy for
affected savings banks. All outcomes are ln differences, except for column (5), which is the symmetric
growth rate. Affected is defined as owning a Landesbank with trading losses during the financial crisis.
Savings bank is a dummy for savings banks. Bank type FE are dummies for cooperative banks, real
estate banks, and commercial banks. Bank size FE are ten dummies for the deciles of the distribution of
the bank’s lending stock in 2006. The data are from Bankscope. Standard errors are robust.
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Table 6.17: Firm employment and other banks with trading losses (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Firm dep on banks with trading losses -0.028 -0.010
(0.011) (0.011)
Firm CB dep -0.050 -0.054
(0.016) (0.016)
Firm dep on other banks with trading losses (except CB) 0.019
(0.013)
Firm DtB dep 0.005
(0.018)
Observations 48,101 48,101 48,101 48,101
R2 0.000 0.019 0.019 0.019
Ln Age No Yes Yes Yes
Size Bin No Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes Yes Yes
Import and Export Share No Yes Yes Yes
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS
Notes: This table reports cross-sectional firm regressions. The outcome is ln employment growth be-
tween 2008 and 2012. The other banks with trading losses banks are the German banks, except Com-
merzbank, that held a large share of loss-making assets during the financial crisis, as listed in Table 1 of
Dwenger, Fossen, and Simmler (2015). For details, see 6.6. Standard errors are clustered at the level of
the firm.
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Table 6.18: County GDP and export dependence
Export-dependent*d -0.011
(0.008)
Export-dependent*d(2011) 0.012
(0.006)
Export-dependent*d(2012) 0.009
(0.007)
CB dep*d -0.138
(0.065)
Observations 5,005
R2 0.360
Number of counties 385
County FE Yes
Year FE Yes
Former GDR FE*d Yes
Industry Shares*d Yes
Population*d Yes
Pop density*d Yes
GDP per capita*d Yes
Debt Index*d Yes
Import Share*d Yes
Export Share*Linear Trend Yes
Landesbank in crisis*d Yes
Estimator OLS
Notes: This table reports estimates from county panel regressions. The outcome is ln GDP. Export-
dependent is a dummy variable for counties in the top quartile of the distribution of the average export
share (fraction of exports out of total revenue, averaged across firms in the county). d is a dummy for
the years following the lending cut, 2009 to 2012. d(2011) and d(2012) are dummies for the years 2011
and 2012 respectively. The control variables, weights, standard error calculations, the years covered by
the data, and the definition of R2 are explained in Table 5.8.
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Table 6.19: Firm employment and export dependence
Export-dependent*d -0.018
(0.012)
Export-dependent*d(2011) 0.020
(0.007)
Export-dependent*d(2012) 0.041
(0.010)
CB dep*d -0.052
(0.015)
Observations 12,066
R2 0.126
Number of firms 2,011
Firm FE Yes
Year FE Yes
ln age*d Yes
Size Bin FE*d Yes
Industry FE*d Yes
County FE*d Yes
Import Share*d Yes
Estimator OLS
Notes: This table reports estimates from firm panel regressions. The outcomes is ln employment.
Export-dependent is a dummy variable for firms in the top quartile of the distribution of the export
share. d is a dummy for the years following the lending cut, 2009 to 2012. d(2011) and d(2012) are
dummies for the years 2011 and 2012 respectively. The data include the years 2007 to 2012. The control
variables and the standard error calculations are the same as in Table 5.6.
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Table 6.20: Equity Extraction Elasticities by Home Improvement
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Last Mortgage for Home Improvement
Equity Extraction Elasticity 0.191 0.183 0.171 0.162
(0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014)
Observations 114,566 114,566 108,237 96,613
Panel B: Last Mortgage Not for Home Improvement
Equity Extraction Elasticity 0.213 0.198 0.189 0.184
(0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 553,200 553,200 524,513 470,038
Panel C: Purpose of Last Mortgage Unknown
Equity Extraction Elasticity 0.337 0.240 0.250 0.235
(0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Observations 716,580 716,580 678,984 606,975
Control Variables:
Month FE × × ×
Household FE × × ×
County x Year FE × ×
Household Controls ×
Notes: The table reports estimates of the equity extraction elasticity, splitting the estimation sample
by whether the last equity extraction decision was made for home improvements or not. Panel A con-
siders homeowners whose last refinance was for home improvements, Panel B considers homeowners
whose last refinance was not for home improvements, while panel C considers homeowners whose
last refinance purpose is missing in the data. Standard errors are clustered by household and shown
in parentheses. The household controls included in column (4) are income level, income growth, the
last mortgage interest rate, the age of the borrower, a dummy for couples, and dummies for the various
reasons for both the last and current refinance (pure refinance / home improvement / debt consolidation
/ other). The table shows that, across the different fixed effects specifications, the estimated elasticity is
quite stable across samples.
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Table 6.21: Further tests by firm opacity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome Employment Growth 1951-56
Commerzbank rel. 0.003 0.003 -0.020 -0.009
bank treated in 1952 (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.017)
Deutsche Bank rel. 0.001 -0.000 -0.025 -0.022
bank treated in 1952 (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011)
Dresdner Bank rel. 0.004 0.006 -0.003 -0.024
bank treated in 1952 (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.011)
Observations 1,177 1,177 301 295
R2 0.001 0.058 0.028 0.241
Controls*zone FE No Yes No Yes
Sample Not opaque Opaque
Notes: The outcome variables, regressors, control variables, and standard errors are explained in Tables
5.19 and 5.20. A firm is opaque if it has fewer than 50 employees in 1951, is younger than 10 years
old in 1952, or is in the bottom ten percent of industry asset tangibility (fixed tangible over total assets).
Standard errors are robust. The samples include only non-stock firms.
Table 6.22: Using 1940 relationship banks as treatment indicators
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employment Growth
Outcome 1949-51 1951-56 1949-51 1951-56
Rel. bank (as of 1940) 0.001 -0.001 0.027 -0.061
treated in 1952 (0.027) (0.010) (0.076) (0.014)
Observations 182 370 25 51
R2 0.374 0.157 0.175 0.338
Controls*zone FE Yes Yes No No
Basic Controls No No Yes Yes
Sample Not opaque Opaque
Notes: The outcomes are the average annual symmetric growth rates of employment in the given period.
(For instance, in column (1), the outcome is the symmetric growth rate from 1949 to 1951 divided by
2.) Relationship bank (as of 1940) treated in 1952 is a dummy for whether one of the firm’s 1940
relationship banks was treated in the first reform of 1952. A firm is opaque if it has fewer than 50
employees in 1951, is younger than 10 years old in 1952, or is in the bottom ten percent of industry
asset tangibility (fixed tangible over total assets). The small samples in columns (3) and (4) necessitate
the use of a basic set of controls, including a fixed effect for manufacturing firms, four fixed effects for
the firm’s employment in 1951 (1-49, 50-249, 250-999, 1000+ employees), and the natural logarithm
of the firm’s age. The controls*zone FE correspond to the standard control variables from Table 5.20.
They include the four employment bin fixed effects, 18 industry fixed effects, and the natural logarithm
of the firm’s age, all fully interacted with fixed effects for the Northern, Western, and Southern banking
zones that were in existence from 1952 to 1957. Standard errors are robust. The samples include only
non-stock firms.
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6.11 Appendix Figures
Figure 6.1: Commerzbank dependence across German counties in 2006
Hamburg
Duesseldorf
Frankfurt
Share of Bank
Relationships
with Commerzbank
1st Quartile: 1-7%
2nd Quartile: 7-11%
3rd Quartile: 11-16%
4th Quartile: 15-30%
Notes: This map illustrates the Commerzbank dependence of German counties in the year 2006. I mea-
sure Commerzbank dependence using a dataset of the year 2006 relationship banks of 112,344 German
firms. County Commerzbank dependence is the average of firm Commerzbank dependence for firms
with their head office in the county. Two insights emerge from the map. First, counties around the post-
war head offices Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, and Hamburg are more likely to depend on Commerzbank. Sec-
ond, the former GDR is more dependent on Commerzbank. The reason is that Commerzbank followed
a unique branch expansion strategy in the former GDR after German reunification in 1990 (Klein 1993).
The other German banks simply took over the pre-existing branch networks of the former GDR state
banks, while Commerzbank built up its own. The potential endogeneity resulting from Commerzbank’s
expansion in the former GDR is one of the motivations for the distance instrument.
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Figure 6.2: The lending cut to different categories of firms
Low productivity
High productivity
Tradable
Not tradable
Low innovation
Medium and high innovation
Under 50 Empl
50-1,500 Empl
Over 1,500 Empl
Old Dresdner dep
Old CB dep
Low county CB dep
High county CB dep
Low growth county 2006-2008
High growth county 2006-2008
Low growth county 2008-2010
High growth county 2008-2010
-.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2
Point estimate on firm CB dep*d
interacted with the listed category
Notes: This figure plots coefficients from several firm panel regressions. The outcome is firm ln bank
loans. Each color represents a different regression. The plotted point estimates are the coefficients on
dummies for the category listed on the left, interacted with firm CB dep*d. The horizontal lines are 95
percent confidence intervals. The red, vertical line represents the average effect of CB dep*d on ln bank
loans of -0.205. High (low) labor productivity is above (below) median 2006 valued added divided by
employment. Tradability and innovation intensity are defined in Section 1.7.1. Old Dresdner dep refers
to dependence on Dresdner Bank branches, which were then acquired and rebranded by Commerzbank.
High (low) county CB dep and county growth are defined as above (below) the median. The control
variables and the standard error calculations are the same as in column (4) of Table 5.4.
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Figure 6.3: Aggregate House Prices, Consumption, and Mortgage Debt
A: US House Prices vs Consumption B: UK House Prices vs Consumption
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C: US House Prices vs Mortgage Debt D: UK House Prices vs Mortgage Debt
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Notes: US house price data are from the Federal Reserve Economic Data, US consumption data are
from the BEA National Income and Product Accounts, and US mortgage debt data are from the US
Flow of Funds. UK house price data are from the Nationwide Index, UK consumption data are from the
ONS National Accounts, and UK mortgage debt data are from the Bank of England. All growth rates
are log differences multiplied by 100.
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Figure 6.4: Average Interest Rate Schedule in the UK (Notches)
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Notes: The figure shows the average mortgage interest rate in the UK (in %) as a step function of the
LTV ratio, with sharp jumps (notches) at LTVs of 60%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85%. The figure plots
coefficients (and confidence intervals) from a regression of the mortgage interest rate on dummies for
each 0.25%-bin of the LTV distribution. To each coefficient, we add a constant equal to the mean
predicted value of the interest rate from all the other covariates. The other covariates include non-
parametric controls for lender, contract duration (time until reset), month of refinance, mortgage type
(fixed interest rate / variable interest rate / capped interest rate / other), repayment type (interest only /
capital and interest / other), term length, reason for refinance, age, couple indicator, and income. The
figure is taken from Best, Cloyne, Ilzetzki, and Kleven (2015) and further details are provided there.
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Figure 6.5: The Explanatory Power of Mortgage Duration
A: Duration Explains Future Price Change
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B: Duration Does Not Explain Future Income
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Notes: Panel A plots distributions of residualized house price growth, with and without fixed effects for
the last contract duration choice (time until reset) interacted with month and county dummies. The panel
shows that past duration choices can explain a large part of the residual price variation (having already
absorbed fixed effect for household, month, and county x year). Panel B investigates if past duration
choices can also explain residual income variation and shows that it cannot. The fact that past duration
is able to predict house price growth, but not other determinants of borrowing such as income, makes it
useful for identifying the effects of house prices on borrowing.
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Figure 6.6: Alternative Specifications
A: From Logs to Levels
Marginal Propensity to Borrow = 0.11 (0.004)
Implied Elasticity = 0.18
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B: From House Prices to Housing Net Worth
Elasticity = 0.05 (0.001)
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Notes: The figure investigates if the previous results are affected by moving from a log-specification to
a level-specification (Panel A) and by moving from house prices to housing net worth as the explanatory
variable (Panel B). Apart from these changes, the figure is based on the previous fixed effects specifica-
tion (2.3) and the panels are constructed in the same way as Figure 5.17. The results are qualitatively
unaffected by the changes, but the alternative specifications are useful for obtaining different parame-
ters. Panel A yields an estimate of the marginal propensity to borrow (equal to 0.11), while Panel B
yields an estimate of the equity extraction elasticity with respect to housing net worth (equal to 0.05).
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Figure 6.7: Heterogeneity by LTV Non-Parametrically
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
Co
nd
itio
na
l E
qu
ity
 E
xt
ra
ct
io
n 
(lo
gs
)
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 38
House Price Change (logs)
0-60 60-80 80+
Notes: The figure plots average equity extraction in different bins of house price growth and in different
bins of pre-determined LTV. Pre-LTV is defined as the LTV ratio at time t absent any equity extrac-
tion/injection at time t and absent any house price growth between t and t − 1. The figure considers
three bins of pre-LTV: low leverage (0-60%), intermediate leverage (60-80%), and high leverage (above
80%). The dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by house-
hold. The figure shows that the level of equity extraction decreases with leverage, while the slope of
equity extraction with respect to house price growth increases with leverage. This is consistent with the
collateral channel.
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Figure 6.8: Distribution of the Change in Monthly Mortgage Payments
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Notes: The figure is based on a sample of households who are pulled down to a lower notch by house
price growth. It shows the distribution of the difference (in GBP) between the household’s current
monthly mortgage payments and previous monthly payments.
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Figure 6.9: Photograph of a page from the 1952 Handbuch der deutschen Aktienge-
sellschaften
Figure 6.10: Lending by the treated banks compared to all other banks
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Notes: The figure shows lending using all other German banks as untreated group. Figure 5.24 uses
the other commercial banks as untreated group. The data are for the December of the given year and
provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank.
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